

Anglo-American University
School of International Relations and Diplomacy

Political Discourse on Immigration in the Czech Republic:
A Critical Analysis

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Political Discourse on Immigration in the Czech Republic:
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Declaration of Consent and Statement of Originality

I hereby declare that no portion of the work referred to in this thesis has been submitted in support of an application for another degree, or qualification thereof, or for any other university or institute of learning.

I declare that this thesis is my independent work. All sources and literature are cited and included.

I also hereby acknowledge that my thesis will be made publicly available pursuant to Section 47b of Act No. 552/2005 Coll. and AAU's internal regulations.

26 August 2015

Vendula Ženatá

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ABSTRACT

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by

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The scale of human tragedy on Europe's doorstep appears to have greatly affected the urgency of language with which it is discussed in Europe's living room. With “refugee crisis” having turned into a “mega-crisis” and “immigration waves” having developed into “tsunamis,” there is little doubt that these developments have been reflected in the wider public discourse. Whether they take root or not, these labels play a role in a particular construction of the situation at hand and may have very real effects.

In the Czech Republic, topics related to migration have been recently increasingly surrounded by an atmosphere of fear, which has re-kindled ethnic and religious intolerance and contributed towards the dehumanization of immigrants and refugees. However, these developments are problematic not only because they incite xenophobic attitudes. They also influence the overall discourse and thus limit the legitimate options available to us in dealing with immigration and related matters, having real impact on the limits of possibility for actual policies.

Reflecting the larger public discourse on one hand and serving as an arena where diverse meanings are offered, contested and shaped, on the other, discourses employed by political actors in a democratic setting are particularly worthy of attention. Drawing inspiration from Critical Discourse Analysis, the aim of this thesis, titled “Political Discourse on Immigration in the Czech Republic: A Critical Analysis,” is to analyze the political discourse on immigration. Studying how political actors construct and legitimize their stance on immigration is essential in pointing attention to how language is used to express and reproduce underlying social representations of “Others.”

In order to capture both the depth and the width of the Czech political discourse, this thesis proceeds in two parts. A detailed analysis of individual political parties' communication constitutes the first. Allowing the depth of the parties' communication to be revealed, it provides not only a detailed insight into the parties' positions on immigration and asylum policy, but also outlines how they conceive of the in-group in relation to the out-group and

the way these and related issues feed into the parties' wider conceptions of belonging, how these are constructed and legitimized.

The second part brings these insights together and through identifying patterns across the respective parties' discourses sets out to map the landscape of the overall Czech political discourse on immigration. Taking a larger perspective, its aim is to sketch out the most important features and tendencies of the immigration discourse and bring attention to the underlying assumptions that inform it.

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1 Introduction

As a result of the conduct of politicians, media outlets, and numerous other actors—conduct that is both overt and covert; purposeful, as well as haphazard, topics related to migration have been in the Czech public discourse increasingly surrounded by an atmosphere of fear, which has re-kindled ethnic and religious intolerance and thus contributed not only towards the confirmation of the existence of “the Others” as a category of people distinct from “us” (most often defined as ethnic Czechs) but also towards their dehumanization. The use of distorted, stereotypical portrayals which reduce the complexity of the issue in my view constitutes the main feature of this tendency—and the main concern that informs this work. Necessarily impoverishing the variety of viewpoints, it likely affects the immigration discourse and, through reproducing particular social representations, influences the limits for legitimate or feasible political action in the Czech Republic, as well as at the level of the European Union (EU).

This thesis sets out to explore the political discourse¹ on immigration.² In democratic politics, political discourse is where larger public discourses should be not only reflected, but also challenged and negotiated. The political discourse thus provides an insight into the extent to which the topic of immigration and asylum may be legitimately discussed. A political campaign in particular offers a valuable opportunity to study political discourse; it may be understood as an arena where the entire spectrum of competing political opinions and underlying discourses is simultaneously presented by its proponents. The aim of this thesis is to explore the role of political parties in representing the wider (political) immigration discourse—assuming that the depth and width of the political parties' discourse further influences the richness of the overall immigration discourse in the Czech Republic. The research question addressed in this thesis therefore is the following:

How have Czech political parties, through their construction of immigration, contributed to the Czech discourse on immigration?

In order to explore both the depth of the discourse, as well as capture its main

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- 1 Generally, the term “political discourse” is in this thesis employed to denote the discourse of those political parties studied in this thesis. It is considered to be a part of, and largely influencing, a wider political discourse in which other political actors participate. The political parties' discourse during election campaign is the focus of this thesis, because it is assumed that in democratic politics, the campaign captures the spectrum of all politically viable immigration discourses (for more information, please see the chapter on Methodology).
 - 2 In the course of the thesis, the word “immigration” is generally used to denote the movement of people from countries outside of the European Union into the EU member states, without distinguishing between their motivations to come, or the EU members' criteria for their legitimate stay. Unless specified (such as by the referring to asylum, asylum-seekers/refugees, or asylum policy specifically), the words “immigration” and “immigrants” are thus used in their widest possible sense as referring to (the movement of) all non-EU nationals coming to the EU.

tendencies, the thesis has two aims. First, it is to provide an analysis of the communication of individual political parties that outlines their discourse in detail. The second aim, drawing on observations from the in-depth analysis, is to map the patterns in the immigration discourse of the political parties and describe its larger tendencies.

The analysis is built upon data collected on the occasion of the 2014 election to the European Parliament. Particularly, political parties' and their candidates' communication of immigration and related issues over the course of the political campaign served as the input for analysis.

The thesis is organized in the following way. The chapter on methodology outlines my ontological presupposition, the theoretical approaches that have influenced my epistemological approach and the particular method employed in the analysis. Importantly, it clarifies how the nexus of constructivist ontology, and the Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) research program that served as an inspiration for my work gave rise to the interdisciplinary approach employed in this work.

The following chapter devoted to the analysis itself is divided into two subchapters that correspond with the two research aims mentioned above. The first chapter includes a detailed analysis of individual political parties' discourses on immigration and related matters. It provides not only a detailed insight into the parties' positions on immigration and asylum policy, but also outlines how they conceive of the in-group in relation to the out-group and the way these and related issues feed into the parties' wider conceptions of belonging, how these are constructed and legitimized. The second chapter brings these insights together and through the identification of patterns across the individual parties' discourses maps the landscape of the overall Czech political discourse on immigration. Taking a larger perspective, it describes the most important features and tendencies of the immigration discourse and brings attention to the underlying assumptions that inform it.

In the last chapter, the most notable features of the Czech political discourse are discussed and potential directions for further research outlined.

2 Methodology

The aim of this section is to outline my ontological and epistemological presuppositions and indicate how they are reflected in the various influences that informed my approach and the method employed in this study. What motivates this effort above all is transparency with regard to the choices made in approaching the case at hand in this particular way.

The starting point of my work is constructivist ontology. My approach to exploring the immigration discourse has been largely influenced by the Critical Discourse Analysis research program and as such employs interpretivist epistemology. Besides outlining the basic tenets of CDA, and briefly introducing the empirical and theoretical work that inspired my approach in particular, this section describes the individual steps taken in the process of analysis.

2.1 Ontology and Epistemology

Underlying my ontological presupposition is “the idea that truth [is] made rather than found;”³ in other words—and perhaps more generally—the rejection of the objectivist assertion that “social phenomena and their meanings have an existence that is independent of social actors.”⁴ This approach does not rule out that “the world is out there” (indeed, as Rorty points out, “most things in space and time are the effects of causes which do not include human mental states”); it merely asserts that our understanding and descriptions of them in no way accurately represent the world in itself.⁵ No objects, understandings and descriptions, including our interests and identities, “could constitute themselves as objects outside of any discursive condition of emergence.”⁶ They are rather socially constituted (or constructed) by actors that are inherently social; they are the “products of inter-subjective social structures.”⁷ This is so, I assume, because no actors can be situated outside of a certain social, normative and linguistic context—though it is contingent,⁸ it necessarily “shapes who they are and the possibilities available to them.”⁹

A particular understanding of language is implied in this ontology that plays an essential role in this account of the social world. First, language is nominalist—it is a purely

3 Rorty, *Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity*. 3.

4 Grix, *The Foundations of Research*. 61.

5 Rorty, *Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity*. 4-5

6 Dunne, Kurki, and Smith, *International Relations Theories*. 216

7 Burchill, *Theories of International Relations*. 217

8 I consider contingency to be the result of what may from a larger historical perspective be considered haphazard power relations.

9 Dunne, Kurki, and Smith, *International Relations Theories*. 170.

human invention, a medium that bears no objective correspondence to the phenomena it signifies.¹⁰ It is a set of metaphors. Its aim is not to describe “how things *really* are” or bring us “closer to the truth/reality,” because it is impossible to escape language(s) to find “a criterion [of choice between alternative metaphors¹¹] [that would] tell us which vocabularies have this desirable feature.”¹² In other words, we are not availed with a way to decide which metaphor is superior due to being closer to the truth. As a result, what we are left with is merely the possibility of comparing various languages (vocabularies), or sets of metaphors, with one another, without not being able to establish a “fact” beyond language.¹³

Second, and following from language's nominalism, is its contingency; metaphors are constantly dying off and new ones are being reinvented.¹⁴ In this regard, our language and culture, as anything else, can be thought of as “something that took shape as a result of a great number of contingencies.”¹⁵ In this regard, Foucault looks beyond these contingencies and stresses “the operations of power” that give rise to them.¹⁶ From this perspective, the human being is also the result of these contingent operations of power—“there is no 'universal person'” and there is also “no 'human nature' shared by all members of the species—the nature of individuals, their humanity, is produced by certain power structures.”¹⁷

This ontology thus implies that nothing is given—because all meanings are human creations that can be re-created through inter-subjective processes, implying a possibility for change, or emancipation (as such, the approach/critique derived from this ontology is also inherently ethical¹⁸). The resulting approach is in opposition to the idea that “what is” can be directly known based on the idea that “sensory experience provides the only legitimate source of knowledge.”¹⁹

The three empiricist assumptions that gave rise to the positivist account of science that stands in contrast to the interpretivist epistemology are the following. First, it is epistemic realism, the idea that the external world not only exists “out there” but has a meaning that is “independent of anything the observer does.”²⁰ Second, the assumption of a universal scientific language refers to the view that the external world can be “described in a language that does not presuppose anything,” one that is value-free and allows the observer

10 Rorty, *Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity*. 9-10

11 Ibid. 20

12 Ibid. 5-8

13 Ibid. 20

14 Ibid. 16

15 Ibid. 16

16 Dunne, Kurki, and Smith, *International Relations Theories*. 215.

17 Ibid. 215.

18 Ibid. 214

19 Ibid. 208

20 Ibid. 208

or the scientist to be detached and objective.²¹ Third, in stark contrast to the nominalist view of language, is the correspondence theory of truth, the idea that the observer can accurately describe the world and his/her statements are “true if they correspond to the facts and false if they do not.”²² The analysis, however, is untenable, if “facts,” as any “truths,” are asserted to be socially constituted, and are therefore contingent representations. In this view, facts or truths are no more than “a property of sentences.”²³

This view of language does not allow us to “get 'behind' language and 'ground' knowledge in the world itself”²⁴ and thus implies an anti-foundationalist view—the idea that “the world [does not exist] independently of our knowledge about it, but rather [that] 'reality' is socially and discursively 'constructed' by human actors.”²⁵ As a result of this view, the relationship between the subject and object is also transformed in the post-empiricist perspective; they are not pre-given and opposed, but rather construct one another.²⁶ “This undermining of the separation of subjects and objects,” Campbell writes, “means any claim to knowledge that relies on dichotomies analogous to the subject/object dualism (e.g. facts against values, objective knowledge versus subjective prejudice, or empirical observation in contrast to normative concerns) 'is [...] epistemologically unwarranted.’”²⁷

This anti-foundational ontology highlights the importance of our preoccupation with interpretation and its “importance [...] to being human,”²⁸ or, put differently, the need to *denaturalize* our notions of facts and their relationship to language, often assumed to be neutral. In the realm of science and the manner in which it is pursued, this ontological presupposition challenges the positivist approach and leads us to rethink our “common sense” assumptions, as well as what it means to be “objective” in scientific endeavors.²⁹ This ontology, as well as its epistemological implications, can in fact be understood to be providing a “deep” critique of the positivist account of science. Any epistemology taking this critique into account “has to be concerned with the social constitution of meaning, the linguistic construction of reality, and the historicity of knowledge [‘the historical production of knowledge in socio-cultural structures and, hence, the refutation of the idea of universal/timeless knowledge,’³⁰ or what Rorty and others would name 'contingency' of

21 Ibid. 208

22 Ibid. 208

23 Rorty, *Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity*. 21

24 Dunne, Kurki, and Smith, *International Relations Theories*. 209

25 Grix, *The Foundations of Research*. 64

26 Dunne, Kurki, and Smith, *International Relations Theories*. 209

27 Ibid. 209

28 Ibid. 209

29 Ibid. 209

30 Ibid. 214.

history and therefore also knowledge]. This reaffirms the indispensability of interpretation, and if we look beyond it, suggests that all knowledge involves a relationship with power in its mapping of the world.”³¹

2.2 Social World: Stable Or Fluid?

The constructivist ontology necessarily gives rise to inquiries related to the matter of change in a world that's socially constituted, which is related to the existing structures' degree of stability. This section is concerned with the possibility of studying social world that is characterized by change and its implications for the analysis.

Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde undertook to occupy themselves with this matter with regard to the analytical framework of Securitization they proposed under the larger critical security research umbrella (described below). They argued that even though the social world is socially constructed, “[this] construction in the security realm is sufficiently stable over the long run” and thus “can be treated as objective.”³² “Even the socially constituted,” they write, “is often sedimented as structure and becomes so relatively stable as practice that one must do analysis also on the basis that it continues, using one's understanding of the social construction of security not only to criticize this fact but also to understand the dynamics of security and thereby maneuver them.”³³

Fierke provides an insight regarding the reasons behind the relative stability of the social world—without doing away with its “roots in the linguistic turn.”³⁴ He proposes that between the extremes of understanding language as a “mirror” (associated with strictly positivist epistemology) and as an “interpretation” (associated with interpretive epistemology), we may also conceive of language and action as “rule-based” and guided by norms.³⁵ That is, social actors *may* be involved in (re-)interpretation (or in Rorty's vocabulary “redescription”), ultimately influencing and altering social structures that have previously been perceived—and reacted to—as ones that are more regular, and therefore followed and upheld.³⁶ However, this need not be the case: Fierke indicates that being “fundamentally social,” language is something we are socialized into through a process that involves more than the learning of certain words; through this process, we learn “how to act in the world—what it means to promise, threaten, and lie, the types of context in which the speech acts are

31 Ibid. 209-210.

32 Collins, *Contemporary Security Studies*. 62

33 Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde, *Security*. 34-5

34 Dunne, Kurki, and Smith, *International Relations Theories*. 175

35 Ibid. 175

36 Ibid. 175-6

appropriate or meaningful, or even what it means to formulate a hypothesis, vote, or deploy a missile. Language use is part of acting in the world.”³⁷ With that in mind, it seems to be reasonable to propose that to some extent, depending on the sphere within which we operate, the socialization process produces what could be called “sticky” interpretations, to use the language of economists, which are—at the societal level—somewhat inertial.

In fact, Rorty also differentiates between the individual/private vocabulary (that is “necessarily private, unshared, unsuited to argument”) and the public vocabulary (“[t]he vocabulary of justice [that] is necessarily public and shared, a medium for argumentative exchange”) as two kinds of tools that are, in his view, ultimately incommensurable.³⁸ Rorty urges us to “drop the demand for a theory which unifies the public and the private [vocabularies],”³⁹ because these are to a large extent irrelevant to one another. Even though he sketches out how private metaphors may “catch on”—become relevant for other people (the public sphere and its vocabulary) and possibly enrich it, Rorty ultimately concludes that this process is long-term and essentially contingent: “[T]o put the point in Heidegger's way, 'language speaks man,' languages change in the course of history, and so human beings cannot escape their historicity. *The most they can do is to manipulate the tensions within their own epoch in order to produce the beginnings of the next epoch* [marked by an altered vocabulary] (emphasis added).”⁴⁰

According to Rorty, the cross-fertilization between someone's private vocabulary and the public vocabulary is possible: “poetic, artistic, philosophical, scientific, or *political* progress results from the accidental coincidence of a private obsession with a public need (emphasis added).”⁴¹ Importantly, however, this process depends on multiple factors beyond the control of any one individual or a group of people; it is very long-term and essentially contingent. Though Rorty introduces this idea without an ambition to develop its epistemological implications, his view seems to be consistent with the assertion that in the short run, the language/vocabulary shared at the societal level (the “public language”) is stable (in fact, Rorty would likely argue even for a more long-run “stickiness”).

The major advantage of this epistemological approach is that, in allowing us to treat the public vocabulary as stable over a certain period of time, it enables us to analyze the social world within a given social and historical context. Considering the, with regard to the temporal scope, limited ambitions of this thesis, it appears reasonable to assume that within

37 Ibid. 175

38 Rorty, *Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity*. xiv

39 Ibid. xv

40 Ibid. 50

41 Ibid. 37

the studied period of time, the social world can be treated as sufficiently stable.

In this regard, the view of “conventional constructivists” that “identity is something to be *discovered* or *unearthed* through analysis (emphasis added)”⁴² is at odds with the approach employed in this work. The stability of collective identities has in fact been the object of debate between the Copenhagen School and McSweeney,⁴³ who argued that rather than being fixed, identity is “fluid and contingent, stemming from the discursive constructions of an only *imagined* community (emphasis in the original).”⁴⁴ I believe that identities—as a category particularly relevant to the study of “us” vs the “Other” and their implications for politics of exclusion—are subject to alteration in-line of years, rather than decades; that is, in my view, identity is more of a *narrative* than a *fact of life*. Though in this thesis, I attempt to take a snapshot of the discourse (and the existing identities) at a “frozen’ moment in time,” I hope it could serve as an input for researching identity dynamics—potentially as a basis for social change and corresponding policy-making.⁴⁵ My concern thus resonates with that of the so-called “critical constructivists”—I would like to provide insight into “how narratives of national identity [with regard to immigration and the narratives of immigration itself] become dominant” as part of the more general effort of exploring of “how they [these ideas] help set the limits for legitimate or feasible political action in [a] particular [setting] and [a] particular [time].”⁴⁶

I am concerned with the discourses employed by political actors precisely because I believe they are important in shaping the collective identity of the in-group in relation to the social representations of the out-group and thus in setting the *limits of possibility* for actual policies. The shift in immigration discourse that has taken place between the concerned May 2014 election and the time of the writing of the thesis a little more than a year later have played an important role in convincing me that change in discourse (if not the social world at large, including identities) is perhaps more possible than we may think.

2.3 Understanding Discourse

Because of the role of language in the constructive-interpretive account of the world and approaches, the interpretivist epistemology is largely preoccupied with discourse, generally understood as “a specific series of *representations and practices* through which meanings are produced, identities constituted, social relations established, and *political and*

42 Williams, *Security Studies*. 66.

43 Burgess, *The Routledge Handbook of New Security Studies*. 86.

44 Collective, “Critical Approaches to Security in Europe.” 453.

45 Burgess, *The Routledge Handbook of New Security Studies*. 88.

46 Williams, *Security Studies*. 66

ethical outcomes made more or less possible (emphases added).⁴⁷ The constructivist ontology is not meant to imply that the phenomenal world does not exist independent of thought, but it does imply the impossibility of an observation that would be language-independent.⁴⁸ No object can thus be constituted “[...] outside of any discursive condition of emergence.”⁴⁹

Discourse includes both the material and the ideal (it should not be understood as something that is merely used to *describe* objects; it *constitutes* both subjects and objects).⁵⁰ As such, it is not limited to linguistic representations; other modes of representations include the aesthetic and pictorial, which also constitute practices through which we try to understand the world.⁵¹

As indicated above, discourses are *performative* in the sense that “they constitute the objects of which we speak.”⁵² “For example,” Campbell explains,

states are made possible by a wide range of discursive practices that include immigration policies, military deployments and strategies, cultural debates about normal social behaviour, political speeches, and economic investments. The meanings, identities, social relations, and political assemblages that are enacted in these performances combine the ideal and the material. As a consequence, the appreciation that discourses are performative moves us away from a reliance on the idea of (social) *construction* towards *materialization*, whereby discourse 'stabilizes over time to produce the effect of a boundary, fixity, and surface' (emphasis in the original).⁵³

Though discourses tend to be “sticky,” this is not to mean that change is not possible, quite the contrary—the social world is constantly changing, though the scope of change varies (and is greatly contested). Critical researchers suggest we can—and should—actively work towards challenging the power structures that give rise to discourses in order to positively influence it (achieve emancipation). What is implied in this account is a Foucauldian understanding of power.

2.4 Understanding Power

Assuming the social world is “not determined by the 'nature' of things,” it is important to denaturalize it; look into how it has become what it is (at this point in time, to us or some other collectivity).⁵⁴ Involving power relations, this gap exposed by the constructivist approach needs to be explored, basically amounting to an analysis of underlying power

47 Dunne, Kurki, and Smith, *International Relations Theories*. 216.

48 Guzzini, “A Reconstruction of Constructivism in International Relations.” 159.

49 Dunne, Kurki, and Smith, *International Relations Theories*. 216.

50 Ibid. 216-7.

51 Ibid. 216.

52 Ibid. 216.

53 Ibid. 216-7.

54 Guzzini, “A Reconstruction of Constructivism in International Relations.” 150.

relations that shape the social world.

In the context of the constructivist research tradition, power is not understood in the “fairly narrow and usually materialist way” that refers to capacities.⁵⁵ It is conceived as a “social structure rather than an interactive relationship in which somebody establishes her will against others.”⁵⁶ It refers to how the invisible conditions that allow for certain action are structured: “[A]lthough it is 'we' who impose meaning, 'we' do not act as autonomous subjects but from a 'subject position' made available by the discursive context in which we are situated [which is in turn shaped by power relations].”⁵⁷

This understanding of power links the social construction of meaning, including knowledge, with social reality.⁵⁸ In other words, meaning construction is a matter of power. The power relations underlying discourse “[refer] to a structure of domination and subordination in which meanings and interpretations impose themselves on the subjects by defining how certain problems are to be viewed and which questions are to be asked.”⁵⁹

2.5 Critical Discourse Analysis

Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) research program, which shares the constructive-interpretive account of the world and involves a “critical perspective on doing scholarship”⁶⁰ has been a major source of inspiration for this work. As Wodak notes, CDA “has never been and has never attempted to be or to provide one single or specific theory. Neither is one specific methodology characteristic of research in CDA. Quite the contrary, studies in CDA are multifarious, derived from quite different theoretical backgrounds, oriented towards very different data and methodologies.”⁶¹ Problem-oriented, it is rather a heterogenous, umbrella-like and often multidisciplinary approach that is characterized by a plurality of methods and eclecticism.⁶² I outline the common ground shared by CDA researchers in the following section.

2.5.1 Discourse as Social Practice

CDA understands language as “social practice”⁶³ and “considers the ‘context of language use’ to be crucial.”⁶⁴ As is enshrined in one of the principles of CDA offered by

55 Ibid. 170.

56 Thomas Risse, “Social Constructivism Meets Globalization.” 14.

57 Ibid. 7.

58 Guzzini, “A Reconstruction of Constructivism in International Relations.” 170.

59 Thomas Risse, “Social Constructivism Meets Globalization.” 14.

60 Meyer and Wodak, *Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis*. 95-96.

61 Wodak, “Aspects of Critical Discourse Analysis.” 6.

62 Meyer and Wodak, *Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis*. 95-96.

63 Wodak, “Aspects of Critical Discourse Analysis.” 7.

64 Wodak and Meyer, *Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis*. 5.

Fairclough and Wodak, discourse “constitute[s] society and culture, and is constituted by them.”⁶⁵ They define it in the following way:

CDA sees discourse—language use in speech and writing—as a form of ‘social practice’. Describing discourse as social practice implies a dialectical relationship between a particular discursive event and the situation(s), institution(s) and social structure(s), which frame it: The discursive event is shaped by them, but it also shapes them. That is, discourse is socially constitutive as well as socially conditioned—it constitutes situations, objects of knowledge, and the social identities of and relationships between people and groups of people. It is constitutive both in the sense that it helps to sustain and reproduce the social status quo, and in the sense that it contributes to transforming it. Since discourse is so socially consequential, it gives rise to important issues of power. Discursive practices may have major ideological effects – that is, they can help produce and reproduce unequal power relations between (for instance) social classes, women and men, and ethnic/cultural majorities and minorities through the ways in which they represent things and position people.⁶⁶

In short, discourses are seen as “relatively stable uses of language serving the organization and structuring social life (emphasis added).”⁶⁷ Therefore, though CDA researchers are interested in critically analyzing, challenging and changing the prevalent discourses, these are characterized by a degree of momentum sustained by existing power relations. In this work, when I approach individual “texts,” or, more generally the political parties’ “communication,” I aim to map and describe the “structured forms of knowledge and the memory of social practices” (discourse) through systematically analyzing a “snapshot” of a set of individual oral utterances and written (as well as visual) documents at a particular point in time⁶⁸ in the Czech Republic.⁶⁹ The aim of my work is to map the political discourse on immigration to get insight into how political actors use language to constitute, sustain and legitimize their stance on immigration, map the underlying ideology mediated by this language, and point to the relations of power that sustain the resulting status quo.

2.5.2 Ideology

As Fairclough stated in one of his principles of CDA, “[d]iscourse is shaped by relations of power and invested with ideologies.”⁷⁰ By ideology, CDA does not mean the conventional conception, but

rather the more hidden and latent type of everyday beliefs, which often appear disguised as conceptual metaphors and analogies, thus attracting linguists’ attention: life is a journey, social organizations are plants, love is war, and so on [...]. In daily

65 “Basic Tenets and Critiques of Critical Discourse Analysis - University of Strathclyde.” 6.

66 Wodak and Meyer, *Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis*. 5-6.

67 Ibid. 6.

68 As discourses are sedimented to some extent, I believe it would be plausible to say that in this work, I captured a snapshot of political discourse on immigration in the Czech Republic of the first half of 2014 at minimum.

69 Wodak and Meyer, *Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis*. 6.

70 “Basic Tenets and Critiques of Critical Discourse Analysis - University of Strathclyde.”

discussion, *certain ideas arise more commonly than others*. Frequently, people with diverse backgrounds and interests may find themselves thinking alike in startling ways. Dominant ideologies appear as ‘neutral’, holding on to assumptions that stay largely unchallenged (emphasis added).⁷¹

Ideology is thus a certain belief system that is ever-present, underlying our perception of the social world. In its concern with ideology, CDA aims to reveal the “implicit assumptions” that “are no longer seen as questionable, [but] as a simple matter of fact” in order to challenge them because they close the social reality to alternatives to the status quo.⁷² Particularly, “the functioning of ideologies in everyday life [often manifested in language use] [is what] intrigues CDA researchers.”⁷³

Ideologies CDA researchers are interested in can therefore be thought of, in Dijk's definition, as certain “‘worldviews’ that constitute ‘social cognition’: ‘schematically organized complexes of representations and attitudes with regard to certain aspects of the social world, e.g. schema [...] whites have about blacks.’”⁷⁴ In this thesis, I aim to uncover these worldviews related to immigration and immigrants, because in my view, they contribute, through particular language forms, towards perpetuating negative public opinion and, at the individual level, prejudices—which in democratic societies further serve as an input in shaping actual decision-making and policies. I believe challenging this practice (through “de-naturalizing” the language involved) may positively influence people's perception of this matter, the debates on this issue and, in turn, also policy-making.

2.5.3 Power

The functioning of ideologies as understood by CDA and the social institutions they give rise to is thus sustained by power, “a central condition in social life.”⁷⁵ However, arising from the constructivist understanding of power, “it is not the individual resources and not the specifics of single-exchange situations that are crucial for CDA analyses, but the *overall structural features in social fields or in overall society* (emphasis added).”⁷⁶ This particular understanding of power and concern for its effects therefore leads CDA researchers investigate the linguistic manifestations of power in larger social contexts, i.e. to study discourse rather than isolated utterances.

It is thus the constructivist ontology that may be thought of as compelling us to

71 Wodak and Meyer, *Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis*. 8.

72 “Basic Tenets and Critiques of Critical Discourse Analysis - University of Strathclyde.”

73 Wodak and Meyer, *Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis*.

74 Ibid. 8.

75 Wodak, “Aspects of Critical Discourse Analysis.” 10.

76 Wodak and Meyer, *Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis*. 10.

recognize that our current condition is not inevitable. We construct the world we live in by giving meaning to it. Yet there is no single, ultimate, truth, but rather a variety of ideologies that create conditions which benefit some as opposed to others and create inequalities in the process. Power is thus, in the Foucauldian tradition, understood as “a systemic and constitutive element/characteristic of society.”⁷⁷ Relations of difference are manifested in the ongoing struggle for meaning, which is constantly being renegotiated through the medium of language. For CDA researchers, power and language are thus inseparable:

The constant unity of language and other social matters ensures that language is entwined in social power in a number of ways: language indexes and expresses power, and is involved where there is contention over and a challenge to power. Power does not necessarily derive from language, but language can be used to challenge power, to subvert it, to alter distributions of power in the short and the long term. Language provides a finely articulated vehicle for differences in power in hierarchical social structures.⁷⁸

2.5.4 The Critical Impetus⁷⁹

CDA research employs a critical perspective on doing scholarship; it may be thought of, as Dijk says, as “discourse analysis 'with an attitude.’”⁸⁰ As other critical theorists, CDA researchers aim to produce not only enlightenment, but also emancipation. They refuse to accept the status quo as a fact of life, but rather uncover the underlying power relations that make it possible—an attitude that arises from their constructivist ontology. They are especially interested in “critically analyz[ing] the language use of those in power,”⁸¹ because language is where “structural relationships of dominance, discrimination, power and control” are manifested.⁸² CDA thus aims to address social problems

from a perspective that is consistent with the best interests of dominated groups [...] and supports their struggle against inequality. That is, CDA research combines [this] with an attitude of opposition and dissent against those who abuse text and talk in order to establish, confirm or legitimate their abuse of power. Unlike much other scholarship, CDA does not deny but explicitly defines and defends its own sociopolitical position. That is, CDA is biased—and proud of it.⁸³

CDA researchers thus not only generally see the practical application of their findings as important.⁸⁴ Besides recognizing the political nature of their work, they also have to recognize the various social, political and economic influences that motivate their work (as

77 Ibid. 9.

78 Ibid. 10.

79 Ibid.

80 Meyer and Wodak, *Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis*. 96.

81 Wodak, “Aspects of Critical Discourse Analysis.” 10.

82 Wodak and Meyer, *Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis*.

83 Meyer and Wodak, *Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis*. 96.

84 Wodak, “Aspects of Critical Discourse Analysis.” 9.

any other endeavor). As van Leeuwen formulated it, “[n]aming oneself ‘critical’ only implies superior ethical standards: an intention to make their position, research interests and values explicit and their criteria as transparent as possible, without feeling the need to apologize for the critical stance of their work.”⁸⁵

Commitment to Emancipation

What motivates this work is my concern with how in the Czech Republic we talk about immigration and related matters. As a result of the conduct of numerous politicians, media outlets, and various other actors—conduct that is both overt and covert; deliberate, as well as “merely” careless—topics related to migration have been in the Czech public discourse increasingly surrounded by an atmosphere of fear, which has re-kindled ethnic and religious intolerance and thus contributed not only towards the confirmation of the existence of “the Others” as a category of people distinct from “us,”⁸⁶ but also towards their dehumanization. The use of distorted, stereotypical portrayals which reduce the complexity of the issue in my view constitutes the main feature of this tendency. However, their existence as such is not as disquieting as the fact that at the societal level, they do not have a forceful argumentative counter-weight (or, even better, counter-weights) that would challenge these representations and propose a dissenting account which would be present a viable alternative.

I oppose these developments because in my view, they have profoundly negative effects on our society: on people's perception and values at the individual level, on the foundations that underlie our collective identity, on the democratic political order and the policies it gives rise to. This manipulative rhetoric is in my view despicable not only because it incites xenophobic attitudes. Importantly, the absence of a strong voice that would decidedly challenge it enables these attitudes to take root in our discourse and thus limits the legitimate options available to us in dealing with immigration—as well as other matters. Through limiting the scope of possible action, this has negative implications for the quality of democratic policy-making. If certain issues cannot be discussed outside the atmosphere of fear, they cannot be discussed rationally; if there is little opposition to the prevalent discourse, the prevalent discourse dictates how we conceive of these issues, limiting the variety of tools available to us in dealing with the matter.

I believe that the immigration discourse currently prevalent in the Czech Republic, as well as its negative effects, are not inevitable. The aim of this thesis is to *map, de-naturalize, and challenge* how we tend to speak about immigration, bringing attention to the political

⁸⁵ Wodak and Meyer, *Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis*. 7.

⁸⁶ Now often defined as the “decent,” ethnically Czech, citizens.

interests behind it. I hope that this work will contribute towards opening up the discussion of these matters, making space for politics—and policies—that are more *democratic* and founded on the values of *tolerance* and *respect* for people regardless of where they come from.

2.6 My Path Towards This Project

The aim of this section is to briefly describe my path towards this work in its current form and shed light on its interdisciplinary nature in the process—particularly the reasons behind studying the micro-foundations of policy-making on immigration.

2.6.1 Securitization of Migration: The Role of Political Representatives

Perceiving the framing of migration in security language as problematic from the perspective of truly democratic policy-making, my original plan was to study the securitization of migration (developed in greater detail in the section on Critical Security Studies). Particularly, I intended to explore how political representatives, through their discursive practices in the realm of the “normal haggling of [democratic] politics”⁸⁷ at the national level, contribute towards this process—or undermine this tendency. However, as I started to explore the political discourse and the literature on the securitization of migration in Europe, I gained the impression that the structure of the EU institutional framework already in place has played a crucial role in this process—and that the political discourse has, at this stage in the Europeanization of migration policy, a relatively small impact on constituting securitized practices. The political decision to Europeanize migration policy in a way that “directly securitized migration by integrating [it] into an internal security framework that defines and regulates security issues following the abolition of internal border control”⁸⁸ has already been made. Political discourse thus today rather reflects and, undoubtedly also sustains this approach, but a variety of other actors currently play a crucial role in the securitization of migration and asylum. As Huysmans and Buonfino write, “administrative rules are central to the practical regulation of this executive-oriented policy area. The competition and relations between various security professionals are equally important for the securitisation of migration and asylum.”⁸⁹

Not only has this policy area already been Europeanized in this particular way—making other actors besides politicians play a significant role in sustaining the securitization

87 Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde, *Security*. 29.

88 Huysmans, “The European Union and the Securitization of Migration.” 770.

89 Huysmans and Buonfino, “Politics of Exception and Unease.” 767.

of this field through its administration. Securitized language is only one aspect of the discursive practices that shape how immigration and asylum related issues are discussed in democratic politics. A broader perspective is necessary in order to get insight into the complexity of the immigration discourse, its overall patterns and boundaries.

2.6.2 Moving Towards An Interdisciplinary Approach

Though the migration discourse tends to be framed in security terms, its other features are also fascinating—and, importantly, consequential. Upon involvement with the Czech political discourse on migration, the idea of systematically exploring the entire discourse (and the securitizing language on migration as one of its aspects) started to appear more fruitful; a holistic approach would allow me to place the various political positions in the context of how we talk—and the terms within which political parties can legitimately discuss—immigration and asylum. Mapping the immigration landscape would allow me to understand the boundaries of the discourse and therefore outline the basis for the limits of possibility for policy-making at both the national and European levels.

The constructivist ontology, particularly its understanding of language, thus brought me to the study of discourse as the micro-foundation of policy-making (through drawing on sociolinguistics above all). This approach is consistent with the principles behind Critical Discourse Analysis, a tradition to which “emphasizes the need for interdisciplinary work in order to gain a proper understanding of how language functions in constituting and transmitting knowledge, in organizing social institutions or in exercising power.”⁹⁰

I understand the exchange of political opinion as a site of power and struggle—not only a struggle for seats in political institutions, but also as a struggle for which meanings and notions of the world will emerge as dominant. A political campaign in particular can in democratic politics be understood as an arena where the whole spectrum of competing political opinions and underlying discourses is simultaneously presented by its proponents. Its snapshot may generate data whose study may provide us with a picture of the immigration discourse. Studying the various political visions and the language in which they are embedded in turn provide an opportunity for insight into the set of beliefs and attitudes, underlying assumptions about the world, that shape the discourse at large and, indirectly, have an impact on policy-making (and therefore the existence of inequalities policies produce)—particularly through setting the limits of what may be legitimately discussed.

An analysis of the immigration discourse can thus be understood as an endeavor

90 Wodak, “Aspects of Critical Discourse Analysis.” 10.

which points attention to how the particular language used mediates the underlying ideology in an attempt to bring attention to and *denaturalize* our (society-wide) assumptions that give rise not only to our meanings, but also our policies—whether at the national or the EU level. Ultimately, I understand this project as a contribution towards efforts that may play a positive role in gradually challenging the current immigration discourse in the Czech Republic, opening it—and thus allowing for a more democratic exchange of opinions, social practices that are less restrained by the underlying ideologies and policy-making that reflects more equal power relations.

2.6.3 CDA: Focus on Political Discourse

This work focuses on the analysis of “political discourse” in the framework of the CDA approach; “in the spirit of contemporary approaches in CDA, this [means],” van Dijk explains,

that critical-political discourse analysis deals especially with the reproduction of political *power*, *power abuse* or *domination* through political discourse, including the various forms of resistance or counter-power against such forms of discursive dominance (emphasis in the original). In particular such an analysis deals with the *discursive conditions* and *consequences* of social and political inequality that results from such domination (emphasis added).⁹¹

As such, following van Dijk's proposition, through the analysis of political discourse I aim to provide one of the inputs into addressing “relevant political questions,”⁹² particularly that on the limits of possibility of measures responding to issues related to immigration and asylum—both at the national and EU levels (the position of the Czech Republic at the EU level is also influenced by the scope of the Czech immigration discourse).

Particularly, I am going to focus on the communication of the most relevant political parties (their official line, and the communication of their representatives and candidates). This is not to imply that I understand democratic political activity to be reduced to political parties, quite the opposite. However, political parties provide a convenient opportunity: in the Czech political system, they play a significant role in the *formulation of political positions* and the *mobilization of citizens in their support*. It is these functions of political parties that allow for the systematic studying of discourse on a certain issue, in this case, immigration and asylum. This is because these two functions *in conjunction* allow for an insight into the discourse to take place; the fact that political parties formulate their positions knowing its receivers are the electorate necessarily means that their communication takes the existing

⁹¹ Blommaert, Bulcaen, and Conference of the Linguistic Society of Belgium, *Political Linguistics*. 11.

⁹² *Ibid.* 12.

public discourse into account.

At the same time, this process is not reduced to mere populism because of these two tendencies: on one hand, parties do have the motivation to declare in their program “whatever the voter wants to hear,” as the median-voter theorem suggests, on the other, political parties necessarily seek to differentiate their message from that of other political parties. This results in positions that are differentiated to the extent they are politically viable. As such, they capture the (perceived) opinions of the electorate, while, at the same time, presenting difference to the extent it captures the variety of public opinion in the society as a whole. As a result, parties' positions provide an insight into the extent to which the topic of immigration and asylum may be legitimately discussed.

I perceive a political campaign as a suitable opportunity to capture the political discourse in the entire political spectrum at one point in time for the purpose of analyzing it. The 2014 Election to the European Parliament is not only the most recent relevant election,⁹³ it was also an election with a significant international element in the context of which immigration and asylum were hotly debated, primarily due to the fact that these are largely perceived as “European” issues. Moreover, since the whole territory of the Czech Republic constituted one electoral district, it may be supposed that the campaign was relatively internally coherent.

2.6.4 A Variety of Influences

Critical Discourse Analysis

The Critical Discourse Analysis research program incorporates a wide variety of methodological and theoretical approaches. The purpose of this section is to briefly outline which of these influences informed my work the most. Since I attempted, within the CDA tradition, to make my approach to the task at hand as problem-oriented as possible, I combined the following elements in drawing on the variety of approaches the CDA umbrella enshrines.

Regarding the relationship between society and language, following, at least to some extent the work of Ruth Wodak and Teun van Dijk in particular, I pay attention to the sociocognitive level.⁹⁴ This approach is related to my assumption that—especially with regard to an issue such as immigration that is often charged with a high level of emotion—how we

⁹³ The most recent elections were the following. First, it was the election to the municipal governments in fall 2014. It is unsuitable for the analysis, because the level of policy-making is largely irrelevant to immigration and asylum. Second, it was the election to the Senate on the same date; on the occasion of this election, however, only one third of citizens in one third of electoral districts was eligible to vote.

⁹⁴ Meyer and Wodak, *Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis*. 15-16.

portray the issue matters immensely; what is particularly important in the sociocognitive regard is in my view the negative portrayal associated with negative, and often fearful emotions, as well as the expansion of certain existing cognitive schemata to the issue of immigration. As a result, I paid attention not only to larger discursive patterns, but also the use of lexicon.

I follow Dijk's understanding of theory as a “framework systematizing phenomena of social reality” rather than any grand theory.⁹⁵ He holds, as many other CDA researchers, that context is essential for CDA. This arises from the assumption “that all discourses are historical.”⁹⁶ I share this view and tried to project into my analysis, though not in a systematic basis, but rather to interpret certain phenomena for the understanding of which insight from context was essential. By context I thus understand all extralinguistic factors that are relevant to understanding what is communicated.

Dijk's research has roots in the theoretical tradition of social representation theory:⁹⁷

Social actors involved in discourse do not exclusively make use of their individual experiences and strategies; they mainly rely upon collective frames of perceptions, called social representations. These socially shared perceptions form the link between social system and the individual cognitive system and perform the translation, homogenization and co-ordination between external requirements and subjective experience. [...] Social representations [...] are dynamic constructs and subject to permanent change. Together they constitute a hierarchical order of mutual dependency.⁹⁸

Though van Dijk “does not explicitly refer to this tradition,” I share with him the view that social representations are important to understanding discourse.⁹⁹ To a large extent, my approach aims to identify the social representations prevalent in the immigration discourse, how political parties reproduce them, challenge and shape them.

This is related to the method of understanding and producing meaning relations.¹⁰⁰ In analyzing the political discourse on immigration, I followed a hermeneutic process and interpretation “which implies that the meaning of one part can only be understood in the context of the whole, but that this in turn is only accessible from its component parts.”¹⁰¹ The constant movement between the specific vocabulary, arguments and discourses of individual political parties and the overall discourse into which the ten studied parties fed their communication is characteristic of my work. It is also manifested in the in-depth analysis of

95 Ibid. 20.

96 Wodak and Meyer, *Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis*. 20.

97 Ibid. 25.

98 Meyer and Wodak, *Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis*. 21.

99 Ibid. 21.

100 Wodak and Meyer, *Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis*. 22.

101 Meyer and Wodak, *Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis*. 16.

the political parties' communication and the map of the entire discourse on the issue, which I both see as important aspects of studying the discourse at hand. The various auxiliary categories created in the process are the by-product of this hermeneutic approach.

I drew on Dijk's work particularly in acquiring inspiration in identifying many of the features (such as semantic macrostructures), linguistic categories and strategies that I subsequently tried to discover in the discourse. Though in this regard, Dijk's work had a large influence on the list of categories I tried to identify in the text, my approach is generally much less linguistically oriented than Dijk's and even less so than Wodak's. Contrary to Wodak, I also do not take advantage of argumentation theory (topoi in particular) in this analysis,¹⁰² not least because the communication in the context of a pre-election campaign is characterized by statements that are not necessarily connected by coherent argumentation. However, some of the topoi identified in political discourse on immigration have served as an inspiration and a basis for the reflection of the categories in the discourse I studied.

Theoretical Framework: Critical Security Studies

The discourse analysis conducted in this thesis is largely empirically-oriented and inductive; conceptual categories play a role in guiding my orientation in the data and inspire the categories created for the purpose of arranging the findings. However, one of these categories—that devoted to the migration-security nexus—is informed by the theoretical tradition of Critical Security Studies (CSS), a relatively well-developed theoretical approach. It is related to my research interest in the securitization of migration, whose political discursive aspect I originally planned to study. As I broadened the focus of my project beyond the security perspective to map the overall political discourse on immigration, the relevant role of this theoretical tradition in this thesis necessarily decreased. However, the migration-security nexus is an important feature of the Czech immigration discourse. As a result, I include the following section which outlines the theoretical roots of my understanding of security that shares a critical perspective.

My approach to security shares the constructivist ontology that has precipitated “important innovations in the study of 'security'” associated above all with the “Copenhagen,” “Aberystwyth” and “Paris” “schools” or critical security studies in general—especially as contrasted with “the traditionally US-dominated field of 'security [or strategic] studies”¹⁰³ that emerged as an academic field after the Second World War and was practiced most

102 Ibid. 22:

103 Collective, “Critical Approaches to Security in Europe.”

prominently during the Cold War.¹⁰⁴

The traditional approach has been summed up by Walt as follows: “Security studies may be defined as the study of the threat, use, and control of military force. It explores the conditions that make the use of force more likely, the ways that the use of force affects individuals, states, and societies, and the specific policies that states adopt in order to prepare for, prevent, or engage in war.”¹⁰⁵ This conception of security was to a large degree influenced by the fact that it was “very much 'a policy science'” [...] [that] grew along with the nuclear age, operating under the shadow of a future nuclear war.”¹⁰⁶ The end of the Cold War brought “what has been termed 'a thinking space'” in approaching to security, resulting from the failure of political realism not only to predict this development, but also to explain it.¹⁰⁷ This provided an opening for “self-consciously critical work to the questions of security” to be seriously considered in the academy.¹⁰⁸

The constructivist ontology is at the core of the CSS. It implies that “the constitution of [security] futures [depends] in social practice rather than immutable law.”¹⁰⁹ Answers to questions traditionally asked with regard to security are not universal, they are the outcome of social interaction between actors over time in a particular social and historical context and are thus contingent and unstable.¹¹⁰ Moreover, the fact that these answers—including the construction of immigration as a matter of security—are not inevitable prompts us to ask questions about their origins as well as their effects. The constructivist ontology enables us to question the starting points of the traditional approaches, which often amount to unarticulated assumptions arising from particular historical circumstances. Critical security studies have thus raised the problem of the political implications of assumptions that had largely gone unchallenged.

For example, they pointed out how “security studies privileges the position of the state” by studying matters commonly associated with the state and what it entails.¹¹¹ They have also brought our attention to the fact that as a result of this legitimizing process, the state has become the primary referent object of security; more generally, they have challenged how we conceptualize security-related issues (such as the identification of not only *referent objects*, but also *threats* and the formulation of policy *responses*¹¹²) and pointed out that the

104 Williams, *Security Studies*. 3.

105 Collins, *Contemporary Security Studies*. 54

106 Dunn Cavelty and Mauer, *The Routledge Handbook of Security Studies*. 46-47.

107 Ibid. 47.

108 Ibid. 47.

109 Ibid. 48.

110 Williams, *Security Studies*. 65-66.

111 Collins, *Contemporary Security Studies*. 55.

112 Dunn Cavelty and Mauer, *The Routledge Handbook of Security Studies*. 40.

current take is neither inevitable, nor without consequences—raising also the question of the politics of meaning, including knowledge.¹¹³ In sum, “[t]hose drawn to a critical security study sought a different security politics as well as a different security scholarship”¹¹⁴ in an attempt “to make explicit the largely statist and military-oriented assumptions of traditional security studies as a means of opening the field to greater theoretical scrutiny and debate, as well as allowing it to address a broader range of issues.”¹¹⁵

Built around the idea that “human communities are constituted by ideas, norms and values,” the epistemology associated with critical security studies is necessarily post-positivist.¹¹⁶ Beyond this characteristic, however, there is disagreement as to what is included under the “Critical Security Studies” label and what is not. Mutimer, for example, argues that “the Copenhagen School” does not fall in this category, along with the Feminist IR scholarship on security.¹¹⁷ In his view, though CSS cannot be decoupled from social construction, the term “critical” is linked to the commitment to social change, rather than merely its ontological position: “Clearly, critical social theory accepts the premise of social construction: were society not produced in and through its practices, transformation would not be possible. However, critical theory is aimed at producing fundamental change of a particular kind, and the possibility, let alone the necessity of such change is not inherent in the constructivist position.”¹¹⁸ As indicated above, I am committed to this principle, though I am less optimistic about the possibility of change particularly with regard to immigration, a matter I address at a later stage.

Though the boundaries of the CSS umbrella are contested, there has been a distinct effort of many of the proponents of the critical approach to security studies (most prominently perhaps in a collectively authored “Networked Manifesto”) to assert its greater inclusiveness in an attempt to “ensure that this critical perspective was not monopolized by a single theoretical approach.”¹¹⁹ Critical security studies can thus be also thought of as more of “an orientation toward the discipline than a precise theoretical label.”¹²⁰ Since the emergence of CSS, the field has seen a crystallization into the “Copenhagen,” “Aberystwyth” and “Paris” “schools” of thought,¹²¹ divisions, which the collectively authored piece of work, the

113 Collins, *Contemporary Security Studies*. 56

114 Ibid. 56

115 Collective, “Critical Approaches to Security in Europe.” 448.

116 Collins, *Contemporary Security Studies*. 57-8

117 Dunn Cavelty and Mauer, *The Routledge Handbook of Security Studies*. 47.

118 Ibid. 48-49.

119 Collins, *Contemporary Security Studies*. 59

120 Ibid. 57.

121 Collective, “Critical Approaches to Security in Europe.” 444.

CASE “Manifesto,” sought to overcome and expand.¹²² I consider this thesis to operate within the broader tradition of CSS, drawing on existing—largely theoretical—work when relevant.

The Migration—(Critical) Security Nexus

Strategic and Human Security Approaches

Following the traditional conceptualization of security as a value to be achieved, migration has been increasingly viewed by academicians as a factor influencing security. As a result, “it has been argued that migration needs to be factored into the calculations of national security strategy, and that national security needs to be factored into the calculations of migration policy.”¹²³ Migration has been seen as relevant to Security Studies in two ways. First, it has considered “the extent to which migratory and demographic developments bear upon national security questions,” taking into account factors such as refugees perceived as potentially violent political actors, their effect on social cohesion and matters related to economic performance.¹²⁴ Second, it is the concern of how security matters affect migration policies.¹²⁵ Turning to human security and thus understanding the individual as the relevant referent object of security, the two aspects generally considered are a practical one and a normative/ethical one.¹²⁶ Pragmatically, the shift in perspective can be “understood as increasingly necessary in a context where political concerns regarding security and migration have shifted beyond the state to the transnational or global level.”¹²⁷ Normatively or ethically, we can speak of a largely humanitarian concern for those who migrate, particularly with regard to some groups, such as refugees and asylum-seekers, and the trafficking of migrants.¹²⁸

This traditional approach, despite its normative charge particularly apparent in the human security paradigm, is rather problematic in terms of its “potential reification of migration as a ‘threat.’”¹²⁹ This view may be consolidated as a result of the view that security can be increased, which leads to the view that “migration policy can be developed in terms that increase the security of states, in terms that increase the security of migrants, or in terms that increase the security of both states and migrants.”¹³⁰ However, this view takes free movement and establishes it in the sphere of security (securitizing the related issues of

122 Dunn Cavelti and Mauer, *The Routledge Handbook of Security Studies*. 52.

123 Ibid. 170.

124 Ibid. 171.

125 Ibid. 171.

126 Ibid. 171.

127 Ibid. 171.

128 Ibid. 171.

129 Ibid. 172.

130 Ibid. 172.

migration and free movement), reiterating migration as a threat.¹³¹ Though this does not necessarily involve the construction of migration to be dangerous in and of itself (politics may in fact result in policies that favor mobility), this approach does encourage and “[legitimize] exclusionary distinctions that have become widespread across Europe, North America and Australasia in terms that identify 'undesirables' such as 'illegal immigrants' and 'asylum-seekers' as necessitating intensified controls.”¹³² In fact, this approach is very much reflected in the EU institutional framework and also the Czech immigration discourse.

In this way, strategic approaches not only do not reflect upon the normative considerations of producing and entrenching “exclusion, violence and inequality,” they also reduce migration to the strategic interactions between states, turning it into “a factor in the calculation of power and national security of states.”¹³³ Even though some normative questions are to some extent considered as a result of the human security approach, the reflections upon the framing of migration in two conflicting claims (state vs human security) and their effects are arguably not considered sufficiently—especially with regard to how they create certain “assemblages of relations between people” and effects related to “the struggle for professional legitimacy.”¹³⁴ In short, the traditional approaches to security narrow down the potential academic richness associated with migration (especially the sociological, political and normative kind) and fail to consider the potential effects of this narrowed path.¹³⁵

Critical Approaches

Critical security studies aim to unleash the richness of the migration-security nexus trimmed by the strategic and human security approaches—and analyze it.¹³⁶ This is possible through perceiving security not as a value to be achieved (or a fact of life defined in a particular way), but rather as a language, interest, knowledge, professional skill or aspiration; in other words, a construct that is “always shaped in relation to other languages, actors, and practices that contest it.”¹³⁷

In this respect, critical security studies have developed various ways of politically analyzing the social processes related to the migration-security nexus (such as how has it emerged to take the current form, how is the issue framed and perceived, what are the effects of the dominant language or practices, what is the relationship between them, knowledge and

131 Ibid. 172.

132 Ibid. 172.

133 Ibid. 172.

134 Ibid. 172.

135 Ibid. 172.

136 Ibid. 173.

137 Ibid. 173.

institutions, etc.).¹³⁸ Recognizing the social constitution of migration-related issues, critical approaches thus have the study of “the circulation of discourses; the application of technologies; the development of legal categories and questions of form-filling, professional routines and training that construct, sustain, and constitute migration as a 'security threat'” and their implications, such as the exclusionary and violent effects on certain groups of migrants, at their center.¹³⁹

CSS often focus on the use and reproduction of discourses regarding migration. For example, critical analysts look at how certain language (such as the use of metaphors, such as 'floods' of immigrants) legitimates certain practices (such as stronger border controls and the enhanced position of border police) at the expense of others (such as the detriment of employers interests).¹⁴⁰ In this context, I aim to study how immigration is discursively constructed in the Czech politics, of which security is one aspect.

Similarly, analysts may also “[approach] security as a practice or frame of domination and/or exclusion” and explore sites, agencies or technologies at the migration-security nexus.¹⁴¹ Border areas, detainment camps for refugees, airports and customs, etc., may be cited as examples of sites that are the object of critical inquiry; the security professionals and their role in the regulation of movement may be considered as an example of agencies and, finally, technologies involved in the monitoring and regulation of the movement of people may include a focus on visas, surveillance, or asylum procedures.¹⁴²

In all these areas related to migration, security practice is approached as “a specific strategy or technique of (de-) politicizing and governing migration”—be they intentional or not and explicit (more often not).¹⁴³ The critical analyst attempts to unsettle the often assumed and given character of these languages and practices—he/she describes their nature, examines the underlying power relations that shape them, explores the institutions that sustain them and attempts to uncover their effects.¹⁴⁴ In this regard, “[t]he presence of security policies in the migration area are thus explained both by the political use of security language in the migration field [...] and by the use of references to migration-related issues in security debates like counter-terrorism [...]; as well as by the presence and relative power of security professionals and experts in a policy field [...]; and by the transfer of security practices

138 Ibid. 173.

139 Ibid. 173-4.

140 Ibid. 173.

141 Ibid. 173.

142 Ibid. 173.

143 Ibid. 173.

144 Ibid. 173-4.

between different policy areas, such as policing football hooligans and migration [...].”¹⁴⁵

Security as a Speech Act

Security may be regarded as a “speech act;” according to the Copenhagen School, “an issue 'shows itself' [...] as a security problem through the *discursive politics* of security (emphasis added).”¹⁴⁶ Rather than describing the respective theoretical frameworks of securitization in detail,¹⁴⁷ the aim of this subsection is to emphasize the constructivist ontology of security and, particularly relevant for this work, its discursive construction.

When applicable, I am going to employ the conceptual framework for analysis proposed by Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde introduced in their seminal work “Security: A New Framework for Analysis.”¹⁴⁸ However, I do not engage extensively with this theoretical framework (such as test the theory or suggest a refinement of its theoretical premises). Rather, I take advantage of it as a conceptual framework that first, advances the notion of security as a matter of discourse and, second, proposes conceptual categories useful in demonstrating how a variety of *referent objects* belonging to a variety of *sectors* may be turned into a security issue through a speech act, conceptual tools which are also useful in categorizing the observations of the analysis at hand.

In the view of Buzan et al., “[t]hreats and vulnerabilities can arise in many different areas, military and non-military, but to count as security issues,” they argue, “they have to meet strictly defined criteria that distinguish them from the normal run of the *merely political*. They have to be staged as *existential threats* to a referent object by a securitizing actor who thereby generates endorsement of security measures *beyond rules that would otherwise bind* (emphases added).”¹⁴⁹ The authors thus differentiate between an issue (the referent object) being a matter of normal politics and an issue that is presented as an existential threat, as a matter of survival:

In theory, any public issue can be located on the spectrum ranging from nonpoliticized (meaning the state does not deal with it and it is not in any other way made an issue of public debate and decision) through politicized (meaning the issue is part of public policy, requiring government decision and resource allocations [...]) to securitized (meaning the issue is presented as an existential threat, requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political procedures).¹⁵⁰

An issue is therefore securitized if it can be argued it is more important than others, a matter

145 Ibid. 174.

146 Ibid. 59.

147 Ibid. 59-67.

148 Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde, *Security*.

149 Ibid. 3.

150 Ibid. 23-24.

of the referent object's continued existence, and justifies extraordinary measures to handle the threat.¹⁵¹

What is essential to successful securitization therefore is a securitizing move (the making of a case for something to constitute an existential threat), followed “the *intersubjective establishment* of an existential threat with a saliency sufficient to have substantial political effects (emphasis added).”¹⁵² Still, securitization is not complete unless the audience accepts the securitizing move to the point it “just gain[s] enough resonance for a platform to be made from which it is possible to legitimize emergency measures or other steps that would not have been possible had the discourse not taken the form of existential threats, point of no return, and necessity.”¹⁵³ When this condition is fulfilled, from the perspective of this framework, securitization may take place with respect to almost any referent object, ranging from the state (military sector), through state sovereignty and ideology (political sector), state finances (economy), and identity, religion, and nation as an imagined community (societal sector), to the environment or its aspects (environmental sector).¹⁵⁴

Securitizing Language

In the context of the studied time period, though migration was proposed to be a threat to a variety of referent objects (developed more in the course of the analysis), they arguably did not legitimize (and in absolute majority of cases were not even meant to legitimize) any extraordinary measures or the breaking of the current rules. As such, securitization did not take place in the studied discourse (judged by the framework proposed by Buzan, Waever and de Wilde). Yet the discursive link between immigration and the security of a variety of referent objects has been made, contributing towards the intersubjective establishment (or reinforcement) of immigration as a threat to a number of referent objects. Though the threat presented by immigration may not (yet) have been advanced as existential, the existence of the discursive link may arguably make this additional step easier. The more security concerns pervade the discourse on immigration, I'd argue, it is less likely that the issue is going to be dealt with within the “normal haggling of politics”¹⁵⁵ (as Buzan et al. propose, any public issue can be placed on a *spectrum* ranging from nonpoliticized to securitized¹⁵⁶—effects of which may also be understood to be a matter of a continuum). This is why I consider

151 Ibid. 24.

152 Ibid. 25.

153 Ibid. 25.

154 Ibid. 22-23.

155 Ibid. 29.

156 Ibid. 23.

securitizing language (the labeling of something in security terms which operates within the framework of standard politics, and is distinct from either a successful or unsuccessful “securitizing move”) to be of concern and point attention to it in the course of the analysis—even if the goal of its use is not outright securitization, but “mere” “attention-grabbing.”¹⁵⁷

Securitization of Migration in the EU: Institutionalized

Buzan, Waever and de Wilde argue that securitization may be ad hoc or institutionalized. They describe the institutionalized security logic as follows:

Securitization can be either ad hoc or institutionalized. If a given type of threat is persistent or recurrent, it is no surprise to find that the response and sense of urgency become institutionalized. [...] The need for drama in establishing securitization falls away, because it is implicitly assumed that when we talk of this issue we are by definition in the area of urgency. [...] This can be shown by trying to inquire about the rationale for decisions in these areas. Behind the first layers of ordinary bureaucratic arguments, one will ultimately find a—probably irritated—repetition of a security argument so well established that it is taken for granted.¹⁵⁸

It may be argued that a particular form of institutionalization of security logic took place through the incorporation of asylum policy into the institutional framework of the European Union. Though perhaps the process differed from that suggested by Buzan et al., as the “speech act” of presenting migration as a security matter was important primarily at the beginning of the institutionalization of security, developed further by a complex interaction of a variety of actors, the end product is very similar to what Buzan et al. describe as institutionalized securitization.

As Huysmans argues, pointing to the discursively constructed moment in the securitization process, “[i]n the 1980s migration increasingly was a subject of policy debates about the protection of public order and the preservation of domestic stability;” the “key theme” being that “migration is a danger to domestic society [...]. In other words, security discourses and technologies penetrated the Europeanization of migration policy.”¹⁵⁹ The emerging EU institutional framework, as a solution to this perceived problem, reflected this understanding of migration.

“The technocratic and politically manufactured spillover of the economic project of the internal market into an internal security project” has been, Huysmans argues, “the key development.”¹⁶⁰ The abolition of internal border control for the purpose of achieving a truly

157 Collective, “Critical Approaches to Security in Europe.” 455.

158 Buzan, Waever, and Wilde, *Security*. 27-28.

159 Huysmans, “The European Union and the Securitization of Migration.” 756.

160 Ibid. 752.

internal market was coupled by the strengthening of external border controls.¹⁶¹ The reasoning behind this development was the following: “if we diminish internal border controls then we must harmonize and strengthen the control at the external borders of the European Community to guarantee a sufficient level of control of who and what can legitimately enter the space of free movement.”¹⁶²

This reasoning is apparent in the case of several Czech political parties in the program, most notably ANO 2011—and is therefore also behind much of the security context of immigration. Though widely contested, the double assumption behind this development is “that control of the illegal movement of goods, services, and persons, happens primarily at the border, and that the free movement of persons is constituted by abolishing border controls.”¹⁶³ This is how the project of completing the single market spilled into an internal security project, with immigration and asylum “hav[ing] been integrated into a policy framework that defines and regulates security issues arising from the abolition of internal border control.”¹⁶⁴ According to Huysmans, this securitization of migration is associated with restrictive migration policy, which is further sustained by the overall approach that privileges the nationals of EU member states over third-country nationals and thus de-legitimizes the presence of immigrants, refugees and asylum-seekers in the EU. Though the aim of this thesis is not to explore these complex patterns, this section is included in order to sketch out the securitized nature of migration in Europe, as, providing the wider context for the Czech discourse on immigration, it is reflected in it.

2.7 Method

2.7.1 Data for Analysis

Time Frame

In the Czech Republic, the concerned election to the European Parliament took place on 23 and 24 May 2014. On the platforms studied, topics related to the EP election and the European Union more generally started appearing in the course of February 2014. Generally, most of the campaigns were officially launched in March and April 2014.

Based on information provided by Chvojka, a political campaign insider, in the Czech Republic, a kick-off of an election campaign generally takes place about six months before

161 Ibid. 758-759.

162 Ibid. 759.

163 Ibid. 759.

164 Ibid. 752-753.

the campaign and takes the form of a conference, convention, etc.¹⁶⁵ The “soft” campaign then generally starts about two months before the election, billboards are put up about a month before the election and the campaign then peaks in the last two weeks before the election, with the last three days of the campaign being the most intensive.¹⁶⁶

In order to capture also the first references to the EP election and its themes, which may be important in setting the agenda or, less explicitly, the tone of the campaign, I decided to choose to study the time period between 1 February 2014 and the last election day, 24 May 2014, though I accessed information published about a week before this period and after it to make sure that no important event possibly relevant for the analysis took place after the election. Capturing almost a four-month period, this time frame should comfortably capture all that is relevant to the EP 2014 election campaign; on the other hand, it does not cover the campaign kick-off.

Choice of Political Parties

I studied the communication of the most relevant political parties, with relevance operationalized in the following way. Based on data from opinion polls on citizens' opinion of the EP election conducted by the Center of Public Opinion Research, a research department of the Institute of Sociology of the Czech Academy of Sciences, I decided to analyze the communication of all those political parties that received statistically significant support from the respondents (at least 1% support of those who declared to participate in the election) in at least one of the three months prior to the election (March,¹⁶⁷ April¹⁶⁸ or May¹⁶⁹ 2014). These parties include (ordered based on the sum of the declared support over the three-month period): ANO 2011, ČSSD, KSČM, TOP 09, KDU-ČSL, ODS, the Green Party, the Dawn of Direct Democracy of Tomio Okamura, the Czech Pirate Party and the Party of Free Citizens.

These ten parties were also considered relevant on the basis of the methodology of the Czech Television. As a result, they their candidates were invited to the Czech TV pre-election debates. This methodology took into account the following factors in assessing the relevance of political parties: first, the representation of political parties in the representative organs; second, the result of the last election; third, the electoral potential assessed by the STEM/MARK and MEDIAN sociological agencies.¹⁷⁰ Electoral potential is an estimate of the electoral result any party could potentially gain in case it could convince all the voters

165 Chvojka, *Timing of Political Campaigns in the Czech Republic*.

166 *Ibid.*

167 “Občané O Volbách Do Evropského Parlamentu - Březen 2014.”

168 “Občané O Volbách Do Evropského Parlamentu - Duben 2014.”

169 “Občané O Volbách Do Evropského Parlamentu - Květen 2014.”

170 “Evropské Volby 2014,” April 30, 2014.

who considered voting for it at the time of the poll to actually vote for it; the respondents could mark more than one party, which means that the sum of the percentages is greater than 100 %.¹⁷¹ According to the results of the polls used in the Czech TV methodology, the estimated electorate potential was the following: ANO 2011 (37 %), ČSSD (30.5 %), TOP 09 (22.5 %), KSČM (19 %), ODS (16 %), the Dawn of Direct Democracy of Tomio Okamura (14 %), KDU-ČSL (12.5 %), the Green Party (9 %), the Czech Pirate Party (6.5 %), the Party of Free Citizens (5.5 %), the Common Sense Party (3 %), the Public Affairs party (2.5 %).¹⁷²

Despite a different methodology, the results of both the single indicator of electoral potential, as well as the overall relevance index that takes into account three factors, point to the relevance of the first ten political parties (identified as relevant according to the criteria set by me in the first round) and two additional parties, the Common Sense Party and the Public Affairs party. I consider this overlap as a sufficient confirmation of these parties' relevance.

Though I did consider analyzing the communication of the Common Sense Party and the Public Affairs party as well, I decided not to include them in the analysis in the end—due to two factors; first, the need to limit the scope of this analysis, and, second, the fact that their electoral potential did not exceed the 5% electoral threshold set for the EP election in the Czech Republic.¹⁷³ That is, based on the results of the opinion poll conducted for the Czech TV, even if all who considered voting for them did in fact vote for them on the election day, they would not get elected into the EP. Moreover, according to the results of the polls conducted by the Center of Public Opinion Research that served as a basis for my primary estimate of relevance, not even 1 % of those decided to vote indicated them as the party of their choice—in any of the three polls. There is little doubt that they influenced the discourse on immigration in some way, especially as, first, their stance towards immigration was negative, and, second, they did get the opportunity to express them in the most relevant debates in the public media.¹⁷⁴ However, I decided to exclude them from the analysis in the end because I consider their importance to be relatively low. As a potential weakness of the analysis, I reflect on their opinions shortly in the discussion section.

Sources of Data

In choosing the sources of the material for analysis, I included both content that the

¹⁷¹ Ibid.

¹⁷² Ibid.

¹⁷³ Ibid.

¹⁷⁴ Particularly on the Czech Television; they did get the opportunity to present their views in the Czech Radio broadcasting, but many other from the relatively less relevant political parties did also—unlike it was the case with the debates broadcast on the Czech TV.

parties themselves tried to disseminate among voters, as well as content that systematically emerged from responses to questions raised by what should be a relatively objective third party (above all, in the election debates in the public media¹⁷⁵).

I believe this approach allowed me to, first, capture both messages the parties deliberately chose to spread, as well as systematically capture reactions to questions the party representatives had to respond to in the course of the debates—to make sure I obtained a statement on the concerned issues from a party even if it had chosen not to actively communicate it on its own. Second, it allowed me to capture both messages that were carefully crafted, planned and prepared by communication professionals for the purpose of the campaign, as well as content that emerged relatively more spontaneously in the course of interviews, etc., allowing for variety of *authorship* (collective and rather moderate, as in the case of party programs that are the result of compromise, vs the personal opinions of individual candidates), *style* and *content*.

Importantly, unlike it is generally the case in much CDA research which tends to analyze typical texts,¹⁷⁶ the data collection phase was a specific phase completed before the analysis. My strategy in data collection was to rather capture a wide body of data, and then narrow it down based on the criterium of relevance (the process is described in greater detail below).

For each party, I gathered the output communicated in the stipulated time period through these channels:

The party website

- the party program and, when applicable, the program of the political party at the European member the national political party is a member of; this European aspect is considered to be a part of the Czech immigration discourse if the European party program was included at the national party's website and translated into Czech language:¹⁷⁷
 - The Czech Pirate Party's political program is identical to the European Pirates' program collectively drafted across Europe. The Czech Pirates participated in its drafting and the resulting compromise is presented as the only political program of the Czech Pirate Party. As such, it is considered to be a part of the Czech discourse.
 - The Czech Green Party listed both its own program and the European Green Party's "Green Common Manifesto" translated into Czech. Also due to the party's strong emphasis on the European dimension of their political endeavors, both were analyzed as constitutive elements of the Czech political discourse.

175 Czech Television and Czech Radio are national public broadcasting companies. The content from pre-election debates broadcast by both companies was analyzed to reduce the effect of a potential lack of objectivity of either.

176 Meyer and Wodak, *Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis*. 23-24.

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- The Czech Social Democrats did refer to the PES Manifesto “Towards New Europe,” but it served only as an inspiration for the Czech Social Democrats' program; for example, it is clear that some wording is similar, but the Czech version is much shorter. However, the PES Manifesto was neither translated into Czech, nor presented by the party. It is therefore reflected upon (primarily because unlike the Czech Social Democrats' program, the PES Manifesto addresses immigration and asylum rather extensively). However, as ČSSD neither presented it in any way to the Czech public, nor used shared the PES position on immigration and asylum, it is not considered to belong to the Czech discourse on the issue, and therefore neither included in the summary of the party's discourse, nor in the map of the Czech discourse landscape.
- data from a section of the website devoted to the EP 2014 elections
- data from a section of the website that includes latest news, press releases, media monitoring, etc.

The party's official Facebook Page

- any output posted on the Facebook Timeline (texts, videos, photos and other visual material)
- any links to which the Facebook Timeline referred
- photos and any other visual materials included in the Photos section of the Facebook Page

The three pre-election debates broadcast by the Czech Television¹⁷⁸

- the first pre-election debate broadcast from Ostrava on 30 April 2014 in which representatives of KDU-ČSL, the Common Sense Party, TOP 09 and KSČM participated
- the second pre-election debate broadcast from Brno on 7 May 2014 in which representatives of ČSSD, ANO 2011, ODS and the Dawn of Direct Democracy participated
- the third pre-election debate broadcast from Prague on 14 May 2014 in which representatives of the Green Party, the Party of Free Citizens, the Czech Pirate Party and the Public Affairs political party participated

The pre-election “superdebate” broadcast by the Czech Television¹⁷⁹

In this “superdebate” the representatives of all of the parties that participated in the three debates mentioned above participated. The following content was analyzed:

- the content spoken by the parties' representatives in the course of the main interview blocks
- the content spoken by the parties' representatives in the course of the interviews in between the main interview blocks
- the Twitter messages tweeted by the parties' representatives broadcast in a written form on the top of the screen in the course of the program

178 “Tři Eurodebaty Z Česka a Jedna Z Bruselu.”

179 “Evropské Volby 2014,” May 22, 2014.

The pre-election debates broadcast by the Czech Radio in the program “Stalo se dnes”¹⁸⁰

- the content communicated by the representatives of the parties analyzed in this thesis (the debates were broadcast in the period between 28 April and 16 May 2014)

Notably, the data collected and analyzes did not include:

- Individual blog entries of individual candidates, or Facebook pages other than the official Facebook page, the reason being that my aim was to primarily analyze communication endorsed by the political party (which is understood as its publication in the official party channel)
- Any official Tweets; I assumed that the analysis of Facebook information would be more exhaustive (covering also posted photos, external hyperlinks, etc.)

Important Notes on Dealing with Collected Data

First, I treated all data as having the same weight. Assuming that if they are communicated by the representatives of the most relevant political parties in the context of the political campaign, they do belong to the studied political discourse, I made them part of the analysis. I did not try to estimate their importance, the extent to which they are representative of the party opinion, or their reach. In other words, once some utterance became part of the discourse and was relevant to the studied topic, I aimed to capture it in the (in-depth) analysis. On the other hand, I consider those elements of the discourse to be a part of the discourse landscape (the overall discourse on immigration) only if they appeared to be a part of some larger pattern, as “ideas [which] arise more commonly than others.”¹⁸¹

Second, in the course of the interviews, representatives from each party were not asked the same questions, which could give rise to a difficulty in data comparability. However, I believe that this discrepancy is offset by the large amount of analyzed data, which would more likely than not capture the information had the political actor considered it relevant enough to communicate it on another occasion.

Third, my goal is not to differentiate between sound and fallacious argumentation, or to study the lack of argumentation coherence. Especially the political communication in the course of the studied campaign, much of the communicated content consisted of politicians' statements rather than developed and coherent arguments, to some extent owing to the chosen data sources. This can be contrasted, for example, with van Dijk's analyses of British parliamentary debates where argumentation patterns are much more discernible.

180 “Projekt Předvolebního Vysílání Českého Rozhlasu pro Volby Do Evropského Parlamentu 2014.”

181 Wodak and Meyer, *Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis*. 8.

2.7.2 Analysis Procedure

Collection of Relevant Data

From the above-cited sources, in the first phase, I selected data that could in some way be relevant to answering the research question, i.e. related above all to immigration and the portrayal of the in-group and out-group. By way of example, this was content produced by the representatives of the studied parties that either directly or indirectly communicated the issues of immigration and asylum, represented the in-group or out-group, or touched upon the more or less related issues of EU mobility, identities (what constitutes European and Czech identities; the conception of “us” vs “the other”); values directly declared or denounced, and values indirectly manifested on a variety of topics and in a number of occasions (the values that are appreciated vs those that are inferior; what constitutes Czech and European values, values in foreign policy—especially those possibly related to migration, such as human rights); the relationship between EU member states (especially the relationship between the Czech state and the EU), as well as the relations of the EU member states with third countries and their portrayal; the parties' stance towards minorities, their rights, etc.

In this first phase of data collection, I strived for an inclusive approach; my attempt was to gather all data that could possibly be relevant to the issue of migration, perceiving them as material that is essential to understanding the more immediate context of the parties' stance on the immigration and asylum policies.

I attempted not to restrict this phase to written text, but, as is evident from the sources of data outlined above, decided to collect also spoken text, or talk (in the form of debates and transcribed interviews posted on the parties' websites, above all), as well as visual communication (such as photos from the campaign; other visual material, such as advertisements in the form of flyers; and moving images, above all spots and short videos). Besides text (whether written in the first place or transcribed spoken word), flyers above all were essential in the crafting of the political messages. I believe this inclusiveness also with regard to the form of the messages enabled me to capture a more complete picture of the political parties' communication and the conveyed meanings.

Data Coding

First, I categorized the data according to the political parties that communicated them. For each party, I then sorted out the collected data according to their source (party program,

press releases, debates, etc.). This ordering was not only practical for subsequent work with the material, it also allowed me to see the discontinuities and contradictions within the communication of a single party more easily. Second, for the practical reasons of better orientation, I attached labels to individual segments of communication to tag categories which emerged from the data. These labels included, among others: “European values,” “European values in foreign policy,” “Vision for Europe,” “European identity,” “National identity,” “EU hierarchy,” “Relationship with other member states,” “EU integration,” “Europe in relation to the rest of the world,” “Migration,” “Ukraine,” “Roma,” “Islam,” etc. Third, I highlighted segments that seemed particularly relevant to the studied issues. Fourth, I made numerous notes in order not to forget various impressions, insights, peculiar expressions or uses of vocabulary, interconnections or contradictions that I noted, etc. The purpose of these steps was to merely allow me to better orient myself in the data and record some of the notable features that emerged from my first contact with the data.

Though my epistemological position indicates it is never entirely possible to put any pre-existing knowledge aside and approach the world anew, I tried to approach the data as inductively as possible to allow for a broad perspective not extensively bound by prior categories.

At first, I looked for the portrayal of migration (such as its advantages and disadvantages), proposals for immigration and asylum policy, whether it is introduced in security terms (an approach that relates to my previous study of securitization, for example), I looked for how individual political parties justify their particular policy positions, messages that convey information about identities (such as the axis of differentiation between “us” vs “the Other”). However, the engagement with the data also allowed me to inductively identify other categories I had not originally envisioned. This enabled me to subsequently look if these are present in the communication of other parties, as well. For example, the fact that I identified a contradiction in one party's communication, a reaction to another party's campaign, the use of a certain metaphor, portrayal or legitimation strategy, allowed me to search for similar categories in the discourse of other political parties.

After this initial phase of exploring the data at hand, I started to increasingly inform this process by categories identified in the existing literature. For example, as I stumbled upon a certain legitimation strategy, I explored the various kinds of strategies described in the literature on the describing of “others,” which subsequently allowed me to identify other strategies, which might have gone unnoticed had I not consulted such work. This aspect of my study of the discourse at hand clearly constituted a deductive element in the identification

of categories. In this work, the identification of categories thus was an iterative process that, in my view, took advantage of both its inductive, as well as deductive aspect.

Analyzing the Data

First, I identified the categories (topics and features) outlined below and described them in detail in a chapter devoted to the in-depth analysis of individual political parties' communication. The findings, which can be thought of as the notable features of each party's communication, are described in detail for each party separately,¹⁸² divided into three categories. Although their boundaries are at times blurry, altogether, they should provide a comprehensive map of each party's immigration discourse landscape.

As Dijk points out, “the boundaries of each category may be fuzzy, and categories will often overlap.”¹⁸³ This indeed was the case; by way of example, these are some of the topic and features that I tried to identify in the data:

The Party's Vision for Immigration and Asylum Policy

I looked for the policies political parties propose in the sphere of immigration and asylum, their argumentation why that is the case; the policy and (declared) value context for their position and other relevant information (for example, in the case of the Czech Pirate Party, I explored the open source drafting history of the political program at the EU level in search for traces of the Czech Pirate Party representatives' intervention to get better insight into their position on the matter).

The Devil's in the Portrayal¹⁸⁴

Besides exploring the arguments invoked by political parties' representatives, I also explored how immigration and related topics are portrayed, as these portrayals (of various categories of immigrants, for example) often serve as a basis for the justification of political opinions on migration (and migration policies). Drawing on Dijk,^{185 186} these are some of the features I tried to identify:

182 In this thesis, the parties are ordered according to the numbers drawn for them for the purpose of the election by the State Election Committee.

“Vylosovaná čísla pro Volby Do Evropského Parlamentu.”

183 Reisigl and Wodak, *The Semiotics of Racism*. 89.

184 A word play on the “devil's in the detail” expression; in the course of exploring the data, it occurred to me that oftentimes, especially in the case of political parties that try to avoid being charged for xenophobia, the smallest details tell a lot. An expression, metaphor, single word, or even apparently insignificant slip of the tongue may tell more than entire political program—especially about the more subtle forms of racism clearly absent from more “sterile” documents. They also convey important meaning to the receivers of the message through sketching a certain image, invoking a certain meaning through the use of a semantic shortcut, etc. These details are essential to the portrayal of “us” and “the Other” that often serve as the basis for justifications of certain migration-related measures.

185 Reisigl and Wodak, *The Semiotics of Racism*.

186 Riggins, *The Language and Politics of Exclusion*.

- *Topics* are defined as “semantic macrostructures” that “represent what speakers find most important [and] regulate overall coherence of discourse, how discourse is planned and globally controlled and understood and what is best remembered by the recipients.”¹⁸⁷ In my work, I looked for the contexts in which immigration is presented. These were often policy contexts (such as in the case of ANO 2011 and TOP 09 that most clearly placed immigration and asylum policy in the policy context of the security of the EU external border). However, other themes that often appeared was criminal activity (whether of the migrants themselves or the structures behind their “smuggling”), or economic matters (especially the “limited resources” or “economic migrants” discourses), etc. These semantic macrostructures may be thought of as a lens that highlights some themes and downplays others. They are mostly found in the following categories: “Immigration: A Matter of...” (above all in case of implicit semantic macrostructures) and “Argumentation: Appealing to Reason” and “Argumentation: Appealing to Normative Structures” (especially in the case of semantic macrostructures that were made explicit as part of an argument appealing to reason or normative structures).
- *Portrayal of the in-group vs the portrayal of the out-group*:¹⁸⁸ There are numerous strategies involved in the portrayal of the in-group and the out-group; often they tend to fall into the category of positive self-presentation or negative other-presentation. I tried to explore how political representatives represent us (who we are, what are our values, etc.) and “the Others” (often presented in opposition to these values) and identify the lexical style of the descriptions of Others¹⁸⁹ employed in this portrayal (such as presenting something in a positive/negative light, particularly the choice of lexicon¹⁹⁰ such as: “illegal” immigrant, “economic” or “social immigration,” “unadaptable” immigrant, “influx,” “tide,” or “inflow” of “foreigners,” and other labels, metaphors, symbols, or language charged with connotations employed in describing the traits and actions of “us” vs “the Other”). I especially tried to explore not only the overt, but also the more covert expressions of racism and negative perception of the Other.
- *Semantic moves in the form of disclaimers*:¹⁹¹ I looked for “the use of special semantic moves that implement the possible contradiction between positive self-presentation and negative other-presentation.”¹⁹² Some of these include Apparent Denial (I have nothing against Muslims, but...), Apparent Concession (They are not all the radicals, but...), Apparent Empathy (In their own country, they face dire conditions, but...), etc.¹⁹³ These were often used to manage the impression of the speaker versus that of immigrants, or political opponents.
- *Arguing and Justifying*: I tried to identify strategies in arguments and reflect on what these justifications imply about how immigrants are construed. Some of the particular strategies that appeared are: Apparent Sympathy (when justifications are constructed to imply the measures with negative consequences for immigrants are in fact for immigrants' own good), Fairness (labelling certain adverse decisions as being “forced” by political reality, etc.), the use of other means to justify a particular

187 Reisigl and Wodak, *The Semiotics of Racism*. 90.

188 Riggins, *The Language and Politics of Exclusion*. 35-37.

189 Ibid. 42.

190 Hart, *Critical Discourse Studies in Context and Cognition*. 39.

191 Reisigl and Wodak, *The Semiotics of Racism*. 92.

192 Ibid. 92.

193 Ibid. 92.

measure or stance (for example, identification with something positive, the use of figures, illustration, common sense knowledge, personal experience, expert opinion...), etc.

- *Implicitness and Intertextuality*: Much of relevant information is not explicitly said and emerges either from the knowledge of the socio-cultural context or from the nexus of more texts (or text and context). I tried to identify this meaning in the studied texts, understand it and point to its possible implications.

Communication

This section was created for the purpose of describing some salient, or interesting, features of the entire communication of the party and its representatives that would otherwise likely remain uncaptured.

Summarizing the Findings of In-Depth Analysis

Based on extensive engagement with the studied material, the studied categories, their boundaries and intersections at both the theoretical and empirical levels, I subsequently established a set of categories that, in my view, cover all the important features of a given immigration discourse. I used them to arrange and summarize the content of the individual parties' communication (which can be found at the end of analysis of each party). They are the following:

Representation of the In-Group

Who are “we” and how are “we” portrayed? This category is operationalized as: first, how the party presents “us” directly; second (and more often), what is the party's vision for our society and its values, most often inferred from their statements on this issue and their presentation of the party itself (this is based on the assumption that if the party presents itself as “opposed to xenophobia” for example, it advances the notion that the entire society should be opposed to xenophobia as well). Third, the image of the in-group was also inferred from the context (for example, if there is evidence the party has nationalist tendencies and envisions a Czech nation that is more patriotic, the inference is made that “we” are/should be a “confident Czech nation”). Importantly, I recorded all messages in this regard, including contradictory statements and representations.

Representation of the Out-Group

How is the out-group represented? How is it different from the in-group? Whom does it consist of? What are their qualities, traits, characteristics and features?

Categorization of Immigrants

How are immigrants categorized? According to what axes are they differentiated? I included categorizations that were both presented as such (for example, when a party representative enumerates the “types of immigrants” that come to the Czech Republic), as well as categories that were implied (for example, when a party candidate stresses the need to address “illegal” immigration, I inferred that the party differentiates between “legal” and “illegal”

immigration).

Immigration: A Matter of...

What is the general topic framework, or semantic macrostructure, in the context of which immigration is presented? What are the prevalent, relatively more abstract, themes of the discourse that have not necessarily manifested at the level of the argument?

Language that Draws the Picture Complete

What vocabulary was chosen to describe immigration-related matters? What descriptions stand out and which labels are avoided?

Justifications and Persuasion Strategies

What semantic strategies were used in asserting a position? Strategies in relation to immigration, as well as other political actors are included.

Argumentation: Appealing to Reason

How did the actors construct arguments about immigration that appealed to the receivers' reason? Above all arguments that included a statement and provided a reason for it were included.

Argumentation: Appealing to Normative Structures

How did the actors construct arguments about immigration that appealed to the receivers' normative structures? What values were used to justify a position? Above all arguments that included a statement and provided a reason that appealed to the receivers' values were included.

This set of summary categories was established for the purpose of providing the basis for the mapping of the Czech political discourse on immigration. They were drafted to capture the salient features of a discourse in a systematic way. I used this tool to make a summary of the discourse of each studied political party; these were subsequently combined in order to allow for the identification of patterns in the overall Czech discourse (*global* structures of discourse as opposed to the *local* structures at “the level of sentential structures, relations between sentences, or turns and moves of dialogical interaction”¹⁹⁴). Notably, capturing actual discourse of the party representatives, the information in the summary often contradicts itself (due to including multiple candidates' communication, or, simply, due to the lack of coherence in the party's arguments) and contains gaps (when, for example, a party tended not to appeal to shared values or did not distinguish between the various types of immigrants).

Mapping the Czech Political Discourse on Immigration

Following the in-depth study of individual political parties' communication, I used the

194 van Dijk, *Prejudice in Discourse*. 55.

information gained as an input in mapping the overall Czech political immigration discourse. Upon mutual comparison and confrontation of the individual parties' discourses, I identified notable regularities and patterns on one hand, and exceptions, on the other. These tendencies to speak about immigration and related matters in one way or another, as well as interesting lacunae are, combined, considered to constitute the political immigration discourse.

This approach thus takes a “big picture” perspective and, rather than pinpointing the details of the parties' communication, describes the characteristic and notable features of the overall discourse, also demarcating its width. It is described using several sections, which were however created merely for the purpose of conveying the observations and, each taking a slightly different perspective (describing a distinct aspect of the discourse)—and at times overlapping—should be considered complementary.

Topics of Discourse: A Theoretical Account

In the course of exploring the overall Czech political discourse on immigration in the studied period, it became apparent to me that the representatives of political parties tend to mention immigration in several distinctive contexts. These overall structures (also referred to as “macrostructures”) of talk can be called, following van Dijk, *thematic* or *topical*.¹⁹⁵ These themes or topics “can be defined in semantic terms: we see them as properties of the (overall) meaning of discourse.”¹⁹⁶ As such, they may communicate the themes or topics of discourse at various levels of abstraction: they may be expressed by one sentence, but also at the level of an entire section of the political program or a candidate's statement.¹⁹⁷

A topic of discourse may be “characterized as the most 'important' or 'summarizing' idea that underlies the meanings” of a segment of text or another form of communication.¹⁹⁸ It expresses its “gist” and is characterized by “global coherence to such an episode.”¹⁹⁹ When approaching the data, I identified them by asking a question: In what terms/in what context/as a matter of what is immigration presented? Importantly, since the propositions falling under a certain category were often contradictory (even in the case of an individual party), the coherence condition Dijk talks about is in the case of my work loosened; it is operationalized in a way that did not require coherence in argumentation—as it is the case with “topoi” often used in the analysis of typical content-related argument schemes that fall under the umbrella of argumentation theory.²⁰⁰ Though I considered the various topoi identified in the literature

195 Ibid. 55.

196 Ibid. 56.

197 Ibid. 56.

198 Ibid. 56.

199 Ibid. 56.

200 As Wodak explains, “[w]ithin argumentation theory, 'topoi' or 'loci' can be described as parts of argumentation which

in devising the topical categories of the studied discourse, their role was merely that of a deductive inspiration.

Several of the themes were identified rather easily, above all because they occurred in the discourse of various political parties (above all immigration as a matter security, crime, economy and values), while others, though potentially important—also for argumentative purposes—appeared more rarely (such as immigration as a matter of the fulfillment of international obligations). In the final map of the Czech political parties' discourse on immigration, I identified the following topics (each topic category is illustrated by concrete examples from the campaign): Fulfillment of International Law Obligations, Global Justice, Human Rights, National Interest, Sovereignty, Values (That We Display), Economy, Security, and Crime.

Representation of the In-Group and the Out-Group

The next two sections are primarily devoted to the representation of “us” vs “them.” The first section drew primarily on the “Representation of the In-Group” summary section, but also on other relevant information provided both implicitly and explicitly about the in-group. The second category on the representation of the out-group is divided into two subcategories: the “Categorization of Immigrants” that for which a summary category of the same name served as the primary source of data and “Additional Portrayals” that is devoted to other important themes identified in the discourse: the portrayal of Muslims, the label of “unadaptable” immigrants and, finally, a section on the portrayal of immigrants as intruders on our values.

Completing the Discourse Map

The final categories are devoted to the relation between the in-group and the out-group and its portrayal and the various strategies used by parties to convince them (primarily drawing on the “Justification and Persuasion Strategies” summary category). Finally, the last area of discourse covered is that on lexicalization and outlines the tendencies in the use of vocabulary; its primary source was the summary category of the same name, “Language that Draws the Picture Complete.”

belong to the obligatory, either explicit or inferable premises. They are the content-related warrants or 'conclusion rules' which connect the argument or arguments with the conclusion, the claim. As such, they justify the transition from the argument or arguments to the conclusion.”
Meyer and Wodak, *Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis*.

3 Analysis

3.1 In-Depth Analysis of Political Parties' Communication

This chapter is divided into ten subchapters, each of which is devoted to the analysis of the communication of each political party included in this work. The description of each party's immigration discourse is organized into three sections. The first one is always devoted to the party's stance on immigration and asylum policy (called “Vision for Immigration and Asylum Policy”). The second subsection, called “The Devil's in the Portrayal” includes information about communication that is relevant to the portrayal of the involved actors (particularly who are “us” vs “them,” the self-portrayal of the political party itself and the portrayal of its political competitors). The third section called “Communication” includes other possibly relevant information about the party's communication of immigration-related issues. Together, these three sections provide a complete picture of each party's immigration discourse, including information both on its content and form. This information is then summarized at the end of each subchapter.

3.1.1 Christian and Democratic Union – Czechoslovak People's Party (KDU-ČSL)

Vision for Immigration and Asylum Policy

Declared Importance of Human Rights

The context of KDU-ČSL's vision for immigration and asylum policy may be thought of as derived, besides others, from its self-proclaimed values, “the respect for the human being—the basis for human rights and the inviolable basis of Europe” detailed as “thoroughness in the protection of human rights, particularly the respect to a human being from inception to a natural end,” “protection of religious freedom, particularly Christianity as a basis for European civilization,” which does contain a hint of contradiction in terms,²⁰¹ “protection of rights of weaker and endangered groups (seniors, mothers on maternity leave, the handicapped),” “solidarity with people who live in real poverty and lack of freedom,” etc.²⁰²

201 What comes to my mind in this regard is the contradiction enshrined in George Orwell's “All animals are equal, but some animals are more equal than others” that the program statement on religious freedom, in which a certain religion is declared to have a special status, resembles.

202 “Program KDU-ČSL pro Volby Do Evropského Parlamentu 23. a 24. Května 2014.”

Policy: Vague and Conditional

The party's reference to immigration and asylum is limited to its support for “flexible EU visa and asylum policy that includes a component of return.”²⁰³ However, it leaves “flexible” and “return” unspecified. It appears that “flexible” may mean that the policy would respond to the needs of the EU, but when it comes to “return,” the reader does not learn anything about the conditions for the return of immigrants (and according to what criteria this should happen). Regarding the solution, KDU-ČSL proposed “civilian, as well as military missions for the purpose of the stabilization of countries, from which economic and political migrants come.”²⁰⁴ It is therefore clear that the party supports a preventive, presumably a more long-term approach, and, importantly, differentiates between “economic” and “political” migrants. The party explicitly imposes a condition for these “foreigners” by not failing to include “the observance of human rights (for example, the equality of men and women, freedom of religion, democracy)” as a “condition for foreigners' right to stay in the EU.”²⁰⁵

Political Program: Knotty History

However, a quick look on the currently posted program does not tell the whole story. There had been a time when the program included the following sentence: “We do not want Europe full of unadaptable immigrants, who burn cars on the outskirts of cities, sell drugs and bring here, among others, radical Islamism.”²⁰⁶ In reaction to the leader of the Green party, as well as the party list for the EP election, Ondřej Liška, who objected to this language, however, KDU-ČSL decided to quietly remove the sentence from the program.²⁰⁷ The leader of the party list, Svoboda, commented the presence of this utterance in the following manner: “That sentence really was there [in the program], however, context is important. We need immigrants, because Europe is dying out. At the same time, everyone's respect for human rights is the foundation of Europe. That's why we don't want immigrants that don't want to adapt, set cars on fire on the outskirts, etc.,” referring to recent events in France.²⁰⁸ This marks a significant shift in approach in the course of the election campaign to one that is marked insistence on the observance of “our” rules and the immigrants' adaptation. Interestingly, the revised position was justified by the fact that “Europe is dying out;” the

203 Ibid.

204 Ibid.

205 Ibid.

206 “Lidovci Se Vymezili Proti Imigrantům, Drogám a Islamismu. Ted' Couvli.”

207 Ibid.

208 Ibid.

party's justification for the acceptance of foreigners is thus the solving of a problem.

The controversy around the party's position also reveals something about the intricacies of program creation, as well as internal dissent. Svoboda, number one on the party list, originally refused to comment on the origins of this position, explaining that the program had been collectively authored and that it is difficult to find the “culprit,” a word choice that implies a reevaluation of the whole situation. However, Zdechovský, number three on the party list, subsequently claimed the authorship of the sentence: “I am the author of the sentence and I hold my ground. If someone wants to live here, they need to respect our rules. The sentence is not xenophobic, quite the opposite.”²⁰⁹ This episode, supported by Zdechovský's contributions on the party's website, signal an internal disagreement over the party's stance on immigration and asylum policy, though the official opinion had been, as a result of an exchange between political parties' representatives, made more moderate. The adjusted opinion of the party on this issue was summed up by Svoboda in the following way (in his words, in response to various “demagogues who misinterpreted the sentence,” a clear move to delegitimize them):

We are aware of the fact that Europe needs immigrants, because it is dying out. At the same time, we are mindful of observing the law and human rights, which is why we insist that those who want to live with us in Europe live according to our rules (which in many places in Europe is not the case). That's the essence of our view of immigration. On the other hand, the EU has to be forthcoming to refugees and all those who need our help.²¹⁰

By these words, Svoboda reasserted the need for guarantees to refugees, though insisted on the respect for law and human rights as a condition for the acceptance for immigrants.

In fact, almost a month before the controversy surrounding the party's program, the leader of KDU-ČSL, criticized several members of parliament from the party ANO in the Chamber of Deputies for their xenophobic language: “From my perspective it is an expression of xenophobia that should not appear in a governmental party and especially not in a party that claims allegiance to European values.”²¹¹ It thus appears to be the case that the party's mainstream opinion is more moderate than it could appear from the controversial statement—and was temporarily swayed by the influence of Zdechovský (outlined below).

The controversy surrounding the party's inclusion of the sentence in its program in fact appears to be the most salient feature of the party's communication of issues related to

209 Ibid.

210 “Vyjádření Pavla Svobody K Diskusi O Pohledu KDU-ČSL Na Migraci.”

211 “Pavel Bělobrádek: Xenofobní Výroky Od Poslanců ANO Mě Velmi Překvapily.”

immigration and asylum. Though the official commentary was rather limited, giving the impression that the party aimed to downplay and sideline this incident, Zdechovský took up the issue and authored a number of articles published on the party's website in which he attempted to move beyond the simplified declaratory—and rather inflammatory—statement and develop his argument for why the issue should be engaged with more openly. Though this activity does not appear to be entirely in line with the party's majority opinion, it may be the case—concluding based on the fact that Zdechovský was given the room to express this opinion on the official website of the party—that the other candidates were relieved that there was someone who claimed not only the ownership of the contested sentence, but also of the issue in general, even if at the cost of the opinions being expressed at times somewhat unscrupulously.

Free-Riding as a Reason for Redistribution

There were even signals that Svoboda supported some form of solidarity with other EU member states with regard to immigration. In one debate, he stated the following: “[...] I'm not completely sure that it is completely clear that we should not take any immigrants from third countries, because if we continue with this position, then we are the parasites of the whole system of the external border protection. That is, some states protect it and thus largely finance it and we enjoy the benefits from the fact that they bear the burden.”²¹²

Immigration as a Solution: The Party's Truly Own Proposal Prevails

However, the justification of immigration as a measure against Europe's aging invoked in reaction to the controversy surrounding the party's original program has been later somewhat undermined. One of the main messages of the program had all along been the party's support to pro-family measures.²¹³ In the very last pre-election “super-debate” on Czech TV, Svoboda sent out these two messages. One of them was a message tweeted live from a part of the debate where politicians were encouraged to engage in an online discussion with citizens: “The fundamental problem of the EU is dying out—not even an inflow of immigrants will make up for the missing children. KDU-ČSL wants an EU that is more pro-family.”²¹⁴ Even though immigration had been earlier presented as desirable, as expressed by another candidate, Ulrych, who said that “a certain reasonable level of immigration may even be beneficial”²¹⁵ because it solves EU's inevitable aging, it was later incorporated into the

212 “Jan Zahradil.”

213 “Program KDU-ČSL pro Volby Do Evropského Parlamentu 23. a 24. Května 2014.”

214 “Evropské Volby 2014.”

215 “Rozhovor S Kandidátem Do EP Vítem Ulrychem.”

previously existing program by altering the message to say that even that is not enough—providing support to measures KDU-ČSL had proposed even before the controversy took place. Later in the debate, however, in the final address to voters, Svoboda somewhat undermined the conciliatory tone towards migrants by stating: “We want Europe of traditional values, where it is possible to live with dignity. We want Europe that sees its future in its own children and *not in the work of immigrants* (emphasis added).”²¹⁶ By this statement, Svoboda transformed immigration from a desirable phenomenon and a solution complementary to previously existing proposed pro-family policies to a non-solution that stands in opposition to pro-family policies.

The Devil's in the Portrayal

Immigration: A Matter of 'Defending our Values and Safety'

Returning to the party program, the section that includes information on its envisioned asylum and immigration policy is called “Safe Europe” with the subtitle “For the Defense of Our Values and Safety,” implying a stress on what KDU-ČSL perceives to be traditional European values in EU's undertakings in world politics.²¹⁷ The information on immigration and asylum is thus included in a section that, besides elaborating on these values, covers measures regarding organized crime, common “fight against terrorism,” post-conflict reconstruction, as well as EU's policy that somehow deals with third countries (be it EU enlargement, its stance with regard to the Russian federation, relations with USA, as well as authoritarian and totalitarian states). Although the inclusion of asylum and immigration policy among matters that concern non-EU countries and EU's role on the world stage more generally is understandable, the stress on security in its context is evident. It is implied not only in the title and subtitle that give the impression that there is a need to protect something—or otherwise, our values and safety/security²¹⁸ may be in danger. Its presence in the asylum and immigration policy is also hinted more subtly by the fact that the reference to the solution of migration is almost immediately followed by the party's position and approach to organized crime, which is immediately followed by “common fight against terrorism.”²¹⁹

The controversy surrounding the party's approach to immigration and asylum policy as sketched out in the original program exposed its tendency to perceive and present immigrants as a threat to security by invoking images of cars burning in the Paris suburbs, a

216 “Evropské Volby 2014.”

217 “Program KDU-ČSL pro Volby Do Evropského Parlamentu 23. a 24. Května 2014.”

218 In Czech, the word used is “bezpečí.”

219 “Program KDU-ČSL pro Volby Do Evropského Parlamentu 23. a 24. Května 2014.”

2005 incident marked by three-week long violence in the course of which thousands of cars were burnt down, which saw the ignition of pre-existing tensions within the largely immigrant population troubled by high unemployment, “racism and heavy-handed policing.”²²⁰ The inopportune sentence in the program also included a reference to immigrants selling drugs and those who bring radical Islamism,²²¹ messages that also have security and criminal connotations.

Islam vs Our Christian Roots

When asked explicitly about the radicalization of Islam as a threat for Europe, Ulrych in one interview answered that he did not believe KDU-ČSL criticized Islam as such,²²² a “semantic [move] that implement[s] the possible contradiction between positive self-presentation and negative other-presentation,”²²³ particularly “[a]pparent [c]oncession.”²²⁴ Yet he did not avoid making the connection between radical Islam and terrorism in this context (though, it must be said, it was the interviewer who introduced this language and this link in the first place). “The problem, however,” Ulrych continued, “lies precisely with radical groups in the countries of the EU plan and some even carry out, terrorist acts (Great Britain, Spain). Here I see a large role for the EU in greater cooperation of the police, unification of legal norms and the establishment of a unified punishment for terrorist acts.”²²⁵ Yet even though the party does not “criticize Islam as such,”²²⁶ the question of religion is understandably rather salient for this Christian Democratic party, which may be the reason for its candidates' willingness to voice their opinions on issues related to it. In his last appeal to voters on the party's website, the party leader Bělobrádek stated, among others, the following reason for participating in the election: “If [KDU-ČSL's supporters] won't come [to the election], they will strengthen those who refuse the Christian roots of European culture and civilization and seek to 'de-Christianize' Europe.”²²⁷ Even though the appeal mentions “de-Christianization” rather than “Islamization,” in the context of what had been said about Islam in the course of the campaign, it is rather evident that the major 'de-Christianizing' force is, in the view of KDU-ČSL, Islam.

220 “French Violence ‘back to Normal.’”

221 “Lidovci Se Vymezili Proti Imigrantům, Drogám a Islamismu. Ted' Couvli.”

222 “Rozhovor S Kandidátem Do EP Vítem Ulrychem.”

223 Reisingl and Wodak, *The Semiotics of Racism*. 92.

224 Ibid. 92.

225 “Rozhovor S Kandidátem Do EP Vítem Ulrychem.”

226 Ibid.

227 “Potřebujeme Vás, Přijďte K Volbám!”

Zdechovský: The Security and Crime Links Made Explicit

Zdechovský who to a large extent defied the party's shift towards a less xenophobic language, was more explicit in making the connection between immigration and security threats when explaining the reasons why KDU-ČSL should address the issue of immigration. Zdechovský argued that we cannot just have immigrants do the work Europe does not want to do; because generations of children have been born here, it is important to engage with the issue actively.²²⁸ “If we look at the reports of security services more closely,” he said, “[...] most of them [...] talk about hidden, as well as open dangers. For example, in the Great Britain these reports mention groups that go fight in Syria or Afghanistan from the Great Britain—against the armies of allies. Even army experts have [...] called attention to the fact that in Afghanistan they often clashed with European Muslims who fought against them.”²²⁹ The link between security and immigration (and Islam) is thus explicit. The justification Zdechovský invoked for this opinion were expert reports of security services, presented in the context of his argument that this issue cannot be further avoided, as other large political parties have done, and immigrants need to be integrated into our society “in a more positive manner.”²³⁰ At the same time, the solution he offers is education for immigrants the need to “respect their values,”²³¹ which appears it might be creating friction with the official party line (particularly the party's insistence on traditional, Christian European values).

Similarly, Zdechovský made explicit the link between crime, particularly drug-dealing, and certain out-groups. Citing police experts, which can be understood as a legitimating move, he said that “in some markets [marijuana dealing] is even organized by the Vietnamese community.”²³² Though this necessarily means that in others, it is not—or that there are other places where it is organized by people other than Vietnamese, the association of this activity with the Vietnamese was nevertheless stressed, citing details such as distribution paths to support his claim. Similarly, he argued that “the cooking of meth was originally a Czech matter, whereas now, it is associated with certain groups that came here from the East.”²³³ Somewhat ironically, he subsequently said he did not like the fact that “society radicalizes against certain groups,”²³⁴ displaying sympathy and engaging in positive self-presentation through denouncing the tendency.

228 “Lidovecký Kandidát, Kterého Obviňovali Z Fašismu.”

229 Ibid.

230 Ibid.

231 Ibid.

232 Ibid.

233 Ibid.

234 Ibid.

Immigrant: Another Unadaptable Citizen

The word used to modify the word “immigrants” was in the replaced contentious sentence, as well as in the ensuing debate, “unadaptable.” The Czech public is very familiar with this word, as it is often used to describe citizens who do not live “properly” and by the rules of the “decent citizens,” the majority. In the Czech public discourse, the phrase “unadaptable citizens” recently started to be used as a euphemism for the Roma minority in an attempt to portray it as a disorderly minority that abuses the Czech social system. In fact, Ulrych made this connection on the level of the abuse of the social system explicit by stating that “we cannot allow that people move to the EU with the aim to abuse the generous social benefits, who are not even willing to respect our cultural and social values and abide by the laws of the host country.”²³⁵ We can therefore observe the tendency to sketch a parallel between the issue of immigration and the Roma issue. Whether this was the aim behind the use of such language or not, this practice may have the consequence of transferring the schema, or the cognitive framework people have created for the Roma issue, to the immigration issue—possibly including the prevalent emotion and level of richness (or, more likely, its absence).

Our Social Benefits

One party candidate also made the discursive link between immigration and the abuse of our social system. When asked about the possibility of mass migration to EU as a result of the instability following the Arab Spring, Ulrych asserted that “we cannot allow that people with the aim of misusing our generous social benefits move to the EU.”²³⁶ The party thus also engaged in the portrayal of immigration as potentially motivated by economic gain and a threat to our social system.

Language Completing the Picture

This portrayal is further supported by rather negative language that the KDU-ČSL candidates at times used. Despite the program expressing the need for solidarity with people affected by poverty and the lack of freedom²³⁷ and Svoboda expressing the opinion that if we do not take in any immigrants, we are “parasites” of the whole system that protects the EU's external border,²³⁸ the language used at other occasions by the party candidates often undermined these claims. Besides the practices described above, Svoboda talked about the

235 “Rozhovor s Kandidátem Do EP Vítem Ulrychem.”

236 Ibid.

237 “Program KDU-ČSL pro Volby Do Evropského Parlamentu 23. a 24. Května 2014.”

238 “Jan Zahradil: Stalo Se Dnes – ODS.”

“tide”²³⁹ of immigrants,²⁴⁰ an expression which has the negative connotation of being overwhelmed. In his final address to voters, when talking about Europe's future, he put “our children” in opposition to “the work of immigrants,” giving a preference to the former.²⁴¹ By saying he wanted Europe that sees its future in its own children and not in the work of immigrants,²⁴² he effectively ruled out immigration from his vision, turning it into something that is not to be associated with the future of Europe.

Communication of Immigration: Asymmetry

Most of these exchanges took place on the KDU-ČSL's website, though the circumstances of the change in the program made it to the mainstream media as well. Facebook was used to communicate issues related to the election, but the topic of immigration and asylum was avoided completely. The only noteworthy activity in this regard was related to the issue of identity and took place two weeks before the election when the party changed its cover photo. The picture displayed three flags—Czech, EU and Ukrainian—right next to one another, with the logos of the EPP Group and KDU-ČSL.²⁴³ The cover photo can be understood as an expression of the party's (and the EPP Group's) support for Ukraine.

On the other hand, the leader of the KDU-ČSL party list actively addressed the issue of immigration in the above-mentioned super-debate, which can be contrasted with other, larger political parties that avoided to bring up the issue on their own or reacted to it only when explicitly asked about it.

KDU-ČSL: Summary

Representation of the In-Group

- we are Europeans with European values characterized above all by the respect to human rights, our Christian roots and traditional values
- we support weaker and endangered groups
- xenophobia against foreigners is not compatible with a party that claims allegiance to European values

Representation of the Out-Group

- they are unwilling to adapt to our society; they do not respect our values (particularly human rights—equality of men and women, the freedom of religion, democracy) and do not abide by our laws
- they are those who cause disturbances and engage in criminal activities (burn cars on

239 In Czech, the word used is “přiliv” signifying influx, inflow, or, literally, high tide.

240 “Evropské Volby 2014.”

241 Ibid.

242 Ibid.

243 “KDU-ČSL - Cover Photos.”

the outskirts of towns and sell drugs); drug trade is associated particularly with the Vietnamese community and certain groups from the East

- they are those who bring radical Islamism and fight on the side of radicals
- they may misuse our generous social benefits
- Muslims are generally not explicitly mentioned (merely implied by the nexus of “immigration which will bring radical Islamism”), other groups mentioned are the Vietnamese community and “certain groups that came here from the East”
- some are refugees and those who need our help; to those, Europe should be forthcoming

Categorization of Immigrants

- economic migrants vs refugees (also called political migrants)

Immigration: A Matter of...

- the need to defend our values and to provide for our safety/security (especially from radical Islamism)
- respect for our values
- defense of our values and safety
- the need to provide help to all refugees that need it
- links to organized crime and terrorism
- criminal activities: foreigners engage in the drug trade
- limited resources (they abuse our social system)

Language that Draws the Picture Complete

- “unadaptable” immigrants
- immigrants bring “radical Islamism”
- vision for Europe that sees its future in our own children, not the work of immigrants
- “tide” of immigrants

Justifications and Persuasion Strategies

- using the disturbances in France in 2005 to illustrate the problems associated with immigration
- use of expert opinion and the provision of details to justify own stance on immigration
- use of apparent concession with regard to Islam (“we do not criticize it as such, but...”)
- use of negative presentation of the party's political opponents
- use of positive self-presentation as a political actor
- use of exceptional example

Argumentation: Appealing to Reason

- pros of immigration
 - it may offset the problem of Europe's dying out
- cons of immigration
 - it presents a threat to our European values, safety and security
 - immigrants are not going to adapt; they will not respect the law, human rights, and our values
 - immigrants are problematic: they engage in harmful activities such as the drug trade

- immigrants abuse our social system
- immigrants should integrate in a more positive manner

Argumentation: Appealing to Normative Structures

- beyond the EU: refugees and those who need our help should be helped (we should have solidarity with people affected by poverty and the lack of freedom)
- within the EU: redistribution of refugees should not be ruled out because the Czech Republic should not be free-riding on the current system (implied solidarity with other EU members)

3.1.2 TOP 09²⁴⁴

Vision for Immigration and Asylum Policy

Decisive Role of the Member States

TOP 09 advocates a strong role for EU member states in the policy area of immigration and asylum. Yet it is not categorized among policy areas where the member states should have a “decisive” role: “Member states should have a decisive role in the matters of education, culture, and the organization of partner and family relations. At least the right of veto should be preserved in areas with a strong impact on the national budget, such as the protection of health, social policy, taxes, and asylum and immigration policy.”²⁴⁵ The program subsequently explicitly states that “the powers and responsibility of individual member states for example for [...] immigration policy [should be preserved],”²⁴⁶ implying that the party disapproves of the revision the status quo in this area. The justification used for this stance are its large economic implications for the national budget.²⁴⁷

Immigration vs Strong Border Protection

Similarly to ANO 2011, TOP 09 discusses the free movement within the Union as associated with the need to protect the “strong” external border in the context of immigration. According to TOP 09, it this strong external border a way to “be able to protect [the EU] from illegal immigration and uncontrolled economic migration,”²⁴⁸ a formulation that most likely differentiates between the two main qualities of immigration stressed by TOP 09 in this context—its illegality and economic nature, with their relation left unspecified. This approach reflects the historical development of this policy area, which TOP 09 approaches as a fact of life.

²⁴⁴ The name of the party is formed from the abbreviation of the party's motto “Tradition Responsibility Prosperity,” with “09” referring to the year of the party's founding.

²⁴⁵ “Volební Program Do Evropského Parlamentu 2014.”

²⁴⁶ “TOP 09.”

²⁴⁷ “Volební Program Do Evropského Parlamentu 2014.”

²⁴⁸ Ibid.

The Limits of Solidarity in the EU

TOP 09 proposes two approaches to solving the matter. The fact that some member states are “overburdened” by “asylum-seekers and illegal immigrants” should be solved by “solidarity in the form of material and logistical help by using European funds and other instruments.”²⁴⁹ The Lisbon Treaty's General Provisions stipulate solidarity as the principle on which common immigration and asylum policy should be built; however, it does not specify what this means in practice.²⁵⁰ Though often referred to as meaning the distribution of refugees among individual member states, TOP 09 envisions other measures that fall short of the redistribution of refugees, similarly to ODS, for example, that suggested support from the European budget.

Prevention

Another approach TOP 09 proposes is prevention: “If we want to effectively solve the problems of illegal immigration, we should focus on the illegal immigrants' countries of origin in the EU and get maximally involved in the area of prevention. A large part of illegal immigrants undertakes their dangerous adventure due to not only [their] dire economic situation, but also naive notions of an easy life within the EU.”²⁵¹ This formulation raises a question of what, according to the authors of the program, should be the goal of such prevention. Considering the arrangement of the sentences, it appears that the second sentence develops the party's prevention approach. So, when the authors write about the “dire economic situation” of immigrants in their country of origin (which can be considered a push factor), it may be concluded that that is what the proposed prevention measures would address. Following this logic, this would mean that the party then turns to pull factors—the idea of “an easy life within the EU”—with the goal of the preventative measure being the putting of this “naivety” right. Based on the structure of the paragraph, this appears likely.

This approach may be thought of as a version of the “apparent sympathy” strategy. It suggests that if immigrants did not have naive ideas about the life in the EU, they would not come—which would be better for them, because they would not have to undertake the journey here. This implication also tends to delegitimize their position and claims, as it indicates that they merely want to have an “easy” life, which is not achievable, implying their situation cannot improve much compared to their current condition in their country of origin.

249 Ibid.

250 “TFEU - Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.”

251 “Volební Program Do Evropského Parlamentu 2014.”

Other Reasons for Migration?

With these solutions in mind, what is completely omitted from the description of TOP 09 in this regard are reasons for migration that go beyond the economic, which are the easiest to brush aside as illegitimate. Though the program mentions immigration and asylum policy as two separate areas, it does not include any information elaborating on asylum policy, or what may be—at least from the perspective of international law—legitimate reasons for leaving one's country, such as war. Similarly, TOP 09 does not envision any preventative measures that would address these circumstances.

Refugees and Radical Fighters

War is mentioned in relation to migration, particularly the civil war in Syria. However, in the program, it is not discussed in the context of asylum policy, but security. The civil war in Syria, along with Iran's nuclear program, TOP 09 considered to be “the main source of danger.”²⁵² “The continuously growing crisis in Syria,” the program states, “has the consequence of an exceptional number of refugees who burden above all the neighboring countries, but now also Europe, and destroy the local, age-old Christian communities. Radical fighters on both sides of the conflict are another potential danger.”²⁵³ This description, besides introducing the issue of religion as relevant, depicts refugees as a destructive force. Oh, and the radical fighters present a danger, too. Luckily, TOP 09 does not, as is the case with some other parties, consider refugees and radical fighters to be one and the same thing.

Within the EU: “Poverty Tourism” Rhetoric Challenged

However, when it comes to migration within the EU, or EU mobility, TOP 09 opposes tendencies that call into question the free movement of people and labor within the EU due to alleged misuse. In its program, TOP 09 claimed to support work and student mobility, whose low level is seen as an obstacle to economic development: “In the whole EU there are millions of vacancies unsatisfied by domestic demand [...]. In this context, we are going to face up to campaigns attacking 'poverty tourism' or 'social dumping,' that are in clash not only with the values and goals of integration, but also real data and numbers. We will not allow the freedom of movement to become hostage to nationalists and populists who want to fortify themselves and build in the European space boundaries once destroyed.”²⁵⁴ In the context of the EU, TOP 09 thus proclaims to stand up against forces that aim to restrict migration within

252 Ibid.

253 Ibid.

254 Ibid.

the EU in the name of protection against the abuse of the national social systems. Moreover, its members see this approach in negative light, but only as long as it happens within the EU. That is, the only difference between this mobility and migration from third countries is that *within the EU* the boundaries have *already* been destroyed.

The Devil's in the Portrayal

We Are Europe

What I noticed when reading the electoral program was a difference in the portrayal of the political space of (and identity of those living in) the EU and that beyond the European borders. The entire campaign of the party was built around the idea that “Europe Are *We*—Not *Them* (emphasis added),”²⁵⁵ whose goal was to suppress the dichotomy between the good Czech national government (or, generally, the Czech identity) and the bad Brussels (or, more generally, the “Others” from Europe that stand opposite to our identity and our interests). The program, for example, states the following: “We are not bearers of an us-them lens, but perceive our role and position in the EU through the lens of members of a crew in a boat, who understandably care about the boat smoothly reaching its destination.”²⁵⁶ This portrayal stresses the EU as a project that is also ours and one whose success we, *understandably*, have an interest in—we are all in one boat and, thus, a common interest (though in other parts of the program, it is Czech national interest that is, somewhat contradictorily, stressed²⁵⁷). At the same time, the use of the boat metaphor is somewhat ironic considering that it is on boats that many people who try to reach Europe find their deaths in the waters of the Mediterranean, an issue that the party does not directly address in its program. In any case, this European perspective is also stressed in a statement of support by a Czech scientist Illnerová who said that “[T]he EU is also our project. Let's not act like it is 'us' here and 'them' in the Brussels. 'We' are the EU as well.”²⁵⁸

The idea that we, Czechs, are Europeans permeated the entire campaign—the visual materials, for example, featured the picture of the party leader, Schwarzenberg with a caption “I'm a European” and an appeal that is literally translated as “Don't Cough at Europe;”²⁵⁹ while “coughing at” is in Czech a colloquial expression meaning “to be dismissive of something” or “not giving a damn about something.” Moreover, among the five reasons why one should vote for TOP 09, the party included this argument: “Because to be a proud Czech

255 “Evropa Jsme My, Ne Oni.”

256 “Volební Program Do Evropského Parlamentu 2014.”

257 Ibid.

258 “Helena Illnerová Volí TOPku.”

259 “TOP 09.”

also means to be a responsible European,²⁶⁰ effectively putting a sign of equation between the two.

This Time We Can: Appeal to Participate

The party communicated a variety reasons why we should “like Ms. Europe,”²⁶¹ feel and act as responsible Europeans, ranging from ones that may evoke unease rooted in the Czech historical experience to ones that are much more positively framed. A flyer summarizing the main program points for example reads: “Europe are we and everything that goes on in it, influences us. So that things are not decided *about us—without us*, we need to sit at one negotiating table and sound loud (emphasis added).”²⁶² This sentence uses the phrase “about us—without us,” which is a reference to the infamous 1938 Munich Agreement, a failed act of appeasement signed by France, Germany, the Great Britain, and Italy that allowed the annexation of a part of the Czechoslovak territory, the Sudetenland, to Germany—in which the Czechoslovak political representatives were denied participation. One of the greatest scars in the Czech historical consciousness, this agreement is often referred to as the “Munich Diktat,” implying the matter was decided “without us,” or “Munich Betrayal,” as it breached military alliance agreements then in force. The phrase “about us—without us” is until today a part of the Czech and Slovak vocabularies. In the context of TOP 09's flyer, it may be understood as an appeal to participation—since we, this time, have the opportunity.

The candidates cited also other reasons, appealing to emotion with an answer “because she [Ms. Europe] likes us,” as well as to reason—“because it is advantageous for us.”²⁶³ Another reason referred to our historical experience and the fact that we should be happy we are a party to a community of democratic countries characterized by the rule of law. We owe allegiance to her because it is our home and we naturally belong there [to Europe]; it is our family and a guarantor of peace.²⁶⁴ Europe is referred to as a partner and a mother of a family characterized by cooperation and peace.²⁶⁵

European Vision

This positive portrayal of Europe resonates with the party's opposition to nationalist and populist calls for the erosion of some of the achievements of integration described above.

260 “Stále Váháte, Koho Volit?”

261 *Proč Mít Rád “Pani Evropu”?*

262 *Ibid.*

263 *Ibid.*

264 *Ibid.*

265 *Ibid.*

The questioning of the free movement of people within the EU, particularly in the United Kingdom, is, according to the candidate Ženíšek “a populist surfing on the wave of aversion towards immigrants,”²⁶⁶ which, based on the context of the campaign, TOP 09 disapproves of. Ženíšek justifies its refusal by referring to our own, similar, experience: “We ourselves remember how unpleasant it was when after the accession to the EU we had a limited access to the labor market of some member states.”²⁶⁷ Finally, the party's idea for Europe also seems to be respectful of diversity: “For us, Europe is not a black and white world, but a colorful mosaic.”²⁶⁸ It appears that TOP 09 envisions a diverse Europe characterized by cooperation among member states and a discernible European identity.

Shifting the Boundaries of Our Identity

The party's effort to advance European identity among the Czech population and to assert the naturalness of their compatibility is unprecedented in the context of an electoral campaign. The determination to take up an issue of identity and shift “the Other” from the boundaries of the Czech Republic much further—in the context of an electoral campaign where votes are at stake—may be evaluated as relatively bold. Moreover, the advancement of the common European identity and the stress on the value of diversity, as well as opposition to some politicians' tendencies to take advantage of the anti-immigrant wave is from the perspective of the immigration discourse praiseworthy. However, such political courage necessarily involves boundaries. And if we explore the boundaries of this vision, it becomes clear that they are placed at the EU frontier. When we peak beyond it, the party slips into the rhetorical tendencies of the other parties, such as negative framing of the issue, securitizing language and the absence of a declared need for the protection of some migrants.

Negative Portrayal

In terms of the language used, the party's program for example mentions the need of the EU to have the capacity to “defend itself” against illegal immigration and uncontrolled economic migration, the unprecedented number of refugees that “burden” neighboring member states or refugees from Syria that “destroy” certain communities. The party also regularly uses the term “illegal immigration” and the program even includes the label “illegal immigrant,”²⁶⁹ conveying a message about the immigrants' criminal behavior. Though this negative language is in the case of TOP 09 relatively weakly represented, it is nevertheless

266 “Ženíšek.”

267 Ibid.

268 “Volební Program Do Evropského Parlamentu 2014.”

269 Ibid.

used, hardly creating a positive image of immigrants that would facilitate a constructive solution to the challenges immigration presents.

Refugees as a Threat: Religion Matters

Moreover, the program mentions the civil war in Syria as one of the two major sources of danger, particularly “the refugees who burden above all the neighboring countries, but now also Europe, and destroy the local, age-old Christian communities” and “the radical fighters on both sides [of the conflict].”²⁷⁰ On this occasion, refugees are presented as a threat to the security of certain communities, in the case of which, notably, their religion is considered relevant enough to be included in the party's political program, implying a threat to an identity with which the voter may more likely identify than with that of the perpetrators of this violence and, implicitly, stands in opposition to it. Moreover, these people are labelled specifically as “refugees,” or people who have legitimate grounds to leave their country, which carries an important message to Czech voters—those who destroy are not some unspecified migrants, but those who demand (and should be granted) international protection.

Communication: A Gap

Finally, I think it is worth mentioning that other than this, the party did not make any statements on asylum, asylum-seekers, or refugees—in the sense that it would endorse the idea or comment on the phenomenon in any way. In my view, this is particularly surprising considering the fact that the party representatives put great emphasis on presenting the party as advocating a value-based foreign policy that values human rights and democratic values as more important than purely economic interests. This tendency manifested itself in the context of the Olympics in Sochi, Russia,²⁷¹ the crisis in Ukraine (perhaps the most visibly)²⁷² or Tibet^{273 274} and appears to have the ambition to continue the foreign policy tradition represented by Václav Havel. In my view, taking up the issue of refugees (with the right to seek asylum being a human right and with this topic being associated with a certain moral stance that TOP 09 tries to, I believe, represent) and making a case for it, at least in letter—somewhere, should, in my view, be natural for this party. As a result, our eyes should turn to its complete absence, in my view.

Generally, TOP 09 can be said to not have communicated information about the issue

270 Ibid.

271 “Kalousek.”

272 Ibid.

273 “Kalousek.”

274 “Volební Program Do Evropského Parlamentu 2014.”

of immigration and asylum outside of the party program. Much information about the values, identity and the relation between the Czech Republic and the EU advanced by the party was communicated in the campaign. Related, they have been addressed as relevant, but I could not infer much from them about the issues of interest. Though the party's addressing of the issue of identity was laudable, I consider the deficiency in information on immigration and asylum to be an unnecessary gap—especially considering the role of this party in the Czech politics.²⁷⁵

TOP 09: Summary

Representation of the In-Group

- *we* are Europeans
- Europe is not a black and white world, but a colorful mosaic
- we are Czechs, which means we are also responsible Europeans
- we are Europeans that value the achievements of European integration, such as the freedom of movement
- we will oppose nationalists and populists
- we advance value-based foreign policy (particularly human rights)
- we support healthy national confidence
- our country has the historical experience of an ex-Soviet bloc country

Representation of the Out-Group

- they undertake their dangerous adventure due to their dire economic situation and the naive notions of an easy life within the EU
- refugees from Syria are a burden to its neighboring countries and a threat to Christian communities
- some come illegally
- some come due to economic reasons

Categorization of Immigrants

- illegal immigration and uncontrolled economic migration (need to be protected against)
- asylum seekers and illegal immigrants (overburden some states)
- these categories imply the existence of
 - asylum seekers vs economic migrants
 - legal vs illegal immigrants

Immigration: A Matter of...

- security of the EU's external border
- inconvenience and security: refugees from Syria are a burden to its neighboring countries and a threat to Christian communities
- economy: immigration and asylum policy has a strong impact on the national budget

²⁷⁵ In the 2010 election to the Chamber of Deputies (the last that gave rise to a political government before the most recent election in 2013), TOP 09 received the third largest electoral support after ČSSD and ODS (16.7 %) and became part of the governing coalition between the years 2010 and 2013.

“Volby Do Poslanecké Sněmovny Parlamentu České Republiky Konané ve Dnech 28.05. – 29.05.2010.”

- values within the EU—solidarity

Language that Draws the Picture Complete

- some member states are “overburdened” by “asylum-seekers and illegal immigrants”
- “illegal” immigrant, “illegal” immigration
- refugees “burden” Syria's neighboring countries
- refugees destroy certain communities
- “defending” against immigration

Justifications and Persuasion Strategies

- the use of the Czech historical experience to counter nationalist tendencies with regard to EU mobility
- implicitly downplayed the severity of conditions in the immigrants' countries of origin

Argumentation: Appealing to Reason

- member states should play a decisive role in immigration and asylum policy due to its strong impact on the national budget

Argumentation: Appealing to Normative Structures

- The fact that some member states are overburdened by asylum-seekers and illegal immigrants should be solved by solidarity in the form of material and logistical help by using European funds and other instruments

3.1.3 Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSČM)

Vision for Immigration and Asylum Policy

Declared Values

The Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia seeks to “return purpose to European integration,” which should be characterized by peace and social progress, and make it more social and democratic in order to achieve a higher level of social, economic and cultural rights for citizens as well as peaceful development for Europe.²⁷⁶ The aim of KSČM is to “rebuild Europe on the basis of solidarity and sovereignty of its people, on the basis of equality and cooperation,” while combating the offensive of neoliberalism, neo-fascism and neo-Nazism.²⁷⁷ As regional and social disparities surge and differences between nations are on the increase as well, “national egoism and xenophobia awaken as a serious threat to democracy,” KSČM holds.

Program: Refugees vs Social Tourists

Due to the fact that none of the studied materials contained concrete references to migration-related issues, this section, as well as the one devoted to portrayal, is based on the

²⁷⁶ “Volební Program KSČM pro Volby Do Evropského Parlamentu v Roce 2014.”

²⁷⁷ Ibid.

content of the party program.

In the first chapter of its program called “Human Rights, Conditions for Citizens and Regions,” KSČM outlines human rights and democratic principles as the main basis for EU politics. The party's vision for immigration and asylum policy is introduced in this context: “[KSČM will support] the regulation of international migration from countries outside of the EU conceptually and with respect to human rights. Effective solution to asylum, differentiate between refugees and social tourism, take [legal] action [implying punishment], against illegal migration and thoroughly defend against it.”^{278 279} Considering its context, emphasis in this particular section is given to the observance of human rights. With the explicit recognition of refugees as a category of incoming migrants, particularly the right to seek asylum is implicitly recognized.

However, the program—already at this stage—distinguishes between two types of migrants, refugees and those who come to benefit from “social tourism,” a label that indicates the party's perception of the latter group's burdensome nature.²⁸⁰ The program suggests that besides refugees, the rest of migrants are “social tourists,” leaving no other option.

Measures Against Illegal Migration

The Communist Party also declares their rejection of what the party refers to as “illegal” migration and proposes strict measures to prevent it, as well as sanction it, endorsing its criminal nature. This point is further developed in the section “Europe of Peace, Europe in the World:” “[the party will support] strict control of illegal migration and the adoption of measures tightening the movement of foreigners engaged in criminal activities.”²⁸¹ KSČM thus presents migration as linked to the issue of the movement of foreigners-criminals and assures its voters to address this issue *also* due to its criminal aspect. However, the potential tension between measures to prevent and sanction “illegal” migration and the observance of the right to seek asylum above all, is left unaddressed.

Conditions Attached

Regarding the work (and thus probably the legal stay) of immigrants, KSČM proposes “to grant work permits to migrants from countries outside of the EU in extent that we are able

278 In Czech, the sentence is: “Regulovat mezinárodní migraci ze zemí mimo EU koncepčně a s ohledem na dodržování lidských práv. Efektivní azylové řízení, rozlišit azylanty od sociální turistiky a postihovat nelegální migraci a důsledně se jí bránit.” The word “postihovat” that describes illegal migration refers to a certain action against it, implying legal action followed by a criminal sanction.

279 “Volební Program KSČM pro Volby Do Evropského Parlamentu v Roce 2014.”

280 Ibid.

281 Ibid.

to absorb, and in professions that will be of benefit. Effective control of 'work under the table.'²⁸² To stipulate clear rules on health and social insurance for legal migrants."²⁸³ The party's vision therefore is to limit the number of economic migrants based on two criteria: our capacity and the usefulness of their profession, while both are left unspecified (the interpretation of the "capacity to absorb" appears to be even more problematic, because no criteria on how to determine this are mentioned).

What appears to be the most noteworthy about this last point, however, is its context. It is included in a section called "For Social Europe" that otherwise enumerates all the social rights Europeans should be entitled to, including, but not limited to, the right to employment and fair reimbursement, adequate free time, access to universal access to free public services, such as health care and education; the proposal to shorten the working hours in the whole of the EU, guarantees for the youth and their right to first employment, guarantees to seniors and right to a reasonable pension, etc.²⁸⁴ These program points are followed by the call to "advance social policy based on sex equality and *eliminating all forms of discrimination, including all groups in a society* (emphasis added)."²⁸⁵ Immediately after that appears a proposal for a particular form of social policy for immigrants that is marked by its need to be governed by "clear rules" that can be assumed to be necessarily different from those governing the rest of the population—all the while the party's declared priority is the "solving of the issues of unemployment, poverty, and *social exclusion* (emphasis added)."²⁸⁶ The party thus declares to provide a wide spectrum of social guarantees, a list that however covers only some—what is perhaps more interesting is that this piece of information did not fail to be mentioned.

Finally, to complete the party's declared value context, KSČM sketched out its negative stance on the ideologies of the far right already in its Preamble.²⁸⁷ This attitude is completed in a section on human rights mentioned above: "[the party will support] opposition against the danger of racism, xenophobia, fascism and revanchism. [It is going to] stand up against aggressive anti-communism, repressions against progressive movements and their representatives."²⁸⁸

282 In Czech, the sentence is "Účinná kontrola tzv. práce na černo," which in literal translation means "Effective control of 'black work'" and refers to undeclared work, interestingly not specifying the status of the worker.

283 "Volební Program KSČM pro Volby Do Evropského Parlamentu v Roce 2014."

284 Ibid.

285 Ibid.

286 Ibid.

287 Ibid.

288 Ibid.

The Devil's in the Portrayal

Negative Connotations

The Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia puts, in its program, people and their rights first. Human rights are portrayed as inviolable and are a consideration in the management of international migration. However, portraying issues related to migration in a peculiar manner, the party's handling of this issue may evoke negative connotations.

First, the right to seek international protection is not questioned; it has its rightful place in the party program: “refugees” are to be “distinguished” from “social tourism.”²⁸⁹ This manner of distinguishing evokes a legitimate-illegitimate distinction.

Conditions for Refugees

Yet though the first mention of migration appears to recognize the existence of asylum unconditionally, another section adds conditions: “[KSČM sees the need] to relate the demand for safe and just Europe even to those who legitimately seek asylum and want to observe the law and European norms.”^{290 291} Though worded in a somewhat confusing way, this sentence seems to say that even though seeking asylum is legitimate, refugees should “observe the law” and follow “European [social]²⁹² norms,” as well as imply the insistence that the refugees' are of the same opinion when it comes to our vision for Europe that is safe and just.²⁹³ The party therefore puts emphasis on the requirement to observe the law, share similar norms, as well as values.

Social Tourists

Moreover, though the formulation “differentiate between refugees and social tourism” has the advantage of recognizing the right to asylum, the other category is reduced to “social tourism.”²⁹⁴ This portrayal not only fails to give justice to the complexity of immigration, giving the impression that those who are not granted, or do not even seek, international protection²⁹⁵ are all of the same kind. It also depicts this as “social tourism,” which is a label that in this context describes migration motivated by relatively generous social benefits, often in relation to low-skilled immigrants with low chances of finding employment.²⁹⁶ What it

289 Ibid.

290 In Czech, the sentence is: “Vztahovat požadavek bezpečné a spravedlivé Evropy i na ty, kteří oprávněně usilují o azyl a chtějí dodržovat zákony a evropské normy.”

291 “Volební Program KSČM pro Volby Do Evropského Parlamentu v Roce 2014.”

292 The norms referred to are most likely social norms, as legal norms are already mentioned.

293 “Volební Program KSČM pro Volby Do Evropského Parlamentu v Roce 2014.”

294 Ibid.

295 The word used to refer to the first group is in Czech “azylant,” referring to someone who has already been granted international protection; a refugee.

296 “‘Sociální Turistika’ Patvarem Roku. Němci Se Jí Přesto Bojí.”

implies is the abuse of the social system by those who have not contributed to it and thus creates the image of immigrants as agents of economic drain. This perception of immigrants through economic lens is also reflected in the party's conditions on the acceptance of migrants—their profession has to be useful to our economy; an attitude that also hints at the party's perception of immigrants, who are reduced to a mere “profession.”²⁹⁷

Word Choice and its Repercussions

Similarly, the use of the predicate “regulate” with the object “migration” also suggests that it is something that needs to be controlled in some way, hardly creating an image of immigration as an opportunity for the receiving society, for example. “Illegal migration,” according to KSČM, needs to be outright “defended against.”²⁹⁸

At the same time, the object that is consistently used throughout the document is “migrant” or “migration” as opposed the narrower term “immigrant” or “immigration” that implies only movement into a political unit (Czech Republic, EU). Though the used term potentially does not have the potentially negative connotation associated with “immigration,” in virtually all cases, the word does imply immigration (it is followed by the words “from countries outside of the EU” or otherwise indicates that the EU is the receiving country).²⁹⁹

The few sentences also indicate a degree of criminalization of immigrants. Not only does KSČM refer to “illegal immigration” as a something against which we need to defend ourselves, the reference is included in the same sentence that distinguishes refugees from “social tourists” and points to the interconnection in the minds of the authors of the text of migration with criminal activity that needs to be sanctioned.

Besides being concerned with the “illegal” status of immigrants, the program includes a reference to the need to effectively control illegal, or unreported, work of immigrants (though their status is left unspecified). This points to another aspect of criminalization of immigrants—this time not of their status, but their employment activity, which is also associated above all with criminal behavior, a problem in need of solving—and presented as such.

Communication: Future vs Past

The Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia did not, during the studied period and in the studied sources, communicate its position on immigration and asylum policy or any

297 “Volební Program KSČM pro Volby Do Evropského Parlamentu v Roce 2014.”

298 Ibid.

299 Ibid.

information on this policy outside of its program. Themes related to immigration and asylum, such as the communication of values and identity-related issues can be generally divided into three categories.

Vision: Forward-looking

On one hand, it is the communication of the party's program priorities—values presented in the context of the EP elections campaign based on a vision that is forward-looking. Proclamations such as: “We are going to strive for a different Europe—one that is social, solidaristic and just,” the statement “We want Europe for people—equal opportunity, strengthened democracy, and protection of all human rights,”³⁰⁰ or the statement expressed in the video invitation to the election: “Let's together build Europe for people, Europe without bureaucracy, wars, racism and xenophobia.”³⁰¹ The idea of a peaceful and cooperative Europe was also one of the communicated themes: “Let's elect politicians of the radical left, the candidates of KSČM, in the upcoming election, who will strengthen and push through the idea of peace, understanding and cooperation of the European union with other states of Europe.”³⁰²

Using of the Demons of the Past

On the other hand, the other aspect of the party's communication of its values was backwards-looking, dominated by the rejection of fascism and far-right ideologies more generally, often referring to the horrors of World War II perpetuated in the name of Nazism (such as the threat of attacks against Jews in the Ukraine that during WWII were commonly perpetrated by nationalists³⁰³). This stance was presented most often in the context of the crisis in the Ukraine, which was characterized by the influence of fascist, far-right and nationalist forces that need to be stopped: “In Ukraine, the power of armed, nationalist and far-right groups, which in the name of revolution can confiscate citizens' property, commit violence and intimidate them, is rising.”³⁰⁴ Filip, the party leader, presented the Ukrainian nationalists (along with Western powers) as having the aim of “completely eliminating the communist movement in the Ukraine,” members of which are “faced with blackmail, intimidation; they are being physically attacked and property is being confiscated. [...] In Ukraine, hundreds of memorials of the World War II were destroyed.”³⁰⁵ The alleged

300 “Cover Photos - Chceme Evropu pro Lidi - Rovné Příležitosti, Posílení Demokracie a Ochranu Všech Lidských Práv.”

301 *Pozvánka K Volbám Do Evropského Parlamentu.*

302 “Výzva Občanům K účasti ve Volbách Do Evropského Parlamentu.”

303 “Projev JUDr. Vojtěcha Filipa K Aktuální Situaci Na Ukrajině a Postoj Vlády České Republiky.”

304 *Ibid.*

305 *Ibid.*

influence of these movements is presented as a far-right threat, which Filip linked to the legacy of WWII. This approach can be illustrated also in the statement on Ukraine advanced by the Communist Party in the Chamber of Deputies: “The Chamber of Deputies with concern follows [the developments] in Ukraine [whereby] fascisizing³⁰⁶ forces have come to power through undemocratic means that are strengthened internationally and threaten democratic development not only in the Ukraine, but also in a number of other countries.³⁰⁷ The parallel with Russian propaganda's typecasting of forces opposing the political leadership associated with Yanukovich as fascist is evident.

The theme of crimes committed in the name of Nazism was also used on the occasion of the anniversary of the end of WWII that the party leader celebrated at the Russian Embassy in Prague. His speech included, among others, the following sentence: “Let's defend peace through our actions. Because *the brown plague of fascism* is, unfortunately, returning, and is still among us. For examples we do not need to go too far in terms of time or geography (emphasis added).”³⁰⁸ ³⁰⁹ Filip also “commemorated the victims of Nazi persecution. 'It is essential to constantly keep reminding ourselves of the acts of Nazi persecution and not forget,' said JUDr. Vojtěch Filip” in Terezín.³¹⁰

These examples of the handling of these issues in creating an image of the world that needs to be protected from far-right tendencies are not directly linked to the EP elections. Yet there was also an instance where this theme was used by the leader of the party list for the EP election, Konečná, in the campaign. In a flyer titled “The awakening³¹¹ of the demons of the past by Minister Válková,” Konečná reacts to Válková's reaction to a question on the expulsion of the German population from Czechoslovakia.³¹² Válková said,!: “[I think] [t]he worst. I understand it was a reaction to what had been happening to Czechs before, but not that much had been happening in the Protectorate.”³¹³ To this unfortunate statement, Konečná reacted in the following way: “Such appalling dehonouration of the Czechs' role during World War to can be heard only from neo-Nazi groups in Germany,”³¹⁴ followed by a Reinhard Heydrich's citation on the annihilation of Czech lands and the enumeration of crimes committed by the “Nazi machinery” in the Protectorate and the expression of Konečná's

306 In Czech, the word used is “fašizující,” literally meaning “fascisizing”--implying an ongoing “fascisization” (turning something fascist).

307 “Návrh Usnesení KSČM K Aktuální Situaci Na Ukrajině.”

308 In this statement, Filip was in all likelihood referring to the alleged situation in the Ukraine.

309 “Nikdy Více Fašismus, Nikdy Více Válku.”

310 “JUDr. Vojtěch Filip, Místopředseda Poslanecké Sněmovny Parlamentu ČR, Se v Neděli 18. 5. Zúčastnil Tereziňské Tryzny, Kde Uctil Oběti Nacistické Perzekuce.”

311 In Czech, the word used is “oživování,” literally meaning “resuscitating” or “bringing to life.”

312 “Oživování Démonů Minulosti Ministryní Válkovou.”

313 Ibid.

314 Ibid.

concern that this may encourage Sudeten Germans to question the Beneš Decrees and demand the return of the property confiscated by the Decrees.

It is apparent that the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia not only advanced a forward-looking vision in its communication of values during the campaign, but that it was also this party, and not only Minister Válková, who engaged in awakening the demons of the past and used the image of threat posed by neo-fascism in its communication prior to the EP election.

Traces of the Communist Past

Finally, regarding the style of some of the communication, the at times peculiar word choice and rhetoric used by the Communist Party cannot escape the eye (and the ear) of a reader who has grown up in a post-Velvet revolution, democratic, era, such as myself. These characteristic formulations do not appear so much in the party program, as they do in transcription of the spoken word (especially of the party leader, Filip—while the style of the party list leader for the 2014 EP election, Konečná, does not appear to me as characterized by this quality; it is rather very clear, simple, straightforward and does not contain this kind of language). Traces of the communist past, they still nestle in the speech of some of the party members, though to a lesser extent in the context of the official communication directly relevant to the EP election.

On a similar note, as can be seen in the summary below, though the party did address issues of immigration and asylum in its program, it does not defend it by arguments. Many other parties state their opinion and *justify it*; for example: We think those fleeing from war should be granted asylum, *because in the past, other countries also helped our citizens when they were fleeing injustice*. Yet the Communist Party did not defend its statements by invoking arguments (rational reasons or values), which is why the “justifications” and “argumentation” categories remain empty.

KSČM: Summary

Representation of the In-Group

- we are Europeans
- we support human rights
- we support sex equality and are against all forms of discrimination
- we are opposed to fascism, national egoism, racism and xenophobia

Representation of the Out-Group

- (some) foreigners engage in criminal activities
- immigrants are often social tourists

- immigrants need to be an asset
- their stay needs to be regulated
- some immigrants have legitimate reasons to be granted asylum

Categorization of Immigrants

- refugees vs social tourists (though economic immigration is acceptable under certain conditions)
- legal vs illegal migrants

Immigration: A Matter of...

- migration should be regulated with respect to human rights
- criminal activities (relating to entry, status and work)
- stipulating clear rules for immigrants' stay and work
- stipulating requirements refugees need to fulfill (observe the law, follow European social norms, share the vision for safe and just Europe)
- economy (social tourism, restricting immigrants' access to social rights and services)

Language that Draws the Picture Complete

- “regulate” migration
- “defend” against “illegal” migration
- “migration,” “migrant”
- “social tourists”

Justifications and Persuasion Strategies

- use of exceptional example (the portrayal of all economic migrants as “social tourists”)

Argumentation: Appealing to Reason

- N/A

Argumentation: Appealing to Normative Structures

- N/A

3.1.4 Czech Social Democratic Party (ČSSD)

Vision for Immigration and Asylum Policy

Too Evident A Lacuna

The Czech Social Democratic Party's “manifesto” for the 2014 EP election does not include any information on the party's stance on immigration and asylum. The only sentence that could provide a hint of what its position may be in this regard is a part of the following bullet point: “We want Europe that would ensure equal opportunities and free movement to all its citizens. Europe that is built upon the solidarity among member states and respect to human rights.”³¹⁵ Since “solidarity” is the word often used in the context of EU members

315 “Chceme Spravedlivou a Sociální Evropu! Programový Manifest ČSSD pro Volby Do Evropského Parlamentu 23.-24. 5. 2014.”

states' position on immigration policy (particularly with regard to the need for a truly common solution in which all member states would participate), the use of the word in this sentence may be relevant in this context, because it refers to the kind of solidarity between member states that is often discussed and invoked in reference to immigration and asylum policy—“solidarity among member states.” The first part of the sentence thus could be thought of as implying the need for solidarity among member states not only as a general principle, but also when applied to various common issues faced by the EU member states—including, possibly, also immigration and asylum policy. Similarly, “respect to human rights” could potentially refer, among others, to the right to seek asylum that has acquired its undeniable place in international law.³¹⁶ However, this attempt at inference is a mere speculation. What can be said with certainty is that the Czech Social Democrats did not include any information specifically on immigration and asylum in their manifesto.

This comes as a surprise considering ČSSD is not only a party that could be expected to wish to express its opinion on this issue due to its ideational foundations, but also a political party that in the last election to the Chamber of Deputies received the largest electoral support³¹⁷ and is therefore the largest governing Czech party with the mandate to engage in active political leadership.

PES Manifesto Exposes Omission

The PES (the Party of European Socialists) Manifesto “Towards New Europe” adopted at the PES Election Congress in Rome on 1 March 2014 was declared by the ČSSD to “*serve as a basis for program texts* of the Czech Social Democratic Party in the campaign (emphasis added).”³¹⁸ Interestingly, the PES Manifesto, more detailed than its Czech version, does include information on the European Social Democrats' vision for immigration and asylum policy. Under the heading “Union That Protects” and a subheading “A Union of Diversity” (from which the themes of protection and diversity can be easily detected), the position is elaborated as follows:

Against rising extremism, we will fight for a Europe that respects everybody's rights and obligations, not one that is based on prejudice, hate and division. Everybody must have a real opportunity to participate and contribute to the societies they are living in. Freedom of movement is a right and a founding principle of the EU. The rights of citizens and their legally recognised families must be respected, while we must fight against fraud and abuse. True solidarity among all EU member states has to be shown in migration and asylum policy to avoid more human tragedies, and sufficient

³¹⁶ Hirsch, “The Right To ‘Seek’ Asylum in Customary International Law?”

³¹⁷ “Völby Do Poslanecké Sněmovny Parlamentu České Republiky Konané ve Dnech 25.10. – 26.10.2013.”

³¹⁸ “Bohuslav Sobotka Na Kongresu Evropských Sociálních Demokratů v Římě Podpořil Kandidaturu Martina Schulze | Česká Strana Sociálně Demokratická.”

resources allocated. In order to save lives, Europe and its Member States must act in solidarity and have the right mechanisms to share the responsibilities. We want effective integration and participation policies, assistance to the countries migrants have left. The fight against human trafficking must be reinforced.³¹⁹

It is worth comparing this paragraph with its Czech, reduced, version: “We want Europe that would ensure equal opportunities and free movement to all its citizens. Europe that is built upon the solidarity among member states and respect to human rights.”³²⁰ The principles of equality, opportunity and the guarantee of the freedom of movement can be found in the Czech manifesto, yet the fight against rising extremism, among others, cannot.

Perhaps most interestingly from the perspective of the issue this thesis is concerned with, it is clear that in the original text, “*true solidarity among all EU member states* (emphasis added)” does refer to immigration and asylum policy: “[it] has to be shown in migration and asylum policy to avoid more human tragedies and sufficient resources allocated,” the PES manifesto states.³²¹ We “must *act in solidarity* (emphasis added),” the PES manifesto further makes clear, “in order to save lives.”³²² All is left of “true” solidarity³²³ in the Czech Social Democrats' manifesto is an unanchored principle of—simply, solidarity, from which who is to benefit is unclear.

Similarly, the PES manifesto envisions a solution in the form of “the right mechanisms to share responsibilities” when the entry of third country national is concerned and, subsequently, “effective integration and participation policies,” as well as solution aimed at prevention (“assistance to the countries migrants have left”), all supported by “sufficient resources.”³²⁴ Czech voters of Social Democracy, on the other hand, cannot find out anything about solutions for issues arising from the immigration and asylum policy area³²⁵—largely because it is not even discussed as an issue that would need attention in the first place.

Yet it is clear that ČSSD used the PES manifesto as a starting point for the manifesto intended for the Czech voters. This necessarily means that not including immigration and asylum policy, as well as omitting the object of the proposed solidarity among EU member states is a deliberate choice of those who created the program manifesto of the ČSSD.

In fact, when Keller, the leader of the party list, was in one debate asked about the absence of certain issues (specifically the common EU foreign policy) in the ČSSD manifesto

319 “PES Manifesto Adopted by the PES Election Congress in Rome on 1 March 2014: Towards a New Europe.”

320 “Chceme Spravedlivou a Sociální Evropu! Programový Manifest ČSSD pro Volby Do Evropského Parlamentu 23.-24. 5. 2014.”

321 “PES Manifesto Adopted by the PES Election Congress in Rome on 1 March 2014: Towards a New Europe.”

322 Ibid.

323 Ibid.

324 Ibid.

325 “Chceme Spravedlivou a Sociální Evropu! Programový Manifest ČSSD pro Volby Do Evropského Parlamentu 23.-24. 5. 2014.”

—and whether their inclusion would not be a way to avoid the criticized democratic deficit, Keller responded that it is not a topical issue that would currently need to be addressed. His concluding remark on this issue was, “We do not put redundant things in our program.”^{326 327} Through simple extrapolation, it could be concluded that from the perspective of ČSSD, immigration and asylum are also examples of such “redundant things” because they have not been included in the program. Had that been the case, considering the great scale of the issue only a year later, the program authors' anticipation skills are a disappointment.

Looking Beyond the Program

Avoiding this topic in the manifesto did not preclude the issues related to immigration and asylum policy to surface during the election campaign. The leader of the party list, Keller, was asked whether he perceived immigration as a large European problem, to which he responded that it is a “huge problem,”³²⁸ suggesting that perhaps this issue may not be “a redundant thing” from the perspective of Social Democrats, after all. In any case, this interview is the most detailed source on the party's position on immigration and asylum policy available.

Keller said that “there are two options: either will immigrants from developing countries be unqualified and dependent upon our social system and social unrest [literally, 'storms'³²⁹] will occur. Or the second option is also bad: if we let in only people qualified and educated, we rob the countries [of them].”³³⁰ This argument, an example of the “apparent sympathy” strategy³³¹ is presented to justify measures not favorable to immigrants. In fact, as Dijk illustrates, it is a common argument:

decisions that have negative consequences for immigrants or resident minorities often are defended by constructing them as being “for their own good.” Potential immigrants are encouraged to stay where they are, for example, with the argument of helping to “build up” their own countries or to avoid coming to 'our' country because they may be confronted by (popular) resentment, if not by the cold or other unpleasant surprises in the North.³³²

Moreover, labeling both possibilities as “bad options” is a strategy that gives more weight to the third possibility: “There is only one option: to try to do maximum, so that the people don't have a reason to flee from their own country. If the area outside of Europe does

326 In Czech, the sentence is: “My nedáváme zbytečnosti do našeho programu.”

327 “Evropské Volby 2014,” May 7, 2014.

328 “J. Keller pro MF Dnes: Evropa Není Hrozba, Ale šance.”

329 In Czech, the sentence is: “Jsou jen dvě možnosti: buď budou imigranti z rozvojových zemí nekvalifikovaní a budou závislí na našem sociálním systému a vzniknou sociální bouře.”

330 “J. Keller pro MF Dnes: Evropa Není Hrozba, Ale šance.”

331 Riggins, *The Language and Politics of Exclusion*. 37.

332 Ibid. 37.

not stabilize, the people will pour here in masses.”³³³ Keller thus proposed a preventative solution to immigration—to minimize immigration through addressing the push factors. He added that this “cannot be regulated by putting up a barbed wire around Europe,” but that overall, the manner in which regulation is achieved is important and he would wait for the actual proposals to assess them, but “if they regulate it by shooting them on the borders, then I will probably have a problem with that.”³³⁴ Besides Keller's suggestion for a preventative approach to immigration in the course of this interview, however, ČSSD did not present any other proposal to solve the issue. It should be, in Keller's view, up to countries such as France and the Great Britain where the problem is especially acute, to propose a solution.³³⁵

Interestingly, this interview, which covered the topic of immigration perhaps most extensively, was limited to the issue of immigration. It was another candidate, Poche (fourth on the party list), who delineated a different approach to political refugees of whom we need to “take care along with the other member states of the EU, because not too long ago in history we were in a similar situation when large portion, or relatively large portion of Czech people sought political asylum abroad, so I believe that on these people we should not turn our backs either.”³³⁶ The host then asked whether she understands it correctly that in this regard, ČSSD was not going to aim towards any large changes—to which Poche replied, “No, I believe it is a purely populist topic of some parties.”³³⁷

The conclusion regarding the Social Democrats' position on immigration and asylum policy is that the party generally does not seek any larger changes in the current policy.

The Devil's in the Portrayal

Since ČSSD did not communicate issues related to immigration and asylum in the party manifesto, the focus of the investigation of the portrayal of related issues will lie with two interviews that covered the issue, one with Keller and one with Poche.

Categorization of Immigrants: Educated or Not?

As indicated above, with regard to immigration, Keller differentiates between two groups, with the criterion used for division being education and qualification. The first group are immigrants from “developing countries” who are “unqualified” and “dependent upon our social system” and the second are immigrants who are “qualified” and “educated.”³³⁸ This

333 “J. Keller pro MF Dnes: Evropa Není Hrozba, Ale šance.”

334 Ibid.

335 Ibid.

336 “Radiožurnál - Stalo Se Dnes (06.05.2014 21.”

337 Ibid.

338 “J. Keller pro MF Dnes: Evropa Není Hrozba, Ale šance.”

categorization can be said to reflect the EU member states' consensus on the desirability of highly-qualified workers subject to the “EU Blue Card Directive” and students and researchers, which serves as a basis for EU-wide measures allowing for their legal migration.

Keller portrays the first, uneducated, group as containing those “who will be dependent upon our social system and social unrest [literally, 'storms'³³⁹] will occur.”³⁴⁰ Using affirmative, he presents this information in a way that it leaves out the option that this may not necessarily be the case—in his portrayal, this group of immigrants is an economic problem (because they will be dependent on our social system), but also a social problem (social unrest/storms will occur).

Categorization of Immigrants: Criminal or Not?

On the other hand, Poche's classification differentiates between one group of immigrants “who come to the Czech Republic to work, are educated, willing to work are adapt... adapt to Czech laws³⁴¹ and de facto contribute to the development of the Czech Republic.”³⁴² The other are “immigrants, say, of a criminal type, who stand against the law, commit criminal offenses.”³⁴³ Then there is the third type, seekers of political asylum, who have already been described above. Though in this latter classification, education and work are also mentioned as factors, the major axis is defined by an orderly citizen on one hand versus criminal offender on the other.

Compared to Keller's differentiation that highlights education and employment, above all, Poche's classification highlights a concern for criminal behavior. Its absence Poche associates with being “adapt... [those who] adapt to Czech laws.”³⁴⁴ This is a very interesting moment in the conversation: Poche was about to use the word pair “adaptable [citizen]” that is by now rooted in Czech public discourse predominantly as the counterpart to an “unadaptable citizen,” a word often used as a euphemism for the Roma population. However, half-way through the word, he deliberately opted for using the word root “adapt” as a verb, rather than a modifier in the form of an adjective that is (relatively more) associated with a particular discourse.

Despite Poche's decision to avoid connecting these two issues through employing the language ordinarily used for one in discussing the other, there is a clear criminalizing

339 In Czech, the sentence is: “Jsou jen dvě možnosti: buď budou imigranti z rozvojových zemí nekvalifikovaní a budou závislí na našem sociálním systému a vzniknou sociální bouře.”

340 “J. Keller pro MF Dnes: Evropa Není Hrozba, Ale šance.”

341 In Czech, the sentence is: “Jedni jsou migranti, kteří přichází do České republiky pracovat, jsou vzdělání, ochotní pracovat, jsou přiz... přizpůsobí se českým zákonům [...]”

342 “Radiožurnál - Stalo Se Dnes (06.05.2014 21.”

343 Ibid.

344 Ibid.

tendency in his language by describing one group of immigrants as necessarily engaging in criminal activities. This effect was softened by making a personal connection to the issue. The host asked him whether “we should be afraid of foreigners,” to which Poche responded by saying: “Well, I’m not afraid of them, if only because my wife is a foreigner.”³⁴⁵ Though by this response, Poche portrayed “the foreigners” he was asked about as someone who is familiar, as opposed to faceless, the classification that followed still depicted the other category as containing the “immigrants-criminals.”

Muslims: Lesser Evil Than Portrayed, Yet a Threat Nevertheless

Keller, on the other hand, besides referring to immigrants as those who will cause social unrest, did not himself start talking about immigrants in connection with crime and security. Neither did he start talking specifically about Muslims in connection with immigrants. When asked about Islam and Islamization (in relation to Miloš Zeman's, the Czech president's opinions), his first reaction was even characterized by de-escalation: “Miloš Zeman has the tendency to turn Muslims into greater evil than they actually are.”³⁴⁶ However, the sentence that immediately followed was: “He's forgetting that all the equipment that Muslims use to *attack* the non-Muslim world, was supplied to them by Europe and America and they were paid for it nicely (emphasis added).”³⁴⁷ The connection between Muslims and attacks on the non-Muslim world is evident.

Besides associating Muslims (without any specification) with security threats, Keller concurred with the opinion that Islam is a “non-tolerant religion” (again, without any specification). When asked whether Muslim immigration is the most dangerous, he replied: “From security perspective, definitely yes. Now it could be said that to Europe can only go those who will culturally assimilate as Europeans. [But] we can't tell who will assimilate only for appearance's sake, but will *remain an Islamist* (emphasis added).”³⁴⁸ Following the logic in this sentence, those Muslims who do not assimilate “*remain Islamists*,” meaning that they necessarily had to have been Islamists in the first place. The use of the words “Muslim” and “Islamist” gives the impression that they are interchangeable, necessarily reducing Muslims to Islamists as a result—a very dangerous practice indeed.

Moreover, the discussion of this topic Keller concluded by saying that “Islam presents a greater risk than the Great October Socialist Revolution.”³⁴⁹ First, the Great October

345 Ibid.

346 “J. Keller pro MF Dnes: Evropa Není Hrozba, Ale šance.”

347 Ibid.

348 Ibid.

349 Ibid.

Socialist Revolution can be understood as synecdoche, referring to the communist era (this interpretation is based on the context of the sentence, which is a reaction to a question referring to “communists”). Second, Islam is, on this occasion again, used without any specification, which gives us the result that Islam as a religion is worse than communism.

Though Keller's statements are very unfortunate for the portrayal of immigration, it must be said that they have been, at least to some extent, brought about by the questions posed. For example, the interviewer posed immigration as a problem, introduced the topic of Islam and islamization in the context of immigration, linked Islam to non-tolerance and asked whether Muslim immigration is the most risky in Keller's opinion.³⁵⁰ At the same time, much of the responsibility lies with Keller who did not always oppose this language and, moreover, used lexicon such as “*mass influx*” of immigration, which is “God's *punishment* for colonies” and used the words Muslim and Islamist interchangeably.³⁵¹

Neutral and Positive Portrayals

Finally, turning to neutral and relatively positive portrayals, Poche argued for the need to “take care of asylum-seekers.”³⁵² Legitimizing his overall welcoming stance towards asylum-seekers by reciprocity; he pointed to the fact that Czechs themselves in the recent past sought asylum, which is a reason why we “cannot turn our backs on them.”³⁵³ During the time of the campaign, the developments in Ukraine were also discussed a lot by ČSSD, not only because it was a governmental party, but also because it is in charge of the foreign affairs portfolio. In this context, immigration from Ukraine was also discussed in neutral terms; Sobotka, the party's leader and Prime Minister, mentioned “a migration wave from Ukraine to Poland, Slovakia, and possibly the Czech Republic as an eventuality.”³⁵⁴ Poche identified the security of Volyn Czechs as a priority, even if that involves moving them to the Czech Republic; the justification he used is the following: “At a moment in which we look after the injured from Maidan, we need to be able to look after our countrymen who now don't feel safe in the Ukraine.”³⁵⁵ His argumentation implies a hierarchy between who are portrayed as foreigners from Maidan as opposed to ethnic Czechs who are identified as “our countrymen,” potentially raising the issue of discrimination in asylum procedures on the grounds of ethnic differences.³⁵⁶ On the upside, however, the message is formulated as one of duty that we have

350 Ibid.

351 Ibid.

352 “Radiožurnál - Stalo Se Dnes (06.05.2014 21.”

353 Ibid.

354 “B. Sobotka v Partii: ČR Udělá Vše, Aby Zabránila Ozbrojenému Konfliktu Na Ukrajině.”

355 Poche, “Varuji Před Zbrklým Rozšiřováním EU a Eskalací Napětí S Ruskem.”

356 Ibid.

towards others (even though in this instance the case is made they are not, in fact, others, but our countrymen), nevertheless, as such it can be thought of as furthering the discussion of duties we have towards others who are in danger.

In reaction to his political opponent in a debate, Poche argued that restricting immigration will not solve the issue of unemployment, a rare attempt to counter nonsense that is so often presented as an argument with regard to immigration.³⁵⁷ Poche chose to support his statement by pointing to the fact that freedom of labor in the EU did not cause any influx to the Czech Republic from other EU states, especially those from the East.³⁵⁸

Finally, the party presented the in-group rather positively as Europeans who respect human rights.³⁵⁹ The party leader also argued for the need to “oppose populists and those who want to break (up) Europe in the name of national egoism.”³⁶⁰ Also on Facebook, the party declared the need to stand up against racism, hatred, anti-semitism and xenophobia.³⁶¹ Though these value statements may be seen as being somewhat in contradiction with its statements related to immigration, the party's resolve in presenting its attitudes may be understood as positive.

Communication: Domestic Politics Prevail

The communication of Social Democrats was in the investigated time period dominated by issues related to the party's governing (the appointment of the government and its first steps in office), rather than issues related to the campaign for the EP election. The crisis in the Ukraine was above all the topic most discussed when it came to foreign affairs. To illustrate the secondary importance of the upcoming election to the party, it did not, for example, publish a news release on the result of the EP election, while it was particularly the website's news releases section that has recorded a great amount of content in the previous months.

On Facebook, the ratio between information on the party's governing and the upcoming EP election was more in favor of the election, with the party providing information on the party's activity in the PES group at the European level, message about its election of Martin Schulz as a candidate for the head of the European Commission, links to video commercials for the EP election, communication of the party's main electoral topics, information about Europe Day with an invitation to participate in the election, etc. However,

357 “Radiožurnál - Stalo Se Dnes (06.05.2014 21.”

358 Ibid.

359 “Chceme Spravedlivou a Sociální Evropu! Programový Manifest ČSSD pro Volby Do Evropského Parlamentu 23.-24. 5. 2014.”

360 “Předseda ČSSD Se ve Francii Zúčastnil Zahájení Kampaně Socialistů Do EP.”

361 “Sobotka.”

ČSSD shared no information related to immigration and asylum policy and related issues, besides communicating values that serve as a basis for European Socialists' cooperation in the EP: freedom, prosperity and equality in a peaceful Europe.³⁶²

Finally, the party's program manifesto appears to be formulated somewhat negatively; it talks about threats and failure: poverty, unemployment, uncertainty about the future, the great wealth accumulated by the elites that is not always the outcome of honest undertaking, competition among states that decrease taxes for multinational corporations, the erosion of security in the form of affordable education, health care and pensions, the growth in executions, bureaucracy, influence of lobbyists and insufficient democratic control, and the list continues.³⁶³ It is understandable that a party may choose to identify the problems that it then offers to solve; however, this particular instance of such approach raises questions regarding the impression it creates among voters and how that in turn influences their willingness to consent with various solutions. A sense of unusual scarcity would, for example, hardly contribute to the electorate's willingness to adopt relatively liberal immigration and asylum policies.

Probably most importantly, the most salient feature of the party's communication of immigration and related matters was the absence of any stance on immigration and asylum policy in its program—despite the fact that the PES Manifesto developed it in rather great detail and in terms relatively favorable to immigrants.

ČSSD: Summary

Representation of the In-Group

- we are Europeans who respect human rights
- we oppose populists and those who want to break (up) Europe in the name of national egoism
- we need to stand up against racism, hatred, anti-semitism, xenophobia
- many of us – Czechs – sought political asylum abroad

Representation of the Out-Group

- unqualified immigrants are those from developing countries, dependent upon our social system and causing social unrest; qualified and educated immigrants are an asset to the countries they are leaving
- they are political refugees we should take care of because we, Czechs, have a similar historical experience
- Muslims are presented as greater evil than they actually are
- Muslims are Islamists
- Islam is dangerous and non-tolerant

362 “Martin Schulz Je Společným Kandidátem Na Předsedu Evropské Komise.”

363 “Chceme Spravedlivou a Sociální Evropu! Programový Manifest ČSSD pro Volby Do Evropského Parlamentu 23.-24. 5. 2014.”

Categorization of Immigrants

- according to education and qualification: unqualified *immigrants* (from developing countries; dependent upon our social system) vs qualified and educated *people*
- according to the citizens' orderliness and legitimacy of claim:
 - 1. those who come to work, are educated, willing to work, adapt to Czech laws and de facto contribute to the development of the Czech Republic.
 - 2. immigrants “of a criminal type” who stand against the law and commit criminal offenses
 - 3. political refugees we should take care of

Immigration: A Matter of...

- education and qualification (qualified and educated *people* vs unqualified *immigrants*)
- orderliness
- legitimate claim
- security
- cultural assimilation vs remaining an Islamist

Language that Draws the Picture Complete

- people will “pour here in masses” if the area outside of Europe does not stabilize
- “social storms” will occur if unqualified people dependent on our social system will come
- “(un)adaptable” deliberately avoided; use of the root as a verb: “[those who] adapt to Czech laws”
- association with criminal behavior
- Muslims are “Islamists”
- immigration as a “punishment”
- immigration from the Ukraine portrayed in neutral terms
- Muslims “attack” non-Muslim world
- immigration is a “huge” problem
- Islam is an “intolerant” religion
- Islam presents a greater risk than communism

Justifications and Persuasion Strategies

- use of the apparent sympathy strategy to justify measures that are relatively unfavorable towards immigrants
- turning the issue personal, dismissing fear
- positive self-portrayal of the political party (we are not racist and xenophobic)

Argumentation: Appealing to Reason

- uneducated immigrants will be dependent on our social system and will cause social unrest
- limiting immigration will not solve unemployment

Argumentation: Appealing to Normative Structures

- reciprocity: we should not turn our backs on political refugees because Czechs were in a similar situation and sought political asylum
- we need to look after our countrymen, the Volyn Czechs, who do not feel safe in the

3.1.5 ANO 2011³⁶⁴

Vision for Immigration and Asylum Policy

ANO and EP Election: Challenging the Prevalent Discourse

In its party program for the 2014 EP election, ANO identified “stable and economically successful European Union” as the fundamental Czech national interest: “From the historical, current, as well as future perspective, a more profound national interest is hard to find.”³⁶⁵ For the context of the campaign perhaps more interestingly, in the context of Czech politics where the fault of everything bad too often lies with the distant Brussels—and where the EP election campaign is characterized primarily by putting a stop to “bad Brussels that directs us what to do”—is ANO's assertion that the fault lies with us, the Czech Republic and its political representation, refreshing. “The main cause for the unfulfilled potential of our membership as well as citizens' expectations lies in the Czech Republic of the last decade,” the program declares.³⁶⁶ At the same time, for a relatively new party that was founded around the ambition to rid the country of its problems, such as corruption, politicians' excessive immunities or disorder in public finances, the tendency to see the problem as lying with the past Czech government is perhaps not surprising. Yet in my view, it is laudable that a party of such importance in Czech politics³⁶⁷ challenges the tendency of many Czech politicians (as well as a large portion of the society) to blame much of the negative on Brussels. One example of the party's challenge to the EU myths is their assertion that due to its small budget, it cannot be considered a European “superstate.”³⁶⁸

Locating ANO's Goals

Because the party resists attempts to be ideologically typecast, it is difficult to make generalizations regarding its outlook; one needs to explore its proposals one-by-one. Regarding integration, “trends, tendencies and projects that lead to strengthen the cohesion among member states and therefore the Union's stability” are “worthy of support.”³⁶⁹ On the other hand, according to the program, “[i]t is legitimate, if some countries do not participate

364 ANO 2011 identifies itself as a political movement. It emerged from a preceding movement called the “Action of Dissatisfied Citizens” (in Czech, “Akce nespokojených občanů,” abbreviated as ANO). In the Czech language, “ano” means “yes.”

365 “Program Do Eurovoleb.”

366 Ibid.

367 “Vólby Do Poslanecké Sněmovny Parlamentu České Republiky Konané ve Dnech 25.10. – 26.10.2013.”

368 “Program Do Eurovoleb.”

369 Ibid.

in some integration circles,³⁷⁰ be it due to their own will or the reason of the non-fulfillment of criteria.”

In sources other than the program, a greater emphasis on the Czech national interest was more distinguishable. For example, in one interview, Telička, the leader of the party list related the topic of integration to Czech interests and Czech citizens more than is the case in the program: “[I support deeper political integration of states in the EU] in areas, in which it makes sense and where the value added at the European value is for our citizens indisputable.”³⁷¹ Similarly, a short news release introducing the party's candidates states that “[t]he main goal of the ANO movement and its candidates [...] is to take advantage of our membership in the EU to assert Czech interest and prestige in Europe and the world.”³⁷² Though the party program talks about defending the Czech national interest, it is not worded so strongly, providing extensive explanations that soften the impression especially in terms of prioritization. Similarly, the program includes one reference to bureaucracy and the need to eliminate redundant processes, while the wording of the news release is more strong, or direct: “We won't be obedient recipients of bureaucratic nonsense, but we won't be troublemakers who negate everything coming from the EU, either.”³⁷³ The vehement style of the news release is much different from the detailed program, which gives almost an academic impression.

Immigration vs Strengthening Citizens' Security

ANO included its view on immigration and asylum policy in a section called “To Strengthen Citizens' Security in a Space Without Internal Borders.”³⁷⁴ ANO thus conceives of immigration and asylum in the context of securing the Schengen external border as a precondition for security inside it.

“Not only for those who lived in countries behind the barbed wire³⁷⁵ is an area without internal borders with free movement, settlement and other rights a significant achievement.³⁷⁶ In such an open space a stable and safe environment for life characterized by the rule of law needs to be ensured,” the program states the justification for measures devised to achieve this.³⁷⁷ This justification is followed by an assurance that “ANO will strive to achieve regulation that is not excessive, but where common action is desirable, the Union and its

370 In Czech, the word used is “okruhy,” referring to certain aspects of EU integration.

371 “Pavel Telička: Chybí Nám Aktivní Evropská Politika.”

372 “Představujeme Kandidáty Do Evropského Parlamentu.”

373 Ibid.

374 “Program Do Eurovoleb.”

375 Referring to post-communist, previously unfree, countries.

376 In Czech, the words used is “výdobytek,” signifying something that is “fought out.”

377 “Program Do Eurovoleb.”

member states flexibly react to newly growing kinds of threats.”³⁷⁸

Following the logic of the existing EU institutional framework related to the Schengen Area, ANO sees the “securing [providing for]³⁷⁹ the external border” as the “[f]undamental precondition for security in the so-called Schengen Area [characterized by] no controls at internal borders.” The party is going to support such measures, particularly those that are the most relevant to the security situation in the Czech Republic, somewhat privileging the Czech national interest.³⁸⁰

Regarding internal security, ANO is a supporter of “effective coordination of member states in the fight against organized criminal activities (above all human trafficking, abuse of children, economic crime and corruption, illegal trade in narcotics, computer criminality) and terrorism.”³⁸¹ Thus, ANO states it supports effective fight against criminal activity both within the common borders as well as at the external border—and the description of the party's policy in this regard simultaneously provides context for the clarification of their stance on immigration and asylum policy.

Positive Impacts of Immigration

Regarding immigration policy, ANO, “aware of the positive as well as negative aspects of immigration, the complexity and ambiguity of the phenomenon, considers the immigration policy of the Union in principle well devised,”³⁸² referring here probably to the division of authority over the issue between the EU level and the member states. Immigration is said to potentially have a positive impact in “contributing to overcoming negative demographic trends (low or negative population growth), bringing top-level specialists, or, by contrast, filling vacancies that are ceasing to be attractive for domestic population.”³⁸³ ANO correspondingly supports the EU Blue Card initiative that facilitates the employment of highly qualified workers “with the potential to contribute to the competitiveness of the Union.”³⁸⁴ However, these positive effects of immigration have one precondition, and that is the “successful integration of immigrants into the society that receives them;” only when this precondition is fulfilled can these desirable effects be realized.³⁸⁵

378 Ibid.

379 In Czech, the word used is “zajištění” that can be translated as “securing,” or, perhaps more precisely (because the word root does not refer to “security”), “providing for.” However, the meaning is closer to “securing,” though a word that does not refer to security was chosen instead.

380 “Program Do Eurovoleb.”

381 Ibid.

382 Ibid.

383 Ibid.

384 Ibid.

385 Ibid.

Justifying Proposed Measures

Moreover, as ANO demonstrates, its stance on immigration would not be complete without the reference to the fight against “illegal immigration” and immigrants' illegal activities.³⁸⁶ Besides the securing of the external border, ANO “supports also other measures in the fight against illegal immigration,” differentiating between “illegal entry [and] stay.”³⁸⁷ This includes, above all, action against criminal groups and networks that organize illegal immigration, while “exploiting refugees and often threatening their health and lives.”³⁸⁸ Regarding another instrument against illegal (over)stay, “[m]ember states need to eliminate the employment of illegally staying (and also often seriously exploited) citizens of third countries more effectively” because it is “a very negative social and economic phenomenon.”³⁸⁹

Another instrument in “regulating migration and eliminating its illegal form” is the “prevention and cooperation of the Union with countries of immigrants' and refugees' origin or transit.” This sentence indicates that the party distinguishes between different categories of incoming people and, correspondingly, different goals of the policies. The justification for “regulation” and “elimination” is that the “failure of managing the immigration trends [...] would lead to destructive phenomena in the shape of an increase in criminality, xenophobia and extremism.”³⁹⁰

Asylum Policy

Regarding asylum policy, ANO declares it is going to “follow” the operation of the Common European Asylum System and explains what its goals are. “In this regard, we are not forgetting how our exiles, from John Amos Comenius, up to exile waves related to the events of the years 1938, 1948 and 1968, were accepted abroad and what they achieved,” the program drafters add.³⁹¹

Solidarity in EU Asylum Policy

Though ANO's program does not include any information on the possibility of a system for distributing asylum-seekers, the party list leader was asked about this in one interview. In his reply, he indicated that in principle, he would support a system based on solidarity among member states. However, upon the European Commission's submission of a

386 Ibid.

387 Ibid.

388 Ibid.

389 Ibid.

390 Ibid.

391 Ibid.

concrete proposal for mandatory distribution a year later, ANO rejected this option.”³⁹² In any case, in the course of the EP election campaign, Telička said the following:

A certain degree of solidarity is in my view appropriate,³⁹³ but primarily, the external protection of the external European border should function well. The EU should lead a successful fight against groups engaged in organized crime. If that all will work and there will be a group of migrants which someone will need to look after, *then I would not be opposed to [our] partaking* (emphasis added).³⁹⁴

Right to Seek

It appears the party defends measures to protect the external border and fight criminal groups involved in the migratory process without, however, properly providing for the right to *seek* asylum. The protection of the external border so adamantly emphasized by ANO could lead to the denial of entry to people with a legitimate claim for international protection. “If that all [would] work,” as Telička says, perfectly (according to the information provided by the party—that is, without any mechanism to tackle this aspect), then there might not be any asylum-seekers to even grant protection to.

ANO's Plan: Detailed But Moderate

ANO's information on immigration and asylum policy is the most detailed of all political parties analyzed in this thesis; the party can therefore be said to be possibly contributing to the awareness of the issue the most—by factually accurate information that documents the drafters' knowledge of the current policy landscape. At the same time, however, the information provided to a large extent merely describes the existing European policy, its development, as well the rationale and justifications for it. Based on the information provided, ANO appears to be in concord with it, but lacking any additional, or own, ambitious vision for its further course and development. Though some of the statements, particularly those related to the benefits of immigration, may be assessed as relatively bold in the Czech political context, the party seems to merely defend the policy status quo, without offering any grand(er) vision. At the same time, considering the other significant parties' positions on this issue (which more often than not take the shape of cautious non-engagement), it may be evaluated as *relatively* ambitious.

392 “Many EU Countries Say ‘no’ to Immigration Quotas.”

393 In Czech, the formulation is “Určitá míra solidarity je podle mě na místě.”

394 “Telička: Máme Jedinou Ambici – Vyhrát.”

The Devil's in the Portrayal

Security Context—Security Language

ANO frames immigration and asylum in the context of the need to defend the security of the internal space, associated with the need to protect the common external border. This conception corresponds with the actual development of policies related to the creation of a zone of free movement at the European level, including the foundations of common immigration and asylum policy. ANO introduces this approach as an inevitable matter of fact, merely reassuring its voters that it will support regulation that is “not excessive.”³⁹⁵

Yet discussing immigration and asylum policy in the context of the need to “react to newly growing kinds of *threats*” manifested at the external border and the need to address *organized crime* and *terrorism* within the area of internal security hardly creates a neutral starting point for discussion on immigration and asylum—discussions that would allow a perception not burdened by the connotations of a security threat.

Immigration: A Complex Matter

The first sentence introducing specifically immigration is neutral—it refers both to its positive and negative aspects and stresses the complexity and ambiguity of the issue. Yet in enumerating its impacts, ANO mentions only the advantages immigration may bring, which include offsetting the meagre population growth and economic contribution. The justifications are as follows: low-skilled workers can do unwanted work and highly-qualified workers can contribute to the EU's competitiveness.³⁹⁶ In an interview, however, Telička also talks merely about the positive aspects of immigration: “Immigration is *positive* in that the EU may get workforce it needs (emphasis added).”³⁹⁷ In justifying the welcoming of highly-qualified workers, ANO used the same justification as is used for the existence of the EU Blue Card initiative.

In this regard, in a radio interview, one of the candidates, Ježek mentioned the purpose of migration: “By definition, migration is a process whose aim is to satisfy the needs of the state, that is, if the option to accept immigration exists.”³⁹⁸ Advancing a very state-centric view, Ježek basically supports the notion that immigration is in the interest of the state. This approach is also supported by his argument that in principle, it is Czech organs that decide about the numbers accepted and that he definitely does not think that “we are a country that

395 “Program Do Eurovoleb.”

396 Ibid.

397 “Telička: Máme Jedinou Ambici – Vyhrát.”

398 “Radiožurnál - Stalo Se Dnes (06.05.2014 21.”

should have any problem with illegal migration.”³⁹⁹

Justification for the Need to Regulate

The negative aspects of immigration are mentioned in the context of the need for EU member states' coordination in eliminating and regulating immigration. The party argues that immigration trends will continue and if they are not managed, “it would lead to destructive phenomena in the shape of an increase in criminality, xenophobia and extremism.”⁴⁰⁰ These negative implications the party therefore uses as a justification for the measures aimed at eliminating/regulating migration, though to what extent these are inevitable is questionable. In this instance, we can observe an assertion of a direct link between immigration and an increase in criminality, introduced as a fact, a prime example of the criminalization of immigrants. Xenophobia and extremism would, according to ANO, rise in response to increased immigration—a development that is portrayed as inevitable and as such conveniently removes the responsibility for it from politicians and other relevant actors.

Interestingly, ANO cites the “successful integration of immigrants into the society that receives them” as the precondition for the benefits of immigration to materialize. Though the integration process is important, this formulation does not make it appear that some change is necessary also on the receiving end—if xenophobia and extremism are not to take root. “Integration,” though, is not elaborated in any detail.

ANO further justifies the use of various tools aimed at the fight against illegal entry or stay by stating that those who organize them “exploit” them and “often threaten their health and lives.”⁴⁰¹ The party therefore invokes the need to protect the well-being of migrants in justifying the need to tackle irregular immigration. This move can be thought of as a strategy of “apparent sympathy” whereby decisions with negative impact on immigrants is defended by being presented as being “for their own good.”⁴⁰²

Though the criminalizing word “illegal” is used to denote irregular immigration, it is never used to describe immigrants as people. It is used to describe immigration and immigrants' entry, stay and status. Seen in the context of other references to criminal activities, it completes the picture of criminalization of immigration.

Defending Asylum

Regarding the issue of migration, the word choice, as well as argumentation are both

399 Ibid.

400 “Program Do Eurovoleb.”

401 Ibid.

402 Riggins, *The Language and Politics of Exclusion*. 37.

noteworthy. In this case, ANO does not propose any changes to the current policy and merely declares it is going to “follow” the developments, which is accompanying with a piece of information of more educational character. Yet despite that, the authors of the program did defend the institution of asylum in principle by referring to the Czech historical experience: “In this regard, we are not forgetting how our exiles, from John Amos Comenius, up to exile waves related to the events of the years 1938, 1948 and 1968, were accepted abroad and what they achieved.”⁴⁰³

The choice of these examples is not a coincidence: it is, first J. A. Comenius, second, events related to the outset of Nazi occupation of Czechoslovakia, third, the Communist seizure of power and, fourth, the Warsaw Pact intervention in Czechoslovakia and the end of the period known as the Prague Spring. These can be in the Czech historical context thought to be perhaps the most legitimate and justifiable instances: Comenius is a figure of European-wide importance that Czechs are very proud of (Comenius came fourth in “the Greatest Czech” television poll⁴⁰⁴) and the other three historical events represent great scars in the Czech historical consciousness (to the point where one can hardly think of other three occasions in the last century in which emigration would be seen as more understandable). The choice of these examples is in all likelihood deliberate, with the effect of approximating emigration due to legitimate reasons to Czechs through the use of examples they can identify with more easily.

Next, the word choice is also noticeable: though the rest of the text speaks of “refugees,” neither this word, nor the word “asylum-seeker” is used in the last, justifying sentence. Instead, the program refers to “exiles” and “exile waves.” The use of “exile” could point to the authors' attempt to stress the reasons for leaving the country to further legitimize the institution of asylum.

In an interview, Telička used similar reasoning in advancing the idea that the Czech Republic should accept refugees: “We also should remember our past when a number of Czech and Slovak citizens emigrated.”⁴⁰⁵

Communication: Educating Voters

ANO's communication has, in my view, one distinguishable characteristic. It contains messages of an informative, at times almost educational nature, presented most often by the party list leader, Telička. An example of this are videos of Telička's speech about the EU at

403 “Program Do Eurovoleb.”

404 “Největší Čech - O Projektu.”

405 “Telička: Máme Jedinou Ambici – Vyhrát.”

the London School of Economics. Though this could be a strategy to present the party's candidates as knowledgeable experts that speak very good English, it was also manifested in the debates where Telička had a tendency to put other candidates' information straight and thus may have had a positive impact on the voters' knowledge about the EU. This difference in style was in fact reflected also in the party's written communication, with some being considerably simplified than other, relatively complex. This knowledge, however, in my view also had the disadvantage of limiting the party representatives' ambition to formulate and advance their own vision, one that is less constrained by the policy status quo.

On the other hand, the domestic themes dominated the communication of the party, which is likely related to the its membership in the government in power. It, for example, did not communicate any information on the Ukraine, likely because it is ČSSD, another member of the government, that is in charge of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In fact, ANO's government membership was also used as an argument in the course of the campaign; ANO asserted citizens should vote for it, because the likelihood that it is going to assert itself at the European level would be increased, it was argued, by the party's position in the Czech politics.

ANO 2011: Summary

Representation of the In-Group

- we value the benefits of an area without internal borders, a historical achievement
- we value democracy, the rule of law, human rights (including minority rights)
- our exiles were also accepted abroad

Representation of the Out-Group

- if immigration is not regulated, it will lead to increased criminality

Categorization of Immigrants

- immigrants and refugees (the category of “refugees” is merely implied)
- legal and illegal migration (ANO differentiates between “illegal” entry and stay and the employment of “illegally staying”)

Immigration: A Matter of...

- the need to react to newly growing kinds of threats
- EU citizens' security in a space without internal borders that implies the need to secure the external border
- fight against organized criminal activities both within the Schengen and on its external border
- the materialization of the positive effects of immigration is conditional upon the successful integration of immigrants
- fight against illegal entry; action against criminal groups and networks that organize it
- fight against illegal stay; action against employment of those illegally staying

- its regulation and the elimination of its illegal form is a matter of prevention of an increase in criminality, xenophobia and extremism
- the (interest/needs of the) state

Language that Draws the Picture Complete

- security and crime-related language—context of “security threats,” “organized crime,” “terrorism”
- immigration has both “positive” and “negative” aspects
- immigration is an “ambiguous” and “complex” phenomenon
- CR does not have a problem with illegal immigration
- “illegal immigration”
- use of “exile” and “exile waves” when referring to refugees

Justifications and Persuasion Strategies

- use of apparent sympathy: fight against irregular migration is justified by immigrants' own well-being
- the institution of asylum is justified by referring to the Czech historical experience, particularly the experience of Comenius and the events of the years 1938, 1948 and 1968

Argumentation: Appealing to Reason

- immigration may contribute to overcoming negative demographic trends, bringing top-level specialists, or, by contrast, filling vacancies that are ceasing to be attractive for domestic population
- the employment immigration and employment of highly qualified workers may contribute to the competitiveness of the Union (EU Blue Card initiative)
- integration is necessary for the benefits of immigration to materialize
- criminal groups and networks that facilitate illegal migration should be fought because they exploit refugees and often threaten their health and lives
- the employment of illegally staying should be fought because
 - they are exploited
 - their employment is a very negative social and economic phenomenon
- regulating migration and eliminating its illegal form is necessary because the failure to manage the immigration trends would lead to destructive phenomena in the shape of an increase in criminality, xenophobia and extremism
- migration should satisfy the needs of the state, that is, if the option to accept immigration exists

Argumentation: Appealing to Normative Structures

- support to a redistribution system of refugees based on solidarity
- with regard to asylum, sympathy and reciprocity are invoked through a reference to the Czech historical experience

3.1.6 Civic Democratic Party (ODS)

Vision for Immigration and Asylum Policy

Immigration and Asylum: The Perspective of Sovereignty

The approach of ODS to immigration and asylum policy should be understood in the context of its relatively cautious attitude towards the EU, as well as its integration. The party declares to challenge what is at times presented as an inevitable and desirable path of deeper European integration.⁴⁰⁶ Besides their “respect for rightist values, such as liberty and tradition, [the party] professes a realistic stance to European integration. European conservatives [a group to which ODS belongs in the EP] [...] do not strive, as opposed to irresponsible populists, to end the European integration process, but to reform it, in order to see the return of the original economically liberal values to its center.”⁴⁰⁷ Civic democrats are advocates of the EU as “a more flexible, economically open and ever-widening whole that leads to the concept of a 'flexible' or 'variable' integration. This concept is the opposite of a European unitary superstate. ODS has been long convinced that the scenario of a one-sided and stiff unification does not correspond with the interests of Czech citizens.”⁴⁰⁸

In fact, ODS, as a supporter of the national state and the preservation of its sovereignty in matters other than economic exchange in the single market, approaches the EU through economic lens that produces a view that is preoccupied with national interest and the relative loss of sovereignty over time. This perception is reflected in the language of the party's representatives, as well as the party's program, which is heavy with references to national interest. It is the result of the fact that each policy area at the EU level is perceived in economic terms and assessed in terms of its benefit to the Czech state; the EU should be a flexible framework that would allow for integration if states deem it to be in their interest, but one that would also allow for its absence if states evaluate that keeping their sovereignty over a particular policy area would be more beneficial for them. This approach is reflected in the following statement from the party program: “For us, membership in the Union is not an end in and of itself, but merely an instrument to support the Czech economy, greater liberty to Czech citizens and strengthening the position of the Czech Republic on the international scene. This is one of the reasons why we are going to consider all steps of the EU from the perspective of Czech interests and look at everything through the eyes of Czech citizens and assess it through the lens of their interests.”⁴⁰⁹

406 “Volební Program ODS - Otáčíme EU Správným Směrem.”

407 “Otáčíme EU Správným Směrem - Volby Do Evropského Parlamentu 2014.”

408 Ibid.

409 Ibid.

On the party's website, ODS summed up its position on the immigration and asylum policy in a way that appears to be in line with its emphasis on state sovereignty: “We are not going to support immigration quotas,” which is a measure that would necessarily erode the national government's authority over this issue.⁴¹⁰ This stance is outlined in greater detail in the program: “We are never going to support any proposals that would lead to the introduction of quotas, according to which would immigrants from third countries be distributed to individual EU member states.”⁴¹¹ The overall policy on immigration is further elaborated in the party program in the following way: “In principle, we are not opponents of immigration into the EU, but we insist that immigration does not lead to the formation of ghettos in the form of immigrant enclaves in the cities, an increase in cultural-civilizational tensions, or even violence.”⁴¹² “This risk,” one can read in the program, “have member states above all the duty to detect and neutralize on time, and not contribute to it by fashionable, but not thought-out, 'politically correct,' policy.”⁴¹³ The “politically correct” immigration policy likely refers to a more open approach towards immigrants. ODS suggests that the possibility of heightened tensions and violence in the receiving society is real and makes a case for avoiding it.

Importantly, the party program does not include the word “asylum,” a by-product of the fact that ODS, on the occasion of this election, did not differentiate between the reasons for the entry of third country nationals into the EU. While some parties strictly distinguished between asylum-seekers and other immigrants, ODS differentiated merely between “legal” and “illegal” immigration⁴¹⁴—the most important aspect of the policy being the level at which this policy is decided. ODS presented itself as an adamant supporter of the position that these matters should be decided in the national parliaments. In fact, when Zahradil, the leader of the party list, draws on the numbers of immigrants, he really talks just about the number of “immigrants,”⁴¹⁵ not further differentiating between immigrants and refugees. Though it may be the case that the numbers cited may include people who have been granted international protection, this is not further elaborated. Only when Zahradil mentions the kinds of powers he is talking about, he enumerates them, arguing that all of them should be retained by the national government: “[I think the Czech Republic should] preserve the right to grant citizenship, asylum or permanent residence permits, according to what our state organs want

410 “Volební Program ODS - Otáčíme EU Správným Směrem.”

411 Ibid.

412 “Otáčíme EU Správným Směrem - Volby Do Evropského Parlamentu 2014.”

413 Ibid.

414 “Jan Zahradil.”

415 In Czech, the word used is “přistěhovalec/přistěhovanci” (s/pl).

and not according to how someone might command us to do from Brussels.”⁴¹⁶

Since the representatives of ODS had the tendency to talk about basically every issue touched upon in the campaign primarily in terms of whether it should even be up to the EU to decide or whether the member states should not reclaim the decision-making powers, it is not entirely surprising that this is also the case with regard to migration. However, one Zahradil's passing reference suggests that it is not necessarily simply a matter of the party's ideology that urges most matters to be decided at the national level. What comes into play, as has been suggested above, is also the fact that the status quo is more advantageous to the Czech Republic in economic terms. After mentioning that some states are exposed to great immigration pressures, he explains how: “I think that the Czech Republic should preserve this relative advantage,” which is followed by an argument against European integration in this policy area.⁴¹⁷ This instance is a clear illustration of how ODS understands matters of EU membership and integration to be a matter of a cost-benefit analysis. In other words, common European values or norms, or another normative structure, does not enter the picture.

The EU-wide solution mentioned by Zahradil is also an economic one—states that are burdened the most by migration may be helped “in another way,” meaning through the introduction of measures other than quotas—“for example from the European budget.”⁴¹⁸ Though this may appear as an attempt to come up with a common solution to the European problem on the basis of solidarity, it may be more likely, given the overall approach of ODS and its stress on the advancement of the national interest in particular, that it is a solution devised to maintain the status quo that is relatively more advantageous to the Czech Republic—even at the cost of financial transfers to countries that press for a common solution.

Despite what may appear as a rather negative conception of immigration in the party program, the depiction of immigration in a video commercial is more positive. Several people are shot answering the question: Who are you going to vote for and why? One of the respondents is a young woman of Asian origin whose answer is: “ODS. I like that it gave a chance also to those who found a new home here.”⁴¹⁹ Considering the reluctance of all major parties to address the issue of immigration, the choice of ODS to present itself as the party that “gives immigrants a chance” appears to me startling, particularly with respect to the political context.

416 “Jan Zahradil.”

417 “Jan Zahradil.”

418 Ibid.

419 “Volební Spot ODS pro Volby Do Evropského Parlamentu – ODS.”

The Devil's in the Portrayal

Not Opponents of Immigration, But

The party's communication of issues related to immigration and asylum is marked by a contradictory tendency expressed in “apparent denial.” On one hand, the party program is formulated in rather negative terms: “In principle, we are not opponents of immigration into the EU” is a formulation that, worded negatively, does not appear greatly courageous. Moreover, it is immediately followed by a “but” that always casts doubt on what comes after: “but we insist that immigration does not lead to the formation of ghettos in the shape of enclaves of immigrants in the cities, an increase in cultural-civilizational tensions, or even violence.”⁴²⁰ The specter of ghettos, social tensions, “or even violence” thus starts hanging over the principled “non-opposition” to immigration before the affirmative sentence is even over. What ODS as a party associates—or what it fears its voters associate (and believes is therefore necessary to address)—with immigration is therefore more than clear.

The Politics of “Politically Correct”

What is meant by “not thought-out, politically correct” policy is nowhere explained, which leaves the reader with the need to assume. As indicated above, it appears most likely to me that this word pair refers to policy that is comparably more open to immigrants. First, if that is the case, it is interesting that a relatively open policy is only “politically” correct—and not simply correct (in the sense “the correct thing to do” due to the fact that it resonates with our values). In this regard, the party's non-differentiation between the reasons for migration raises a question whether it is, in the eyes of the party members, a relevant consideration in the decision-making, or whether other factors (such as economic considerations) should drive it. Second, in my view it is most likely that calling a relatively more welcoming approach “politically correct” is a strategy for pointing to the “fact” that it is only correct for the purpose of “saving face,” but other than that, it is not a good policy, not least because it is “not thought-out.” As such, it may be thought of as an example of a delegitimization strategy.

Language Completing the Picture

Moreover, the program suggests that the member states should neutralize the risks associated with immigration “on time,” creating the impression of an imminent threat. ODS, particularly in its electoral program, thus sees—and reproduces—the idea of immigration as a phenomenon that is necessarily associated with certain risks or threats that need to be

420 “Volební Program ODS - Otáčíme EU Správným Směrem.”

countered before it is too late.

ODS representatives also talked in terms of “legal” and “illegal” immigration, which in fact formed the only categories of immigrants. This approach not only criminalizes a large group of immigrants, hardly contributing positively to their image, but also legitimizes the existing administrative rules on immigration and asylum.

I also noticed that a few times, when asked about “immigrants,” ODS candidates responded using the word “foreigner” instead of “immigrant.”⁴²¹ Though I suspect the reason for this is to use a less charged euphemism to reduce passions surrounding the issue, it also means that immigrants, even when “legally” in the Czech Republic, are talked about as being “foreign,” depicted as “the other.” I am not sure whether Zahradil's figure of 4 % (which he once uses to describe the number of “foreigners”⁴²² and another time to describe the number of “immigrants”⁴²³) includes immigrants who have been granted Czech citizenship, but if that is the case, this label indicates that this group of people is still considered “foreign.” Finally, Kollman mentioned “long-term guests” and “immigrants” when referring to non-European immigration.⁴²⁴

Immigration? Exaggerated

On the other hand, the tendency of Zahradil himself to reduce the emotions surrounding the issue of immigration, is apparent. In one interview, the candidates discussed the newly-imposed restrictions on permanent residency in Switzerland and Zahradil explained the measures, adding “[...] so I believe that the, well, hysteria in the media that surrounds this question, is inadequate.”⁴²⁵ Moreover, in another interview, when discussing the issue of immigration, he attempted to put the number of immigrants in the Czech Republic in perspective: “I would really like to give [you] one number. According to the statistics of the Ministry of the Interior, there are approximately 4 % of immigrants [of the population as a whole] living in the Czech Republic, which is deeply below what the situation is in some other countries that are exposed to really massive pressures. Both from legal and illegal immigration.”⁴²⁶ In another interview, Zahradil cited the same number, adding that, the 4 % of immigrants are moreover made up of communities very “compatible’ with the rest of the society, which is deeply below the average of some European countries and therefore

421 “Jan Zahradil.”

422 Ibid.

423 “Jan Zahradil.”

424 “Marcel Kollmann.”

425 “Jan Zahradil: Stalo Se Dnes – ODS.”

426 “Jan Zahradil.”

there is no need to haunt [the population] by immigrants.”⁴²⁷ ⁴²⁸ Though this necessarily implies that some immigrant groups are not compatible with the Czech society, Zahradil's attempt to put this matter straight is laudable. This is even more so considering the overall tendency of politicians to escalate certain issues compared to the often more restrained and relatively less opinionated electoral program.

Another candidate, Vlasák, also contributed to reducing the at times sharpened nature of the debate on immigration. First, when responding to the question on the external border, he reasserted the audience that the Schengen area works relatively well.⁴²⁹ Second, when reacting to a question about the potential mass immigration following the Arab Spring, he asserted that the “topic of 'Arab' immigration is from the perspective of the Czech Republic, lying in the very heart of Europe, more than exaggerated. Besides the Moravian nationality, the greatest minority here are Slovaks, Poles and Germans, followed by Ukrainians and the Vietnamese. *Muslims in the Czech Republic don't form a very numerous group, [...] about ten thousand people, mostly foreigners* (emphasis added).”⁴³⁰ Vlasák concludes his statement by the following contention: “Personally, I don't understand the logic of how the [political] movement [the Dawn of Direct Democracy] of one unnamed person who has himself photographed with a sword and in a kimono [Tomio Okamura], can have the theme of the struggle against minorities as the main election slogan.”⁴³¹

Unadaptable Immigrants

However, it was also Vlasák who made the connection between the issue of migration and the “unadaptable citizens” theme. When asked about “neighborhoods populated exclusively by immigrants from the Middle East and North Africa” that are “characterized by criminality and the unwillingness of their inhabitants to integrate,” Vlasák replied that this issue should be addressed at the municipal level and that we should be concerned with our own issues of this sort: “We ourselves have problems with unadaptable citizens [...]. These are the problems we should concentrate on, because these worry our citizens.”⁴³² Vlasák thus made a discursive link between a group of immigrants and those who in the Czech public discourse are labelled as “unadaptable.” This could have the effect of both reinforcing the perception that the Czech “unadaptable” citizens are “characterized by criminality and the unwillingness of their inhabitants to integrate,” and transferring the qualities generally

427 In Czech, the word choice is: “proto není nutno se tady strašit migranty.”

428 “Jan Zahradil.”

429 “Oldřich Vlasák.”

430 Ibid.

431 Ibid.

432 Ibid.

ascribed to the Czech “unadaptable” citizens to immigrants.

Foreigners: Potential Intruders

As mentioned above, the “unadaptable citizens” theme is in the Czech context associated with the economic issue of the (alleged) misuse of the social system. This chord was struck by another ODS candidate, Kollman, when in response to the question on the potential mass migration from the Arab countries he asserted the “natural duty to defend the EU as a space [...] from any *intruder of our cultural traditions or economic vacuum cleaners*⁴³³ [...] wherever they come from (emphasis added).”⁴³⁴ In Kollman's words, “the abuse of the generous system of social benefits” is “unforgivable.”⁴³⁵ Besides potentially intruding on our culture and social system, Kollman also advocated deep integration, an “absolutely maximum adaptation to the host country and maximum observance of law of the given country, *without someone trying to turn it here to chaos*, from which they themselves fled in order to *do better* (emphasis added).”⁴³⁶ ⁴³⁷ “Doing better” could be meant to imply “being better off” in economic terms, but it is not specified. However, Kollman proposed that foreigners may turn this country into chaos, particularly when they are not maximally integrated. “The EU as space that *we as Europeans were building together for many years* (emphasis added)” is portrayed as the object of protection.⁴³⁸

Migrants from the Ukraine

Finally, the issue of immigration was several times mentioned by the representatives of ODS in the context of the crisis in Ukraine in the sense that the Czech Republic may expect Ukrainian immigrants. Zahradil inquired how the Czech Republic is going to “get ready for the arrival of migrants from the Ukraine.”⁴³⁹ On another occasion he mentioned that the crisis presents a “risk” for the Czech Republic from the perspective of “potential migration” as the it could lead Ukrainians to “consider leaving the country and seeking a new refuge [in the sense of home, not necessarily asylum].”⁴⁴⁰ However, despite this one mention

433 In Czech language, the translation of the word “vacuum cleaner” is “vysavač,” the root of which is associated with the verb “to suck in.” This particular word choice thus directly implies that we need to protect the EU from immigrants who would wring money out of our economy.

434 “Marcel Kollmann.”

435 Ibid.

436 In Czech language, the sentence is: “Integrace znamená naprosto maximální přizpůsobení se hostitelské zemi a maximální dodržování zákonů dané země, bez toho aby se ji někdo pokoušel změnit v chaos, ze kterého sami uprchli, aby se jim dařilo lépe.” I translated “dařilo lépe” as “do better;” it could mean “do better economically,” but it is not clear.

437 “Marcel Kollmann.”

438 Ibid.

439 “L.Rouček v Událostech, Komentářích.”

440 “Jan Zahradil.”

of immigration from Ukraine as a risk, the issue was not presented with negative connotations, but rather as an eventuality we should be prepared for.

Communication: Supplementing the Program

ODS communicated their vision for immigration and asylum policy through the party's electoral program, but without providing detail. Individual politicians' communication in pre-election interviews was thus crucial to completing the picture. While some of the other candidates' responses tended to take advantage of the “unadaptable citizens” language, as well as language marked by (above all, economic) stereotypes, the leader of the party list, Zahradil, played an important role in reducing the alleged salience and controversy characterizing the discussions. In the “super-debate,” Zahradil completely avoided touching upon the issue of immigration, contrary to the representatives of some smaller parties. The party's Facebook timeline has not recorded any reference to any related issue either. The party's video spot featured a foreigner, portraying the party's relationship towards foreigners positively. This was a uniquely positive portrayal in the context of planned communication.

ODS: Summary

Representation of the Out-Group

- they are described as “foreigners”
- foreigners in the Czech Republic are not numerous and, moreover, “compatible” with the rest of the society
- the other is not of European origin, but is a long-term guest here, or an immigrant
- the others, non-Europeans, could intrude our cultural traditions, abuse our social system and turn this country into chaos
- the following groups are mentioned: Arabs, Slovaks, Poles, Germans, Ukrainians, the Vietnamese, Muslims; named to illustrate that the Muslim population is insignificant

Representation of the Out-Group

- we are Europeans who have been building the EU for years
- we disapprove of populism (implied)
- the program stresses the Czech national interest and the interest of Czech citizens

Categorization of Immigrants

- legal vs illegal immigration
- the immigrants in the Czech Republic are “compatible” with the rest of the society, implying there are other groups that are not compatible

Immigration: A Matter of...

- national interest
- limited resources (immigrants abuse our social system and may be “economic vacuum cleaners”)
- the level at which decision-making is made (sovereignty)

- cultural and social space (immigrants intrude it and may create chaos)

Language that Draws the Picture Complete

- “illegal” migration
- “foreigners” and “long-term guests”
- “long-term guest”
- ODS gives immigrants a chance
- often talking of foreigners, rather than immigrants
- need to neutralize risks “on time”
- migration from the Ukraine: neutral language, once referred to as “risk”
- “economic vacuum cleaners”⁴⁴¹
- “intruders of our cultural traditions”

Justifications and Persuasion Strategies

- (assuming “fashionable, but not thought-out, 'politically correct,' policy” refers to a more welcoming approach towards immigrants,) accepting of immigrants is presented as “fashionable, but not right” (delegitimization strategy)
- use of apparent denial (“we are not opponents of immigration, but...”)
- pointing out the lack of logic of a political opponent's campaign (Okamura)
- positive self-portrayal of the political party (“we are not irresponsible populists”)
- use of euphemisms (talking about immigrants as “foreigners” and “long-term guests”)
- use of evidentiality: use of figures to demonstrate the issue of immigration is overstated, citing the largest minorities to illustrate Muslims are not a large group in the Czech context

Argumentation: Appealing to Reason

- there is no need to be afraid of Muslim immigration, because Muslims are not numerous
- immigration could lead to the formation of ghettos (immigrant enclaves), an increase in cultural-civilizational tensions, or even violence
- immigrants may abuse our social system, intrude our cultural space, create chaos
- regarding immigration policy, the status quo is advantageous (the CR should maintain its relative advantage); appeal to reason (economic aspect)
- maximum integration in the host country is necessary

Argumentation: Appealing to Normative Structures

- N/A

441 In Czech language, the translation of the word “vacuum cleaner” is “vysavač,” the root of which is associated with the verb “to suck in.” This particular word choice thus directly implies that we need to protect the EU from immigrants who would wring money out of our economy.

3.1.7 Dawn of Direct Democracy of Tomio Okamura⁴⁴²

Vision for Immigration and Asylum Policy

Information about Immigration: Surprisingly Brief

Before introducing the Dawn's vision for immigration and asylum policy, it is worth noting that it has, so far, just one electoral program for the purposes of all elections, including that to the European Parliament in 2014. Quite understandably, that has somewhat limited the party's possibility to devise a proposal for immigration and asylum precisely for the EU context.

The party's main point in this regard is the following: “We want strict conditions for the immigration policy of the Czech Republic. We don't want here unadaptable immigrants or the arrival of religious fanatics.”⁴⁴³ This issue is not developed in any depth, which is striking, considering the fact that most of the electoral campaign of the party was built on the issue of immigration and defense against the dangers it presents.

Context: A Confident Nation

References to issues related on the national identity may also be relevant, especially for understanding the ideational context of the party. The Dawn of Direct Democracy party has displayed nationalist tendencies. It advances the notion of a self-confident, sovereign Czech Republic with a strong national identity: “Our goal is a self-confident and strong Czech state.”⁴⁴⁴ According to the party, we should be more aware of our value as a nation: “We consider the fact that the Czech state does not look after us becoming a proud and self-confident nation, to be a serious problem. Yet we may take pride in [having had] many important, world-wide known personalities. As a nation we stood the test of many historical events. Still the state does not lead us towards realizing that from the childhood.”⁴⁴⁵ This view should, according to the program, manifest itself also in education policy: “Today, subjects such as national history,⁴⁴⁶ history, or civic education are being left out. These subjects should be the bearers of the message⁴⁴⁷ of the Czech nation.”⁴⁴⁸

442 In the case of this party, it was more complicated to differentiate between the policy and the portrayal aspects of their communication than was the case with other parties. I tried to include the party's proposals and arguments in the first part on policy proposals and focus on their communication in the part devoted to portrayal. However, these two categories are so intertwined that it was rarely possible to make a clear distinction.

443 “Program Hnutí.”

444 Ibid.

445 Ibid.

446 In Czech language, the name of the subject is “vlastivěda.”

447 In Czech language, the word used is “poselství,” referring to a message, but a very weighty one; it is a word that could describe the Gospel, or some content with an important legacy.

448 “Program Hnutí.”

On the topic of national note, though other parties use the state as a justification for the division between “us” who as nationals are entitled to privileges from the state and “them” who do not have these rights, this argument is relatively more salient in the communication of the Dawn representatives: “The truth is that we cannot give money to foreigners if we don't have enough means for the citizens of the Czech Republic.”⁴⁴⁹ Though the Westphalian state system these claims are based on is the basis of the current international system, the Dawn movement stresses this national entitlement much strongly than other parties, especially through the use of a historical claim: “The citizens of the Czech Republic have to unequivocally be the priority; our ancestors were building this country for centuries.”⁴⁵⁰ The in-group is in this context presented as the “decent Czech citizens,” an expression that permeates the entire rhetoric of Úsvit that presents itself as “defending the interests of decent Czech citizens”⁴⁵¹ as opposed to “looking after foreign [alien] immigrants.”^{452 453}

Petition Against Immigration: Key to the Campaign

A “Petition for the Tightening of the EU Immigration Policy” (notably referring to the immigration policy of the EU, and not of the Czech Republic as in other messages) was an important component of the party's EP election campaign and provided the party's additional reasoning:

We, citizens signed below, ask for a fundamental tightening of the European Union's immigration policy by means of this petition. We refuse the misuse of our compassion and humanistic traditions by the criminal trade with immigrants. Those subsequently, under the better scenario, take jobs from our citizens, or, under the worse scenario, abuse the European social system. Europe belongs to Europeans and those who respect European values. Our compassion cannot be interpreted as a weakness or indifference. Europe has to stay and will stay European. We need to preserve our cultural identity, which is based on Christian values.⁴⁵⁴

Based on the text of the petition, it may be concluded that the Dawn of Direct Democracy refuses immigrants who do not respect European values, because “Europe has to stay [...] European,” a label which, according to the party, refers to European cultural identity and values arising from Christian values. A press release accompanying the launch of the petition further explains that the Czech governments repeatedly adopt legal norms that are “demonstrably against the interest of Czech citizens on the pretext they are implementing

449 “Tomio Okamura K Projednávánému Zákonu O Pobytu Cizinců.”

450 Ibid.

451 “Tak Už Visí Naše Billboardy!”

452 In Czech, the expression used is “cizí imigranté,” with the adjective referring to something that is not one's own.

453 “Výzva Vládě K Podpoře Slušných českých Rodin – Vytvoření Státního Fondu Na Podporu Rodiny.”

454 “Petice Za Zpřísnění Imigrační Politiky EU.”

European directives.”⁴⁵⁵ As a result, the party states, it launched the petition and is going to suggest “zero tolerance for illegal migration and strict quotas for legal migration”⁴⁵⁶ in the EP.

Immigration: A Matter of Limited Resources

Besides the effects on society, the leader of the party list Šarapatka also highlighted the economic dimension of the issue: “We cannot save the whole planet's poor. We simply don't have [enough money] for that and our task is to look after those in need from our country [decent people—families with children, the handicapped, seniors, children threatened by poverty⁴⁵⁷].”⁴⁵⁸ This attitude translated in the following policy solution: “Our priority is zero tolerance to illegal migration and the stipulation of a clear principle that the motherland pays for the social benefits of foreigners,”⁴⁵⁹ with “motherland” most likely referring to the country of origin of foreigners. Besides the issue of financing social security (where the theme of the families with children was highlighted in the slogan “Support to families, not unadaptable⁴⁶⁰”), the party also suggested that immigrants take over “our” jobs, as can be illustrated on one of their slogans “Work for our [citizens], not to immigrants.”⁴⁶¹

Another—what can be thought of as a justification or reasoning—provides Ms. Samková who originally led the party list but was later removed due to a fraud scandal. In an article titled “Is immigration an asset?” that implies an economic criterion for the acceptance of immigrants, she explained that immigration may be an asset when the receiving country “is mostly unpopulated with rich natural resources,” citing the example of Canada (particularly the example of Alberta's oil industry that required workers).⁴⁶² However, in Europe, Samková argued, the same is not the case—neither Europe, nor immigrants benefit; “social security, tolerance, and living standards” are in short supply, she argues. Moreover, “[m]iserable people who illegally arrive to Europe, [...] are smuggled into Europe in thousands or tens of thousands, [but] don't find a place where they could live their way and according to their cultural traditions and values, [...] staying, for the most part, unintegrated, unrooted, not understanding what is expected from them and why.”⁴⁶³ This can be thought of

455 “Celoevropská Petice Hnutí Úsvit „Za Zpřísnění Imigrační Politiky EU“ S Podtitulem „Nechceme U Nás Nepřízřusobivé Cizince Nebo Náboženské Fanatiky“.”

456 Ibid.

457 “Program Hnutí.”

458 “Nelegální Imigraci Nelze Tolerovat, Tvrdí Lídr Úsvitu pro Evropské Volby.”

459 Ibid.

460 In Czech language, the word “unadaptable,” originally an adjective, has been used also as a noun to refer to “those who are unwilling to adapt to the majority society.” Though the noun form does not exist in English, when the word is used as a noun in Czech, I'm going to translate it as such into English, since using a noun over an adjective implies that the “unadaptable” trait is defining, as opposed to one of many possible characteristics when used as an adjective.

461 “Podpora Rodinám, Ne Nepřízřusobivým; Práci Naším, Ne Imigrantům.”

462 “Glosa Kláry Samkové - Je Imigrace Přínosem?”

463 Ibid.

as an instance of the strategy of “apparent sympathy” whereby a certain position “[is] defended by constructing [it] as being 'for their own good.'”⁴⁶⁴

Alleged Unfulfillment of Human Rights

Subsequently, Ms. Samková argued that accepting immigrants means the unfulfillment of their human rights, another example of the use of the apparent sympathy strategy.⁴⁶⁵ According to my understanding, the reason for this is the following: the cultural context of Europe is very different, making integration unlikely, and resulting in the immigrants' confusion and feelings of unrootedness (based on the preceding statement).⁴⁶⁶ It is also possible that she meant that the human rights of immigrants cannot be fulfilled because immigrants are largely unqualified and it is therefore more difficult for them to find a job (the following statement).⁴⁶⁷ Finally, besides the human rights argument, she cites another economic argument—the “privatization of gains and the socialization of losses”—saying that “[f]rom the employment of cheap labor force, individual businessmen benefit, whereas all other expenses [...], i.e. social benefits, the cost of requalification and integration, investment incentives for their employment, are paid by the state—that is, us all.”⁴⁶⁸

Threat to Europe as We Know It

Another justification offered for the party's position on immigration, also offered by Samková, is the suggestion for the utilitarian approach of the “theory of the greatest good” that is however immediately refuted: “How can the EU with [...] 500 million people, absorb 1.3 billion immigrants? That is clearly nonsense, because,” Samková offered another argument, “[when this 'quota' is fulfilled], there will be no EU, or Europe,” because it will be “ruined,” she threatens with the complete wrecking of Europe.⁴⁶⁹ This appears as an attempt to appear “rational and reasonable,”⁴⁷⁰ yet on the basis of providing a completely exorbitant—and unreal—data and the use of misleading vocabulary (quotas when she's not talking about what quotas traditionally refer to in the context of immigration and asylum policy).

Finally, she offers a solution based on what she believes are the pull factors for migration to Europe, “freedom and economic achievements”—suggesting it would be “much more easy and right to strive to achieve the spreading of European ideas and functional

464 Riggins, *The Language and Politics of Exclusion*. 37.

465 “Glosa Kláry Samkové - Je Imigrace Přínosem?”

466 Ibid.

467 Ibid.

468 Ibid.

469 Ibid.

470 “Rhetorical Discourse Strategies Used Against Immigrants.” 7.

systems to the countries of immigrants' origins."⁴⁷¹ One of the solutions offered therefore is prevention in the form of spreading "European ideas" and "functional systems" beyond Europe.⁴⁷² However, this is only suggested in principle; the Dawn movement does not offer any suggestions on how particularly this may be achieved.

Ukraine: A Different Story?

Finally, the crisis in the Ukraine was also used by the party representatives as an opportunity to stress the issue of immigration. Ukraine was presented to be "on the brink of a huge humanitarian crisis" whose impact will "fall on us in the form of tens of thousands desperate refugees" for which "our ransacked state is not ready."⁴⁷³ Candidate Kobza called on politicians to make sure that the "immigration wave" does not take us by surprise, stating that we will either be able to "look after these refugees or that it will flood us as a great wave of desperate homeless people with whole families, small children, the elderly."⁴⁷⁴ Kobza's statements suggest that he differentiates between incoming refugees for whose arrival we should get ready (because it is a humanitarian crisis) and economic migrants whose redistribution among member states currently is not a priority: "In light of the Ukrainian crisis the idea of the relocation of detained economic migrants from Southern Europe to Central and Northern [Europe] seems to me absolutely unacceptable. Economic migration [...] has to be decidedly refused. Because we are expecting the humanitarian one."⁴⁷⁵ In one interview, Kobza mentioned the right to refuge explicitly. When talking about the "exodus of refugees from the Ukraine," he said that their lives are threatened and that "[t]his kind of refugees has the right to take refuge somewhere where they can survive until things calm down."⁴⁷⁶

At the same time, however, about two weeks after Kobza's statements to this effect, the representatives of the Dawn movement were calling for the protection of the Czech economy, above all, from the Ukrainians; particularly, the toughening of the conditions for their stay. The argument was that the "Western Ukraine, which will end up in the EU's sphere, will cost us billions of euros. Only the canceling of visas will mean a great inflow of workforce from the Ukraine, with the Czech Republic being one of the most vulnerable states [to it]."⁴⁷⁷ "In this regard," the party statement reads, "we are going to suggest in the Chamber

471 "Glosa Kláry Samkové - Je Imigrace Přínosem?"

472 Ibid.

473 "Jsme Připraveni Na Humanitární Krizi Na Ukrajině a Exodus Ukrajinských Uprchlíků?"

474 Ibid.

475 Ibid.

476 "Rozhovor S Jiřím Kobzou pro Parlamentní Listy."

477 "Vyjádření Hnutí Úsvit – Zpřísnění Podmínek Pobytu pro Imigranty a Pozorovatelská Mise Na Ukrajinu."

of Deputies [...] the canceling of social benefits for foreigners who stay in the CR and are without a job,” a solution which should include a one-time contribution for the return to their home country.⁴⁷⁸ Their proposal was to include also a change in the rules that allow to gain permanent residence extremely easily.⁴⁷⁹

These two messages are not necessarily contradictory; candidate Kobza called for the provision of protection to those Ukrainians threatened by war, while the party as a whole used the crisis in the Ukraine to call for the tightening of conditions for the stay of foreigners, including Ukrainians, and the granting of residence rights—which appears to target what the party deems to be economic migrants. Though not contradictory in the literal sense, the party opted for not sending a message of solidarity with Ukrainians and rather took the crisis as an opportunity to send another anti-immigration message to the public. On the other hand, Kobza's statements suggest that at least some of the party representatives do recognize some reasons for migration (though temporary) as justifiable. Although this appears to be the result of one candidate's activity, rather than the official party line, in the context of the party's communication, it may be perceived as a good sign.

The Devil's in the Portrayal

Unadaptable Immigrants

First, the representation of immigrants as “unadaptable” is perhaps the most salient feature of the movement's portrayal of immigrants; it is enshrined in the program: “We don't want here *unadaptable immigrants* or the arrival of religious fanatics,”⁴⁸⁰ as well as in the flyers: “Support to families, no to *unadaptables* (emphases added).”⁴⁸¹ What the party means, or attempts to convey, when its campaign refers to “unadaptable immigrants” is very well documented by one flyer that says “We want support to *decent* families with children[;] no to unadaptables! (emphasis added).”⁴⁸² Below, there are two pictures: one of a mother, a father, a daughter and a son—the “decent” family, one may assume—on a walk, holding hands; and the other of run-down “paneláky”⁴⁸³ the area in front of which is covered with garbage. The message is conveyed even by the weather in these two pictures—the sunny day coupled by bright colors in the first one as opposed to the dreary, cloudy day in the second, grayish

478 Ibid.

479 Ibid.

480 “Program Hnutí.”

481 “Podpora Rodinám, Ne Nepřízřusobivým; Práci Naším, Ne Imigrantům.”

482 “Chceme Podporu Slušným Rodinám S Děťmi, Ne Nepřízřusobivým.”

483 The Czech name for buildings made from large, prefabricated concrete *panels* (hence “paneláky”) typical of Central East Europe.

one.⁴⁸⁴ In using this flyer, the representatives of the movement not only tried to convince people that immigrants are “the opposite of decent,” making a link with those who are generally portrayed as “unadaptable” in the Czech Republic, the Roma. They also send a message about family norms, with family portrayed as the traditional, stereotypical nuclear family of two heterosexual parents, and two children—not even any two children, but a boy and a girl; anything too different from this model, the flyer suggests, is strange—characteristic of strangers who are necessarily messy and “unadaptable,” as the binary depiction hints.

Inspiration from the Swiss People's Party: Immigrants as Black Sheep

The same message “Support to families, no to unadaptables; work to ours [citizens] not to immigrants; we have 650,000 people without work” was used in a poster⁴⁸⁵ that largely copies the infamous poster campaign launched by the Swiss People's Party in Switzerland in 2007.⁴⁸⁶ Featuring five white sheep standing on a Czech flag, with one of them kicking away one black sheep, it is strikingly similar to the posters used in Switzerland (where the white sheep are three and standing on a Swiss flag, kicking away a black sheep), an inspiration the movement admitted.⁴⁸⁷ The anti-immigrant nature of the message with its kicking away of the black sheep (pointing to a foreign element, with the implied racial difference) is hardly contestable. Moreover, the use of the black sheep also refers to the metaphorical meaning of the “black sheep”—the “different,” but more often with negative connotations as the “bad” or “disgraceful” one. Interestingly, this world pair started to be used figuratively “supposedly because a real black sheep had wool that could not be dyed and was thus worth less,” implying a lower worth of the black sheep—though, at the same time, and ironically, “black sheep in a flock was considered good luck by shepherds in Sussex, Somerset, Kent, Derbyshire.”⁴⁸⁸

Strict Immigration Policy—Less Islam, More Security

In any case, the Swiss poster read “Pour plus de sécurité,” meaning “For more security,”⁴⁸⁹ a link to security which the Czech version of the poster did not make. However, that does not mean the Dawn movement did not present the issue of migration as a matter of security. The movement representatives did frame immigration as a security threat while, at

484 “Chceme Podporu Slušným Rodinám S Děťmi, Ne Nepřizpůsobivým.”

485 “Podpora Rodinám, Ne Nepřizpůsobivým; Práci Našim, Ne Imigrantům.”

486 “Proposed Swiss Immigration Laws Show ‘Rise of New Racism and Xenophobia.’”

487 “Volební Plakát Hnutí Úsvit pro Květnové Evropské Volby.”

488 “Black Sheep.”

489 “Proposed Swiss Immigration Laws Show ‘Rise of New Racism and Xenophobia.’”

the same time, linking it to Islam. One candidate, Fiala, stated that “[f]rom the perspective of its own security the Czech Republic has to solve two fundamental issues,” one of them being “[the need for a] strict immigration policy, so that in a few years we don't have to search mosques for weapons and literature spreading fear and hatred.”⁴⁹⁰ In other words, in the view of the movement, immigration, particularly the immigration of Muslims, presents a security threat that needs to be addressed by stricter immigration rules.

A message to this effect is also conveyed by another poster that reads: “Do you want a stricter EU immigration policy? We are against the influx of illegal immigrants and religious fanatics!”⁴⁹¹ The flyer contains two photographs. On the left one, there is a boat full of people, most likely to create an image of immigrants coming across the Mediterranean Sea. The other photo depicts more than a dozen of men kneeling—most likely to invoke a picture of praying Muslims. In front of them, there is a pile of weapons. In my understanding, the flyer is sending the message that those who come in overcrowded boats are those “religious fanatics (emphasis added)” mentioned repeatedly in the campaign who present a security threat, symbolized by the weapons they set aside to take time to pray. Similarly, the party justifies its idea of immigration as a security by invoking the results of opinion polls on foreigners being a threat.⁴⁹²

Kobza, another candidate, developed his view on Islam in great detail on the movement's Facebook page. Though at first, he engaged in the strategy of positive self-presentation by stating that “any religion is in its dogmatic, orthodox and fanatic form a threat to society” and that he is not going to condemn Muslims because “they have a lot we Europeans could learn from,” necessarily understanding “Europeans” as “non-Muslims,” or by referring to his life experience with different countries, but he quickly moves on to describe why Islam presents a threat.⁴⁹³ Kobza, differentiating between Muslims that are “adaptable” and “unadaptable,” defines “adaptable” Muslims as “those who are Muslims because they were born in the Muslim world, but otherwise live their own way” and “unadaptable Muslims” as “those who fell for orthodox and radical Islam.”⁴⁹⁴ He then explains in rather great detail how Muslims will gradually gain greater and greater influence “until they seize control through democratic tools and introduce sharia and get the West under Allah's rule.”⁴⁹⁵ An increase in Muslims' influence will lead to an increase in the number of

490 “Reakce Radima Fialy K Prohlášení Ministra Obrany O Jednotkách NATO v ČR.”

491 “Chcete Zpřísnění Imigrační Politiky EU?”

492 “Hnutí Úsvit - Proč Podporuji Petici Za Zpřísnění Imigrační...”

493 “Islámské Tažení Evropou.”

494 Ibid.

495 Ibid.

mosques where “the cells of dogmatic Muslims emerge the most often.”⁴⁹⁶ Kobza then mentions the export of Saudi Arabia's radical clerics abroad, “consequences of which manifested in the increase of terrorism in Europe,” a reference to the first security threat.⁴⁹⁷ Second, he asserts that “tolerant and intolerant Islam don't exist. There's just one Islam, as there is one Quran and that is a dogma that is not to be discussed,” serving as an argument for his assertion that multiculturalism cannot work—arguments for which he calls “dogmatic,”⁴⁹⁸ an instance of negative presentation of the Muslim other, as well as multiculturalism and its defenders. Kobza further develops the negative presentation of the other by saying that “an intolerant, non-discussing, and dogmatic religion that justifies violence” cannot enrich our society, in Kobza's words, rather ironically, labelled as “a *tolerant*, democratic world (emphasis added).” The increase in political demands of Muslims “threatens also our society” and “[o]pen Europe is a questionable, dangerous myth, at the end of which Europe, as we know it, will not exist.”⁴⁹⁹ What it is all about is “preventing the clash of cultures from growing into the clash of civilizations.”⁵⁰⁰ Interestingly, this is the only explicit reference to the clash of civilizations in all of the material studied.

The Dawn movement also uses “an exceptional example” to “convince the readers into thinking as if the example written in the article represents all other immigrants.”⁵⁰¹ One example is the use of the Cronulla Beach in Sydney affair in which a group of young Muslim men raped a local girl; “[w]hen [she] announced [it] to the police, the youngsters said it was their right given by Allah to treat unbelievers this way and that [...] they have the holy right to do that.”⁵⁰² Though Kobza says that a number of Muslim organizations denounced the act, he cites this as “a very instructive example of a multicultural society,” basically inducing fear in connection with immigration.⁵⁰³ In the same interview, Kobza depicted immigrants in a negative way, creating an impression of fear. When asked about the redistribution of refugees and whether he sees immigration as a threat, indeed a not very easy starting position, he concurred, saying that he “see[s] it as a path to hell” because “the Czech Republic has enough problems with the integration of its unadaptable citizens,” creating the impression that immigrants will also, necessarily, be unadaptable.⁵⁰⁴

Moreover, he said that, from his own experience, when he worked on a hospital

496 Ibid.

497 Ibid.

498 Ibid.

499 Ibid.

500 Ibid.

501 “Rhetorical Discourse Strategies Used Against Immigrants.” 6.

502 “Rozhovor S Jiřim Kobzou pro Parlamentní Listy.”

503 Ibid.

504 Ibid.

project on the border of Angola and Zambia, he asked about the type of injuries they had to deal with, to which they replied:

'No, it is violence. It is injuries from fights and brawls.' When they fought, they did not look around and they didn't care they can kill someone. I see it as very dangerous to make transfers of refugees to Europe, because I don't know how Europe should treat them. We cannot close them to some kind of camp and guard them and, at the same time, we cannot let them among people, because there's no work here.⁵⁰⁵

Perhaps unintentionally, but when asked about immigrants, he, speaking from his own experience—striking at least some credibility points—depicted them as dangerous people. Though the reason given for the fact we cannot let them among people is that there is no work here, the image that still lingers in the readers' minds is that they get into fights and may kill innocent bystanders. On another occasion, by presenting Khomeini's opinions in describing Muslims and their political ambitions, Kobza also used a rather extreme example.⁵⁰⁶

Similarly, Fiala said that “if someone is offended by Christmas and considers Sharia to be a superior law, [...] we say clearly—the Czech Republic is not your country.”⁵⁰⁷ This mention of Sharia not only depicts Muslims as the most problematic immigrants, but also may create the impression that the introduction of Sharia, a rather extreme position not representative of all Muslim immigrants, is what Muslims generally demand. These examples are also likely used to present immigration as a threat and create fear among voters.

Language Completing the Picture

The Dawn's messages were supported by the following choice of vocabulary: Samková declared she would “*protect* the EU from immigrants,”⁵⁰⁸ because if we don't, it will be “*ruined* [literally *subverted*] (emphases added).”⁵⁰⁹ Or, on the occasion of introducing their petition to the public, one representative mentioned that “[t]he Czech Republic does not need unadaptable foreigners or religious fanatics, they need us; they need to *parasitize* on our system (emphasis added).”⁵¹⁰ Moreover, the movement's policy stance supporting “zero tolerance for illegal migration and strict quotas for legal migration”⁵¹¹ is also characteristic of its representatives' rhetoric that strictly distinguished “illegal” migration from “legal,”

505 Ibid.

506 “Islámské Tažení Evropou.”

507 “Hnutí Úsvit K Imigrační Politice (Sestřih Brífinku).”

508 “Vyjádření Kláry Samkové K Imigrační Politice – Musíme Zabránit Přijímání Emigrantů Do EU!”

509 Ibid.

510 “Hnutí Úsvit K Imigrační Politice (Sestřih Brífinku).”

511 “Celoevropská Petice Hnutí Úsvit „Za Zpřísnění Imigrační Politiky EU“ S Podtitulem „Nechceme U Nás Nepřizpůsobivé Cizince Nebo Náboženské Fanatiky“.”

stressing that many immigrants come “illegally;” are “smuggled into Europe”⁵¹² and, in fact, they are occasionally referred to as “illegal migrants.”⁵¹³ Moreover, the party mentioned the number of foreigners working in the Czech Republic, undeniably in an attempt to demonstrate that they take jobs away from “our” unemployed, stressing the “il/legal” nature of this work: “[...] around 400,000 foreigners work here both legally and illegally.”⁵¹⁴ The issue is further criminalized through references such as the “criminal trade with immigrants.”⁵¹⁵

Economic Immigrants

The Úsvit candidates asserted the category of “economic immigrants,”⁵¹⁶ also alternatively called “social emigrants.”⁵¹⁷ Besides argumentation in support of this view, the party representatives also used language to support this perception, such as “Immigration is an increasing problem to which we only contribute by increasing the *social gifts* [social security] to immigrants.”⁵¹⁸ This stance also resonates with Samková’s thought piece on immigration called “Is immigration an *asset?* (emphasis added)”⁵¹⁹ that reflects the economic lens through which the party looks at immigration.

Refugees as People Above All

On the other hand, some of the party representatives did portray refugees as people, above all, rather than a threat to our economy or security. Lanka, in his address to the Chamber of Deputies on the issue of Ukraine, mentioned:

You see, I'm afraid that [...] we forget what should be the most fundamental—Ukrainians themselves. We forget that Ukrainians—both from the East as well as the West of the country—are completely normal people and I believe they don't wish for anything unusual. They want to have a family, they want to have means to provide for it and they don't want to be afraid to let their children out just because there are currently tanks out there.⁵²⁰

Considering the context of the party's communication, this is a very sensitive representation of the issue. In fact, Kobza, in a statement outlined above, concurred with the view that something needs to be done about what he calls “the humanitarian crisis” presented by refugees from the Ukraine—though he warned that if something is not done about this,

512 “Glosa Kláry Samkové - Je Imigrace Přínosem?”

513 “Chcete Zpřísnění Imigrační Politiky EU?”

514 “Výzva Vládě K Podpoře Slušných českých Rodin – Vytvoření Státního Fondu Na Podporu Rodiny.”

515 “Hnutí Úsvit - Proč Podporuji Petici Za Zpřísnění Imigrační...”

516 “Jsme Připraveni Na Humanitární Krizi Na Ukrajině a Exodus Ukrajinských Uprchlíků?”

517 “Tomio Okamura K Projednávanému Zákonu O Pobytu Cizinců.”

518 Ibid.

519 “Glosa Kláry Samkové - Je Imigrace Přínosem?”

520 “Dnešní Projev Poslanca Martina Lanka v Poslanecké Sněmovně K Situaci Na Ukrajině.”

“they will *flood* us as a great *wave* of desperate homeless people with whole families, small children, the elderly (emphases added).”⁵²¹ On the other hand, this can be contrasted with Samková’s depiction of refugees coming from the Mediterranean area as primarily “economic immigrants,” which raises a question of why this distinction is made and for what purpose.

Refugees as Passive Receivers

Another depiction is in my view worth noting. Samková described immigrants as “[m]iserable people who illegally arrive to Europe, [...] are smuggled into Europe in thousands or tens of thousands, [but] don’t find a place where they could live their way and according to their cultural traditions and values, [...] staying, for the most part, unintegrated, unrooted, not understanding what is expected from them and why.”⁵²² In this sentence, Samková describes immigrants as unfortunate, miserable people who are confused and lacking agency.

Though generally I don’t assign great importance to the use of passive tense, it appeared to me very curious in connection with Samková’s statement on immigrants’ passivity and confusion. This declared lack of agency seems almost ironic considering the immigrants’ decision to set out on this journey and overcome its dangers in reaching the borders of the EU. Perhaps the use of the passive tense in the sentence: “[immigrants/refugees] *are smuggled* into Europe” as well as in many others we utter in relation to immigration indeed has real effects on how we perceive incoming foreigners, their agency—and beyond.

Communication: If This is Xenophobia, Then Yes, We Are Xenophobes

Finally, one particular strategy seems to me characteristic for the Dawn representatives’ overall rhetoric—they often express their xenophobic stance and, aware it may be attacked for being xenophobic, they first, either acknowledge these accusations, subsequently appealing to the voters’ “common sense:” “Despite all accusations of xenophobia [...] I have to appeal to you, dear colleagues, to your common sense,” followed by what is presented as a simple matter of fact: “The Czech Republic simply does not have enough money to provide for [...] all citizens and their families that express an interest in it.”⁵²³ Or, second, they acknowledge the accusation, but present the object of xenophobia as something else that is design to fulfill the criteria for “common sense:” “If you call this duty

521 “Rozhovor S Jiřim Kobzou pro Parlamentní Listy.”

522 “Glosa Kláry Samkové - Je Imigrace Přínosem?”

523 “Tomio Okamura K Projednávanému Zákonu O Pobytu Cizinců.”

[the duty to look primarily after those in need in our own country] xenophobia, then yes—we are xenophobes.”⁵²⁴ Through rationalizing their view through appealing to their voters' common sense,⁵²⁵ the candidates of the Dawn movement tried to irrationalize those who accuse it of xenophobia and racism by substituting the object of criticism by an acceptable one. Though declaring they are xenophobes, these statements, being connected with the strategy of irrationalization, de facto amount to their denial⁵²⁶ of xenophobia.

Alternatively, one of the candidates, Ms. Radostová, attempted to identify the party's xenophobic stance with the majority opinion. She attempted that by referring to opinion polls conducted by the Center of Independent Public Opinion Research. After citing the results of this poll, she argued that these opinions (formulated in the petition in this particular case) are not xenophobic or populist and that instead, the petition initiated by the Dawn movement “expresses what most Czechs think and want.”⁵²⁷ This attempt to establish a link between what “most Czech people think and want” and the party's position is an example of a rhetorical strategy that “present[s] the addressers as rational and reasonable, in order to defend themselves from possible charges”⁵²⁸—which, in this case, are charges of xenophobia and populism Ms. Radostová expects. At the same time, it clearly amounts to a strategy of “denial of racism.”⁵²⁹

On another occasion, the party opted for justifying their position on immigration by the developments in Switzerland, a country that is in the Czech Republic generally perceived in positive light, that are presented in the following way: “Not even the Swiss like this kind of economy [whereby the government bears the costs of immigration], which is why they said NO to further immigration. I expect that similarly to me [Samková], Tomio Okamura and the whole Dawn, Switzerland will be dubbed a gang of Nazis, fascists, xenophobes and human-rights thugs without feelings. Welcome to the club, Switzerland.”⁵³⁰ In a modified version of the Dawn's “we are unrightfully called xenophobes” rhetoric, the Dawn representative Samková tried to identify the movement with Switzerland, justifying its position.

Dawn of Direct Democracy: Summary

Representation of the In-Group

- we are confident Czechs
- we are Europeans: Europe belongs to Europeans and those who respect European

524 “Nelegální Imigraci Nelze Tolerovat, Tvrdí Lídr Úsvitu pro Evropské Volby.”

525 “Rhetorical Discourse Strategies Used Against Immigrants.” 7.

526 Riggins, *The Language and Politics of Exclusion*. 37.

527 “Hnutí Úsvit - Proč Podporuji Petici Za Zpřísnění Imigrační...”

528 “Rhetorical Discourse Strategies Used Against Immigrants.” 7.

529 Riggins, *The Language and Politics of Exclusion*. 37.

530 “Glosa Kláry Samkové - Je Imigrace Přínosem?”

values

- we are Europeans—not Muslims (these groups are disjunctive)
- our cultural identity is based on Christian values

Representation of the Out-Group

- not decent citizens, not adaptable to the Czech society
- religious fanatics who are going to spread hatred
- take jobs from our citizens
- immigrants abuse the European social system, those that receive social gifts
- non-Europeans or those who do not respect European values
- desperate homeless people with whole families, small children, the elderly from the Ukraine
- refugees have the right to take refuge somewhere where they can survive until things calm down
- there will be a great inflow of workforce from the Ukraine, which will cost us a lot of money
- they are the “black sheep” and what it symbolizes—disgraceful, less worthy
- some are Muslims
- are intolerant Muslims
- are adaptable and unadaptable Muslims (adaptable were merely born in the Muslim world, whereas unadaptable Muslims are those who fell for orthodox and radical Islam)
- Muslims cannot enrich our society because they believe in an intolerant, non-discussing, and dogmatic religion that justifies violence
- are causing the clash of cultures that may grow into the clash of civilizations
- Muslims who rape girls, declaring Allah gave them the holy right to do that
- Africans who get into fights and brawls and don't care if they kill someone
- those who are offended by Christmas and consider Sharia to be a superior law
- Ukrainians are people who don't wish for anything unusual
- those live according to their cultural traditions and values, staying unintegrated, unrooted, not understanding what is expected from them and why
- absolute majority are unqualified people who have difficulty to understand the culturally-conditioned system of our work

Categorization of Immigrants

- illegal vs legal migration
- refugees vs economic migrants (social migrants)
- intolerant Muslims (because there is just one, intolerant, Islam)

Immigration: A Matter of...

- economic restraints (scarce resources—social security, employment, funds for requalification, ...) where preference should be given to Czech nationals
- absorption capacity
- existence or non-existence of the EU
- use of wrong data and misleading language to make the situation appear worse
- security (one example cites terrorism)
- threat to our society
- criminal trade (with immigrants)

- the need to keep our cultural identity based on Christian values
- not being humane
- the tightening of conditions for the stay of foreigners-criminals
- sovereignty/authority (the European Parliament should introduce zero tolerance to illegal immigration and strict quotas for legal immigration)
- humanitarian crisis (with regard to refugees from the Ukraine)

Language that Draws the Picture Complete

- “unadaptable” immigrants, “unadaptables”
- “religious fanatics”
- “miserable” people, “desperate” refugees
- “smuggled” into Europe
- great “inflow,” “influx,” “flood” of immigrants
- a “wave” of Ukrainians may “flood” us
- “decent” families and citizens
- “black sheep”
- immigrants need to parasitize on our system
- we don't need them, they need us
- “illegal” immigration, “illegal” immigrants, “illegal” work
- “economic” or “social” migrants
- “social gifts”
- Europe may be “ruined”/“subverted”

Justifications and Persuasion Strategies

- use of opinion polls to present the party opinion as rational and reasonable, merely reflecting the result of the opinion polls
- use of denial of racism and xenophobia
- use of apparent sympathy
- use of exceptional example
- use of “appeal to common sense,” irrationalizing their political opponents
- substituting substituting the object of criticism (xenophobic and racist messages) by an acceptable one (looking after Czechs in need)
- use of a legitimating example (Switzerland)
- use of claims based on historical entitlements

Argumentation: Reasons

- Czech governments repeatedly adopt legal norms that are “demonstrably against the interest of Czech citizens on the pretext they are implementing European directives.
- We don't have money to save the whole planet's poor. We should support those in need from our country instead (decent people—families with children, the handicapped, seniors, children threatened by poverty).
- In case of a place where social security, tolerance, and living standards are in short supply, immigration is not a good idea for either party.
- Here, the human rights of immigrants cannot be fulfilled.
- Immigration rules should be strict because of the privatization of gains and the socialization of losses.
- Immigration rules should be strict because the EU cannot absorb 1.3 billion people immigrants.

- Immigration rules should be strict because if we accept 1.3 billion immigrants, there will be no EU anymore.
- Immigration is not a solution to the problems of the countries of immigrants' origin; these should be solved by the spreading of European ideas and functional systems instead.
- Our ransacked state is not ready for immigration.
- Social benefits for foreigners who stay in the CR without a job should be cancelled, because it would cost us a lot of money.
- Immigration rules should be strict because otherwise we will soon have to search mosques for weapons and literature spreading fear and hatred.
- Immigration rules should be strict because otherwise the Muslim population is going to increase and it is going to seize control through its democratic means and introduce sharia and get the West under Allah's rule.
- Immigration rules should be strict because an increase in Muslims' influence will lead to the increase in the number of mosques where the cells of dogmatic Muslims emerge the most often.
- Immigration rules should be strict because multiculturalism cannot work
- Immigration rules should be strict because it will prevent the clash of cultures from growing into the clash of civilizations
- Transfers of refugees to Europe should not be made because we don't know how to deal with them.
- We need to protect the EU from immigrants because otherwise, it will be subverted.

Argumentation: Normative Structure

- We refuse the misuse of our compassion and humanistic traditions by the criminal trade with immigrants.
- We should not forget that Ukrainians are completely normal people and I believe they don't wish for anything unusual. They want to have a family, they want to have means to provide for it and they don't want to be afraid to let their children out just because there are currently tanks out there.

3.1.8 The Green Party

Vision for Immigration and Asylum Policy

Program: Focus on Asylum

The Green Party outlines its vision for immigration and asylum policy in a chapter of the program titled “We Want To Live in an Open, Liberal and Just Europe,” which reflects the values behind it. First, mobility within the EU is mentioned: “The free movement of European citizens within the EU enriches states economically and culturally.”⁵³¹ This idea of openness is subsequently developed with regard to third countries: “Also towards the outside the EU cannot be an inaccessible *fortress* (emphasis added),”⁵³² directly referring to the notion of “Fortress Europe.” From human perspective, it is “inadmissible that thousands of

531 “Program pro Eurovolby.”

532 Ibid.

people annually die on its borders.”⁵³³ The Green Party commits to “effective help to people who flee from areas where their life is threatened. To those who cannot return, it is necessary to offer effective programs of integration to the European society. We are going to support an increase in the number of integration centers.”⁵³⁴ One solution therefore is the granting of asylum that is, in the eyes of the Greens, inseparable from a sound integration policy.

Another approach stresses, as is the case with many other parties, prevention: the Green Party claims to contribute towards “[EU’s] more effective help to the poor people directly in places where they live, so that the flight to Europe [is] not the only solution to their desperate situation.”⁵³⁵

Green Common Manifesto: The Big Picture

The European Green Party’s “Green Common Manifesto,”⁵³⁶ shared on the Czech Green Party’s website in Czech, can also be considered a relevant input. Migration is mentioned on a number of occasions, The section “Fighting for Fair Asylum and Migration Policies” outlines the European Greens’ vision for asylum and migration policies. First, regarding asylum, it introduces the big picture: “The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimates that in 2013 there were almost 40.000.000 displaced persons in the world, of which almost half are refugees outside their own country. The UN indicates that 200.000 of these refugees urgently need to be resettled every year, but only half of them find a new home; more worryingly only 4.500 are resettled in the European Union - compared to 80.000 per year in the USA.”⁵³⁷ The Greens’ proposal is thus justified by the worldwide need for refugee resettlement and the comparison with the U.S. policy in this regard.

EU Border: A Clash Between Human Rights and Security

The common manifesto also identifies the issue of restrictions on the right to seek asylum legally and outlines, among others, solutions that would address this issue: “Thousands of people die on Europe’s external borders every year, because of ever stricter controls and because the means of legal entry into the EU remain limited. The EU has a duty to ensure that these people can seek protection.”⁵³⁸ Moreover, the Greens appear to locate this deficiency as arising from the clash between security (embodied by FRONTEX) and human rights (particularly the right to seek asylum that tends to be secondary in this context), which

533 Ibid.

534 Ibid.

535 Ibid.

536 “Společný Evropský Manifest - Strana Zelených.”

537 “Change Europe, Vote Green: The Green Common Manifesto.”

538 Ibid.

necessarily is a first step towards the desecuritization of this practice. They argue the following:

We need more efforts to establish an asylum system worth its name. The European Border Agency, FRONTEX, is the wrong agent for that and member states are violating human rights in their border policies. We need greater efforts by the EU as well as by member states and more coordination for ‘rescues at sea’, and we need legal and safe ways for entry, for example with humanitarian visas. We have to get rid of the current rules (the ‘Dublin Regulation’) that force refugees to apply for asylum only in the country where they first entered the EU.⁵³⁹

The principle of prevention included in the Czech Green Party's program is paralleled also in the common manifesto, invoking solidarity as a basis for policy-making.

We should, in our foreign relations as well as our trade and development policies, address the issues which force people to migrate. Greens have been successful in the fight for the creation of an EU Joint Resettlement Programme as well as for funds for emergency resettlement of refugees facing a humanitarian crisis. EU member states must do everything they can to make full use of these funds and show solidarity, not only amongst each other but also with troubled neighbouring regions.⁵⁴⁰

The European Greens' emphasis on solidarity implies support for the redistribution measures among EU member states, as well as a generally relatively welcoming policy towards asylum-seekers. The second aspect is further reflected in the party's support for the advancement of European values in the transformation of the EU's neighboring regions; particularly, the program proposes the granting of asylum as one of the paths towards this goal: “The EU should work with civil society, *granting asylum* and support to defenders of freedom and democracy and granting scholarships (emphasis added).”⁵⁴¹

Migration is also mentioned in the context of security. A section “Domestic Security Policy” highlights the “need to improve police and judicial cooperation, especially tackling terrorism, organised crime, including mafia associations, environmental and economic crime.”⁵⁴² “In doing so,” the manifesto reads, “the EU and its member states should however prevent the stigmatization of migrants and minorities.”⁵⁴³ Though migration is mentioned in the context of security, it is done for the purpose of countering the stigmatization of migrants and minorities that is often the result of measures taken in the name of security—which is a truly unique position in the context of the Czech immigration discourse.

EP Election: An Opportunity to Make a Statement on Values

Finally, the Czech Green Party took up the issue of immigration—and particularly the

539 Ibid.

540 Ibid.

541 Ibid.

542 Ibid.

543 Ibid.

debates and atmosphere surrounding it—to make a statement against hatred and fear of the unknown and some parties' populist use of these tendencies that started appearing in the course of the campaign. In the Green Party representatives' opinion, the greatest potential problem in this regard arises from the “increasing indifference of parliamentary political parties against hateful marches and the radicalization of the majority society in places of social tensions. The public elites basically overlook this problem and some even try to capitalize from it and escalate the conflicts,” citing Okamura's Dawn political party as an example.⁵⁴⁴ This is a problem because these populist tendencies may “aggravate the situation and thus deny the values of openness, tolerance and solidarity on which the unified Europe is built,” in the words of another candidate, Shanaáh, who thus pointed out the link with the European dimension of this issue.⁵⁴⁵ This stance can therefore also be considered a part of the Greens' policy towards immigration and asylum. Since the Greens' portrayal of the issue was the focal point of their message, I describe it in greater detail in the section devoted to portrayal.

The Devil's in the Portrayal

Their Life Is Threatened, Period

Perhaps most importantly, the starting point of the Green Party with regard to immigration and asylum policy is that immigrants are “people” in need of help because their “life is threatened.”⁵⁴⁶ Stated as a matter of fact, without any accompanying doubts or additional conditions and other “buts,” this portrayal counters the prevalent depiction of immigrants as primarily *economic* migrants (“with better smartphones than we have”⁵⁴⁷) who simply seek a better life—that is so common in the Czech public discourse. The Greens' approach, lacking any hint of a doubt about the legitimate nature of threats to the immigrants' lives, reintroduces the need to protect this group of people as something completely natural and uncontested.

Avoiding Standard Labels

It appears to me that the second, preventative, solution, addressing “the poor people” targets immigration that is driven primarily by these people's “desperate” situation arising from poverty, that is, above all economic considerations, to use the prevalent language.

544 “Zelení Podpoří Nenásilnou Blokádu Neonacistů v Ústí Nad Labem, Upozorňují Tak Na Extremismus v Celé Evropě.”

545 Ibid.

546 “Program pro Eurovolby.”

547 An argument I often hear that, in my view, excellently sums up the opinion that “these are no 'refugees,' but economic migrants who learned on TV that there is a better life here [in Europe] that needs to be taken away from us,” a comment one AAU alumna posted on my Facebook page.

However, this done in a way that does not question the legitimacy of their needs, as well as the need for our assistance.

Moreover, likely a result of a conscious choice, the words “immigrant,” “asylum-seeker,” “refugee” and the like are nowhere to be found in the Czech Green party's program to the EP (merely the relatively more neutral word “migration” is used in the name of the program section). Instead, the word “people” (or the word “people” modified by a certain description, such as “poor” or “who flee from areas where their life is threatened”⁵⁴⁸) is consistently used throughout the document. By extension, the same applies to the expression “illegal immigration/immigrant” otherwise very commonly used by politicians. Though we cannot know with certainty whether the authors of the program did this intentionally to avoid the advancing of certain labels and categories, following the constructivist view of language, this effect is arguably present. This choice can be understood as the Greens' contestation of the dominant construction of “reality” and a proposal for an alternative.

Immigration: A Matter of Values

The entire political program of the Green Party is very value-based, which is evident also from how the issue of immigration and asylum are presented. The authors write that it is “unacceptable” from the perspective of the values of humanity that thousands of people die at the EU border because it is an “inaccessible fortress.”⁵⁴⁹ Similarly, the granting of asylum is linked to the values of freedom and democracy and their defense. The Green party's stated support to the rights of minorities and resistance towards discrimination also derives from their understanding of “human rights [...] as the basis of a civilized society and their consistent defense [...] as the main pillar of the EU.”⁵⁵⁰

When Liška, the leader of both the Green party and the party list to the EP election, was asked to react to the opinion that the Greens “lure immigrants to the country”⁵⁵¹ in the Czech TV “superdebate,” he responded that “[t]hat is, of course, nonsense,” identifying immigration as a “European problem” that needs to be “solved rationally. Above all, to prevent populists from taking advantage of this weighty problem by inducing intolerance.”⁵⁵² Before repeating the Greens proposal to solve this issue, Liška restated that “those people flee from very difficult conditions,” appealing to the voters' solidarity.⁵⁵³ This aspect was strengthened by the statement that the “fortress” is only in the last twenty years behind the

548 “Program pro Eurovolby.”

549 Ibid.

550 Ibid.

551 “Evropské Volby 2014.”

552 Ibid.

553 Ibid.

loss of more than 20,000 human lives as “[r]efugees from African countries or Syria die at the European coasts every day, overlooked and without help.”⁵⁵⁴

Liška's labeling of immigration as a problem may be considered one of the most objectionable moments of the Greens' communication. However, he named it “a European problem,”⁵⁵⁵ which raises the question whether the modifier did not shift the meaning from “a problem” to “our common, European problem,” which would shift the emphasis from the portrayal of the issue as “a problem” to “our” problem. Since in the following sentence, he used the words “weighty problem,” it appears likely that the portrayal of the issue as problem was intended rather than not. However, this may have been done so that the party could propose that it be “solved rationally,”⁵⁵⁶ which it did.

Challenging the Xenophobic Discourse

In fact, the party's attempt to make a case for moving away from inducing fear (through the use of emotional appeals and statements presenting immigration as a danger) towards a rational discussion of the issue, is a recognizable feature of its campaign. It was communicated through most channels I analyzed: not only did Liška warn against it in the superdebate, this stance was also communicated through press releases and, recast into a humorous form, visual materials.

In a statement on the launching of the Green party's campaign “With Humor Against Hatred—The Dawn of Human Decency of Šádí Shanaáh,”⁵⁵⁷ Shanaáh, one of the party's candidates to the EP calls on the “intelligent and decent part of the Czech society decidedly stood up against xenophobes.”⁵⁵⁸ This formulation uses both positive self-portrayal and negative portrayal of a political opponent. Since this is perhaps the most distinct and bold statement against xenophobia reacting to Okamura's campaign, I include it in its entirety:

In the Czech Republic, the economic and social crisis is bringing a very dangerous phenomenon based on hatred and fear, similarly to Germany in the 20s and 30s of the past century. Political parties of the Dawn of Direct Democracy of Tomio Okamura kind coldly calculated for themselves that it is possible to gain votes by channeling the frustration of the crisis-stricken fellow citizens against immigrants, Muslims, or the Roma. People such as Klára Samková⁵⁵⁹ hijacked the traditional concept of liberal values and liberties, declared themselves to be their defenders and implanted into it

554 “Zelení Podpoří Nenásilnou Blokádu Neonacistů v Ústí Nad Labem, Upozorňují Tak Na Extremismus v Celé Evropě.”

555 “Evropské Volby 2014.”

556 Ibid.

557 The name of the campaign is a parody on the name of the political party called “the Dawn of Direct Democracy of Tomio Okamura,” indicating that Shanaáh's intervention is necessary to reintroduce decency into the Czech political sphere following Okamura's activity.

558 “Prohlášení Ke Spuštění Kampaně „Humorem Proti Nenávisti – Úsvit Lidské Slušnosti Šádího Shanaáha“.”

559 Klára Samková was originally the leader of the Dawn of Direct Democracy party list, but was later recalled due to a fraud scandal. She is well-known for her xenophobic remarks.

their version of [...] racism.

I personally was and still am the target of this hatred. My email and Facebook account were attacked by far-right extremists, I receive messages to get ready for deportation and other disquieting threats and ultimatums. On social media I have been called, for example, a monster and a baby killer. All I had to do was to have an Arabic name and defend the rights of Muslims. Whether I am a Muslim myself or not, the Islamophobes don't care about.

Although the Islamophobic and xenophobic community could've been until recently perceived as not much more than a mere curiosity, it is impossible not to notice the intrusion of these fomenters' activities into the upper echelons of politics. How else could we explain the fact that in the Czech Parliament, the Deputy⁵⁶⁰ representing ODS, Jana Černochová, or the Senator Pavel Trpák, sponsor anti-Muslim “debates” lead by the members of the Czech Defence League, an organization that figures on the Ministry of the Interior list of extremists. There's no need to remind [readers] that President Zeman placed a sign of equation between Muslims and Nazis.

It is also because of these dangerously growing passions which some politicians purposefully inflame that I decided to respond with humor. I'm going to continue in this campaign and I hope that other people will join [...]. Let's laugh at xenophobes together!

Looking at the different building blocks of this declaration separately, we can see a statement (politicians' channeling of fear and frustration towards certain groups of people is a dangerous phenomenon) that is supported by an account of personal experience with its manifestation and examples of others that give evidence to the claim that when Shanaáh describes from his personal experience, it is not an isolated event, but part of a wider problem. The use of personal testimony appears to me as quite effective as it shows that these tendencies turn against those we may perceive as “Others” but whose stay in our country would probably be challenged by few. Moreover, the form of a personal testimonial, because it allows for a personal perspective, has the advantage of allowing for greater empathy from the audience. In my view, the citing of the instances whereby Shannaáh was called a “monster” and a “baby killer”⁵⁶¹ are effective in that through revealing their absurdity, they prepare grounds for—what Shanaáh likely saw as—the only possible answer: a reaction based on humor.

Shanaáh's Response

Though in the campaign, Shanaáh used more flyers where he touched upon the topics of immigration, diversity and tolerance, as well as his own identity, I will elaborate on the three that were referred to in the press release and in which, in my understanding, poke fun at

560 A member of the Chamber of Deputies.

561 “Prohlášení Ke Spuštění Kampaně „Humorem Proti Nenávisti – Úsvit Lidské Slušnosti Šádího Shanaáha“.”

himself and his identity, Okamura and his political opinions as they relate to his identity, and the immigration scare stirred up by Okamura and other forces.

First is a flyer with his picture in which he has the word “deported” stamped on Shanaáh's chest, saying: “Don't you want me in the CR? Circle [#] 5 and deport me to Belgium.”⁵⁶² In this flyer, Shanaáh makes fun of his identity, as well as those who ask for his deportation, implying, through his request, that they are empty-headed (as its fulfillment would lead to Shanaáh's election).

Second, Shanaáh ridicules Okamura's political opinions, pointing to the irony that arises from the fact that he, as a person with Japanese roots (and a name), he incites hatred against people who are not ethnic Czechs and represents a very nationalist political tendency. In the picture, Shanaáh has a part of the logo of the Dawn movement around his head, which creates a rainbow halo and wears a Japanese sword, saying: “I hate the Arabush,⁵⁶³ dinks⁵⁶⁴ and negroes. Half-Japanese are fine.”⁵⁶⁵ ⁵⁶⁶ In a separate statement, Shanaáh commented on Okamura's campaign in the following way:

[He] decided to play the xenophobic card openly. His party's poster, on which white sheep chase the black one away from their flock, is an attack on the lowest of human instincts [...]. Neo-Nazis and extremists use the same theme all over Europe. When it comes to the Muslim community, Okamura, following the principle of collective guilt, typecasts them as religious fanatics. The Greens are convinced that Europe can and has to become a continent that is open to the outside [world], ready to accept without prejudice anyone who wants to live a dignified life.⁵⁶⁷

Third, Shanaáh pokes fun at the immigration scare in general when in another picture he says: “I have a rifle, [food] cans, and water. I'm ready for a migration wave. How about you?”⁵⁶⁸

Using the racist language of his political opponents, stereotypical attributes of certain groups and not reflecting on the fact that Okamura may identify himself with a different identity than the one Shanaáh ascribes to him based on his outward—in fact, racial—characteristics, for many, Shanaáh balanced on the edge of good taste. However, from the perspective of the political discourse related to immigration, it is a clear message against hatred and xenophobic tendencies that I, as such, perceive as possibly important. The question remains, however, whether this form of anti-campaign indeed had this effect or not.

562 “Humorem Proti Nenávisti: Nechcete Mě v ČR?”

563 “Arabush.”

564 “Dink.”

565 In Czech language, the sentence is: “Nesnáším arabáče, rákosníky a negráče. Polojaponci jsou v pohodě.”

566 “Humorem Proti Nenávisti: Nesnáším Arabáče, Rákosníky a Negráče. Polojaponci Jsou v Pohodě.”

567 “Zelení Podpoří Nenásilnou Blokádu Neonacistů v Ústí Nad Labem, Upozorňují Tak Na Extremismus v Celé Evropě.”

568 “Humorem Proti Nenávisti: Jsem Připraven Na Migrační Vlnu.”

Challenge to Xenophobia as a Campaign Theme

That the anti-xenophobic attitude was not characteristic just for one candidate, but was turned into an important feature of the Greens' overall campaign can be illustrated the Green party candidates' participation at a non-violent blockade of a neo-Nazi march. On this occasion, the party declared that its aim was to “bring attention to the alarming increase of extremist tendencies in the society.”⁵⁶⁹

The party representatives did link this activity to the EU and the upcoming election to the European Parliament by referring to the common European values that these tendencies threaten. Liška said:

The Greens call on all [...] to join the blockade and give a clear signal that they are not going to tolerate the spreading of racist and xenophobic atmosphere in the society. In the upcoming election, extremists who do not shy away from openly supporting today's dictators [...] beyond Europe's borders in an attempt to destroy the project of a unified Europe may gain in [political] strength. It is the task for all democratically-thinking people to stand up to this threat.⁵⁷⁰

Stereotypes: Not Avoided

The party's communication was characterized by an appeal to Czech voters to perceive Europe and the EU more positively and support the idea of a united Europe, an opportunity to propel the Czech Republic “forward.”^{571 572} The message that Czechs should like Europe, engage with it more positively and metaphorically cross the borders (because “the Greens surpass frontiers”) and send to Europe the best we have (the Green's candidate), because “[their] Europe is [our] Europe,” was conveyed by the Greens' “Eurosong.”⁵⁷³ This music video features various kinds of Europeans (a German, an Austrian, a French, Scots) who are portrayed in a very stereotypical manner. Though they are used as a hyperbole and a joke, as Liška said,⁵⁷⁴ these representations may indeed advance the stereotypes they are meant to point out.

Communication: Emphasis on Values

The Green Party advanced the notion that Europe is built on the values of tolerance, openness, solidarity, stressing the values of human rights and liberal democracy. According to the Green Party, it is essential that Europe does not “renationalize” but unifies; integrates

569 “Zelení Podpoří Nenásilnou Blokádu Neonacistů v Ústí Nad Labem, Upozorňují Tak Na Extremismus v Celé Evropě.”

570 Ibid.

571 The slogan of the Green Party was “Česko dopředu,” meaning “Czechia [move] forward.”

572 “Česko Dopředu.”

573 “Zelení Přišli S Extravagantním Muzikálovým Klipem ‘Eurosong.’”

574 Ibid.

more deeply instead and vigorously defends the values on which it is built.⁵⁷⁵ These values became evident through the party's communication of primarily two issues.

Ukraine: A Battleground of Values

First, it was the above-mentioned topic of xenophobia, which was presented as a threat to European values. Second, it was the topic of crisis in the Ukraine, which had an important place in the Greens' campaign, as can be documented by the fact that the party representatives and candidates to the EP participated in various events to express their support for “free Ukraine.”⁵⁷⁶ “Aggressive geopolitics,” one flyer argues, “belong to the past. The EU has to decidedly defend a free Ukraine.”⁵⁷⁷ It depicts a globe that is embraced by a bear, likely symbolizing Russia's aggressive geopolitics, and suggesting that if we don't stand up to “defend free Ukraine,” the entire world may be eventually threatened by this kind of geopolitics.⁵⁷⁸ Ukraine was thus in the campaign portrayed as a battleground of values:

Several hundred kilometers from here a civil war rages on the borders of Europe and the EU does almost nothing to prevent the invasion of values that are an antithesis to the values of liberal democracy that we profess and on which our society is built. And people have the option to [...] vote whether they want Europe that speaks with one voice and that is able to defend these values on this continent.⁵⁷⁹

The Greens thus portrayed Putin's Russia as a threat to our European values and used the crisis in Ukraine to illustrate that the clash is real; it is already taking place not far away from us—and offered a solution in the form of a strong, united EU that speaks with one, strong voice—to which one can contribute by voting Green.

The Green party further supported their case by pointing out political forces in the Czech Republic that undermine “free Ukraine”⁵⁸⁰ and, therefore, the European values envisioned and advanced by the Greens. A flyer they used in the campaign titled “All Putin's Men” depicts the candidates to the EP Ransdorf (the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia), Mach (the Party of Free Citizens), Okamura (the Dawn of Direct Democracy), Klaus (a former Czech President who had recently expressed affinity towards Putin's Russia) and, finally, the largest in size of all, Putin himself.⁵⁸¹ The text on the flyer reads the following: “A functioning Europe is worth five minutes of your time. Come elect the Greens [...], in order to stop Putin's influence in Europe.”⁵⁸² The description next to the flyer informs

575 “Evropské Volby 2014.”

576 “Agresivní Geopolitika Patří Minulosti.”

577 Ibid.

578 Ibid.

579 “Evropské Volby 2014,” May 14, 2014.

580 “Agresivní Geopolitika Patří Minulosti.”

581 “Všichni Putinovi Muži.”

582 Ibid.

that “[e]xtremist and eurodestructive parties and politicians support Putin's efforts at crumbled and weak Europe,” with an appeal to voters to “increase the energy independence of Europe and the influence of Putin's fifth column.”⁵⁸³ The Greens thus argued for the need to stand up against these forces in the Czech Republic (labeled as “Putin's fifth column”⁵⁸⁴) that challenge these European values by either their direct links with Russia's elite or by their political opinions that weaken the EU as a strong actor (whether this be by directly challenging EU's role and authority, or by undermining the values around which it has been built).

The Green Party: Summary

Representation of the In-Group

- we are Europeans who respect the values of openness, tolerance and solidarity
- we are Europeans whose defense of human rights is the main pillar of the EU
- we oppose xenophobia and Islamophobia
- we support global justice and solidarity

Representation of the Out-Group

- they are people
- some are people who flee from very difficult conditions; areas where their life is threatened
- some are poor people

Categorization of Immigrants

- people whose life is threatened pointed out as a special category
- poor people

Immigration: A Matter of...

- helping people (whose life is threatened or who are poor and in a desperate situation)
- respect for human rights, particularly with regard to conduct at borders and seeking protection
- advancing European values in the transformation of the EU's neighboring regions (granting asylum)
- bearing a fair share of refugee resettlement on a world-wide scale
- solidarity (among EU members and with troubled neighboring regions)
- values of humanity

Language that Draws the Picture Complete

- refugees die without help, overlooked
- a “weighty European problem”
- “Arabush,” “dinks,” “negroes,” “half-Japanese” (ironically)
- use of EU national stereotypes (declared to be hyperbole)

583 Ibid.

584 Ibid.

Justifications and Persuasion Strategies

- use of positive self-portrayal and negative other-portrayal (with regard to a political opponent)
- use of personal testimony supported by details (to illustrate the effects of hate talk)
- use of irony to respond to xenophobic tendencies
- use of figures to provide context of the world-wide need for refugee resettlement and comparison with the United States to present the EU figures as falling behind

Argumentation: Reasons

- The means of legal entry into the EU remain limited, restricting the possibility to protection, which is why EU asylum system needs to be reformed.
- The degree of immigrants' integration to European society should be enhanced
- The topic should not be about
 - cold populist calculation
 - purposefully spreading fear

Argumentation: Normative Structure

- From human perspective, it is inadmissible that thousands of people annually die on its borders.
- EU member states must do everything they can to make full use of resettlement funds and show solidarity, not only amongst each other but also with troubled neighboring regions.
- It is the task for all democratically-thinking people to stand up to those who attempt to destroy the project of a unified Europe.

3.1.9 Party of Free Citizens

Vision for Immigration and Asylum Policy

The Party's Focus

The Party of Free Citizens advocates right-libertarian Eurosceptic views. In the context of the election to the EU, its main priority was the exit of the Czech Republic from the EU. To this end, the Free Citizens organized a petition for the calling of a referendum on this issue, which was also one of the main elements of the election campaign. Emphasizing the concept of sovereignty, the party defends the greatest autonomy for the member states possible, the preservation of their political and cultural diversity, with cooperation in the sphere of economy above all.

The party's position on immigration and asylum is not explicitly addressed in its program for the 2014 EP election and therefore all information on their stance in this regard is gained from other sources.

Immigration: A Matter of Authority

In relation to immigration and asylum, the main emphasis seems to be related to the

party's opinion on the sovereignty and the division of powers among national and European institutions. Free Citizens, in their general political program from December 2013, propose that EU member states pass a Constitutional law listing exclusive competences of national parliaments to prevent the shifting of authority to European institutions—and asylum and immigration policy are to be one of the policy areas over which states should retain their authority.⁵⁸⁵ Other than that, “vast migration waves” are in the program mentioned under the heading “External Security” in the context of “risks that are to be solved by military means.”⁵⁸⁶

Charting the Boundaries of Immigration

More on the party's stance on immigration and asylum can be found in the “Questions and Answers” section of the Free Citizens' website, particularly, in an answer to the question: “What is your opinion on the immigration issue?” that also reflects the emphasis on sovereignty and decision-making powers at the national level: “We were against the Lisbon treaty also because it enables the outvoting of the Czech Republic when it comes down to asylum policy. We consider the national border an important trait of a sovereign state and the state has to have the right to say whom it wants to admit to its territory and whom not.”⁵⁸⁷ Mach further explains that “[i]t is necessary to avoid problems they have due to uncircumspect immigration policy in the Netherlands, France, Germany and elsewhere,” though why these developments took place he does not specify.⁵⁸⁸ “On the other hand,” he says, in some circumstances immigration is permissible: “it is necessary to provide for long-term residence in case someone marries *into* the Czech Republic⁵⁸⁹ or works here as a foreigner. However, we are fundamentally against directed migration as a solution to some problem (the idea we need more immigrants, so that the pension system based on continuous financing does not crash I consider to be dangerous social engineering.) (emphasis added).”⁵⁹⁰

Immigration and Islam

In another question, the party representatives were asked about their “opinion on immigration and the threat of Islam.”⁵⁹¹ Mach connected these two phenomena in his answer,

585 “Politický Program.”

586 Ibid.

587 “Otázky a Odpovědi.”

588 Ibid.

589 In Czech, the formulation used is “marry *into* the Czech Republic (emphasis added),” referring to a situation whereby someone marries a Czech citizen, as opposed to two foreigners who marry one another on the territory of the Czech Republic.

590 “Otázky a Odpovědi.”

591 Ibid.

referring to immigration as related to Islam only. He explained that Free Citizens incorporated the principle of religious freedom in their statutes and religion “should not [therefore] be dragged into politics, should not be forced onto others. Which applies to Christianity as well as Islam.”⁵⁹² However, he refers to the Western culture, in which Christianity, as well as other influences (Judaism, Ancient times, as well as pre-Christian customs), have their place, making the issue of religion relevant to discussions related to our culture after all.⁵⁹³

The “Islamization of Western Europe” and, what he later termed “the upswing of Islam in the West” was “artificially induced” by “a faulty policy of multiculturalism” that characterized the immigration policy of the Western countries, Mach asserts.⁵⁹⁴ Islam is therefore too widespread and the Western states' approach to immigration that led to this state of affairs is one of the reasons why the Party of Free Citizens oppose common decision-making about these matters introduced by the Lisbon Treaty.⁵⁹⁵

What could be concluded based on these hints is that although in some instances immigration is permissible (long-term residence should be granted to a foreigner who marries “into” the Czech Republic or works here), immigration policy should not lead to the “Islamization” of the receiving country. However, besides these principles, Mach does neither specify any other criteria in greater detail, nor suggests how should these two propositions should be reconciled. With regard to the EU and policy-making at the EU level, according to the Free Citizens, the Czech Republic should fully reclaim its authority over immigration and asylum policy. “Vast migration waves” are a “risk” to be solved by military means.⁵⁹⁶ The Party of Free Citizens did not make any statement on asylum policy.

The Devil's in the Portrayal

Migration: A Security Risk

The Party of Free Citizens tends to portray migration as a security risk. Not only does its political program mention “vast migration waves caused by catastrophes, uneven demographic development, uneven need for resources (strategic raw materials, water and energy), uneven economic development and other causes” as a “risk” from the perspective of “external security.”⁵⁹⁷ The document summarizing the party's view of the EU, called

592 Ibid.

593 Ibid.

594 Ibid.

595 Ibid.

596 “Politický Program.”

597 Ibid.

“Alienated Europe,” mentions “[m]igratory pressures and the related risks for all states” that add up on the boundary of each state, which “inadequately increase the security risks,” as an argument against the Schengen Area that is dangerous for its massive personal data collection.⁵⁹⁸ This reference also illustrates the authors' inclination to conceive of migration as a security threat.

When discussing Islam in the context of immigration, Mach used the “Islamization of Western Europe” and “the upswing⁵⁹⁹ of Islam in the West” vocabulary,⁶⁰⁰ which are, relatively, neutral, though this does not mean that the party members see this process as a neutral phenomenon. However, Mach does not explicitly say that Islam is a threat to Europe, though the question to which he answers, does. Yet in his answer, he does emphasize that it was the Free Citizens who as the only political party defended Geert Wilders when he was to come to Prague to “give a lecture on the dangers of Islam for Europe.”⁶⁰¹ Though the link is not direct, it is present.

Liberal, Not Xenophobic

At the same time, on the occasion of the launching of their campaign, probably in reaction to a question from the media⁶⁰² on the policy towards the granting of work permits, Mach responded: “We would be against the EU's dictating [this] to us. We are a liberal, not a xenophobic party, we are concerned about the freedom of the individual (emphasis added)”⁶⁰³ in a statement in which he most likely attempted, through the use of positive self-presentation, to set the Free Citizens apart from the xenophobic campaign of the Dawn of Direct Democracy.

As the party nowhere elaborates on the issue of asylum, there is also no reference to immigration that could be potentially justified on moral grounds. Although this may be the case due to the party's ideology that emphasizes minimal government intervention in the context of a right-libertarian outlook, it is nevertheless noteworthy, because the institution of granting asylum not only exists, but also has a relatively long history in international relations.

598 Bartas, Mach, and Payne, “Odcizená Evropa.”

599 In Czech language, the word used is “rozmach.”

600 “Otázky a Odpovědi.”

601 Ibid.

602 This topic is only written about in the media; it is not mentioned in the relevant party's press releases or other communication.

603 “Zakazují Nám Džus, Žárovky, Rum. Svobodní Chtějí Bránit Euronoesmyslům.”

Communication: A Gap

The party's stance on the issue of immigration and asylum was not communicated in the context of the campaign specifically. The few references the party's representatives made on this topic (elaborated above) were not directly related to the EP election, but were rather included in the general “Questions and Answers” section of the website.

The main features of the Free Citizens' Party's electoral campaign was, as already mentioned, a petition for a referendum on the Czech Republic's exit from the European Union,⁶⁰⁴ and, above all, a campaign titled “We Are Going to Clamp Down on Eurononsense,”⁶⁰⁵ which also formed the party's main slogan for the election campaign.⁶⁰⁶ Besides the “Eurononsense” in the form of bans on calling certain produce, such as “rum,” or “juice,” or other legal norms prohibiting the use of classical light-bulbs, etc., the Free Citizens' Party stressed that the biggest “Eurononsense” of all is the common European currency, the Euro.⁶⁰⁷ In the course of the campaign, the Free Citizens' tried to convince Czech voters that the Czech government should negotiate an exception to the requirement to adopt the Euro.⁶⁰⁸

Generally, the party's representatives stressed the value of freedom in the course of the campaign, particularly in the pre-election debates, for example. Much of the communication was carried out on social media and the Internet in general.

Party of Free Citizens: Summary

Representation of the In-Group

- we are Czechs
- we respect religious freedom
- we are part of the Western culture where Christianity, as well as other influences (Judaism, Ancient times, as well as pre-Christian customs) form its basis

Representation of the Out-Group

- some are Muslims, other groups are not mentioned

Categorization of Immigrants

- only the reasons for migration are mentioned—catastrophes, uneven demographic development, uneven need for resources (strategic raw materials, water and energy), uneven economic development and other causes

604 “Petice Za Vypsání Referenda O Vystoupení ČR Z EU.”

605 In Czech language, the slogan is “Posvítíme si na euronemysly,” literally translated as “We are going to throw light on Eurononsense,” which refers to a close scrutiny and opposition to “nonsense” allegedly forced upon the Czech Republic by the EU.

606 “Zakazují Nám Džus, Žárovky, Rum. Svobodní Chtějí Bránit Euronemyslům.”

607 “Svobodní Zahájili Kampaň Zakázanou Snídání S Novináři.”

608 “Přijmout Euro Se České Republice Rozhodně Nevyplatí.”

Immigration: A Matter of...

- sovereignty (at what level is decision-making made)
- security: “vast migration waves” are a security risk to be solved by military means
- indirectly: restricting individual's liberty through massive personal data collection through Schengen cooperation
- Islamization

Language that Draws the Picture Complete

- “vast migration waves”
- “Islamization of Western Europe”

Justifications and Persuasion Strategies

- invoking examples of some Western European states to illustrate how immigration policy has failed
- positive self-presentation: we are a liberal, not a xenophobic party

Argumentation: Appealing to Reason

- immigration may cause problems, as in the Netherlands, France, Germany and elsewhere
- some immigration is permissible, for example if someone marries a Czech or works here as a foreigner, long-term residence should be granted
- opposed to directed migration as a solution to some problem (to finance the pension system, for example)
- Islamization induced by a policy of multiculturalism should be avoided

Argumentation: Appealing to Normative Structures

- N/A

3.1.10 Czech Pirate Party

Vision for Immigration and Asylum Policy

Czech Pirate Party: A European Party

The Czech Pirate Party's election program is characterized by a strong European dimension, not only because it was a Czech version⁶⁰⁹ of a program common to all European pirate parties⁶¹⁰ which was a “part of the common election effort.”⁶¹¹ The Common European Election Programme is an outcome of the European pirate parties' cooperation at the European level that in March 2014 culminated in the formation of the European Pirate Party.⁶¹² European pirates share the view that the EU “as a supranational institution is a project of its member states rather than of its citizens” and seek to address the EU's

609 “Společný Program Pirátských Stran pro Volby Do Evropského Parlamentu v Roce 2014.”

610 “Common European Election Programme of the European Pirates for the Elections of the European Parliament in 2014 (CEEP).”

611 “Common European Election Programme (CEEP).”

612 “Welcome European Pirates!”

democratic deficit by allowing for and encouraging greater citizen participation, addressing transparency-related issues, strengthening the principle of subsidiarity and “encourag[ing] the development of a common European space for culture, politics and society, and protect[ing] the existing rich and diverse cultures that exist within the Union”—by taking advantage, among others, of “[t]he Internet as a medium of communication offers tremendous opportunities for political development, overcoming top-down, one-way communication.”⁶¹³ Issues stemming from the arrival of the Information Age (such as open government, protection of privacy and civil rights, copyright and free software and net policy) are the focal point of the Pirates' program.

Refugee Policy in the Common Program

The Pirates' Common European Election Programme for the 2014 elections to the EP does not provide much information on their vision for immigration and asylum policy. Interestingly, the program does not say anything on the issue of immigration and a short section is devoted only to “Refugee policy.”⁶¹⁴ The entire content is the following: “The European approach to asylum and refugees must be based on the acknowledgement of human rights and fully respect the Geneva Convention on Refugees and the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child.”⁶¹⁵ Though somewhat unrelated to “Refugee policy,” the section also includes the outline of Pirates' position on “EU neighbourhood policy and EU development policy [that] should be geared towards lasting improvement of living conditions and focus on the promotion of human rights in all partner countries and regions. We denounce all tendencies to create a repressive apparatus of survey and control in Europe.”⁶¹⁶

This approach is in line with the Pirates' emphasis on the respect for human rights and, in the context of today's European information society, particularly privacy and civil rights—which is in fact the name of the section under which “Refugee policy” is subsumed.⁶¹⁷ The need to respect the rights of minorities and the right for fair treatment are even included in the preamble: “PIRATES strongly believe that all people have the right to fair and equal treatment. It is essential that society respect the rights of minorities. We will stand against discrimination of any kind and oppose movements that act against Human Rights.”⁶¹⁸

613 “Common European Election Programme of the European Pirates for the Elections of the European Parliament in 2014 (CEEP).”

614 Ibid.

615 Ibid.

616 “Common European Election Programme (CEEP).”

617 “Common European Election Programme of the European Pirates for the Elections of the European Parliament in 2014 (CEEP).”

618 Ibid.

Though the program makes clear the value background of Pirates, it can be hardly concluded that the information it provides on immigration and asylum policy is in any way exhaustive. The advantage of the Pirates' attitude towards open data, however, lies in the fact that the genesis of the program can be to some extent tracked. As a result, unlike it is the case with other political parties, we may see what actors were involved in its creation, how and why.

Insights from Drafting History

For example, it is clear from the drafting history prior to the Athens Conference in November 2013 that German Pirates made a relatively more extensive proposal for the section “Refugee Policy”:

PIRATES propose a fundamental reform of the EU-policy on refugees and asylum. Any “full boat” ideology is unacceptable. The European approach must be based on the acknowledgement of human rights and fully respect the Geneva Convention on Refugees and the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. All member-states must accept refugees and asylum-seekers according to their capacity. No individual member-state should be left alone with the financial, logistic and administrative burden; European solidarity is called for instead. “Frontex”, the Agency for the control of EU-borders, which often violates international law and human rights, is an incarnation of the European Union's misanthropic exclusion policy. PIRATES demand to dismantle the Agency altogether. EU-neighbourhood-policy and EU-development policy must be geared towards lasting improvement of living conditions and focus on the promotion of human rights in all partner -countries and -regions. We denounce all tendencies to create a repressive apparatus of survey and control in Europe.⁶¹⁹

Upon first reading, it is evident that this proposal is much more ambitious than the final result; calling for a “fundamental reform,” it refuses any approach that would deny asylum-seekers protection on the grounds that the EU does not have the capacity and demands a solution based on true solidarity among EU members.⁶²⁰ The German Pirates, expressing their disdain for Frontex, called to dismantle it, which the Pirates from Sweden asked to be removed.⁶²¹ On the other hand, Pirates from Catalunya proposed a “[b]an [on] immigration detention centers:”

The human rights of people who are in immigration detention are of particular concern to the European Pirates. Liberty is a fundamental human right, recognised in major human rights instruments to which Europe is a party, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Convention on the Rights of the Child. People who are held in detention are particularly vulnerable to violations of their human rights.⁶²²

619 “Proposals for the Topic ‘Civil Rights’ in the CEEP.”

620 Ibid.

621 Ibid.

622 Ibid.

Records from the “Online Conference on the Common European Election Programme for 2014 later in November 2013” reveal a subsequent watering down of the proposal. It was the Czech Pirate Party that struck down the refusal of the “full-boat ideology,” as well as removal of the sentence denouncing Frontex human rights and international law violations.⁶²³ Wherever “must” was used, the Czech Pirates proposed the word “should” instead.⁶²⁴ The version Czech Pirate Party proposed was thus the following:

PIRATES propose a fundamental reform of the EU-policy on refugees and asylum. ~~Any “full boat” ideology is unacceptable.~~ The European approach must be based on the acknowledgement of human rights and fully respect the Geneva Convention on Refugees and the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. All member-states ~~must~~ should be equally willing to accept refugees and asylum-seekers according to their financial capacity. No individual member-state should be left alone with the financial, logistic and administrative burden; European solidarity is called for instead. ~~“Frontex”, the Agency for the control of EU borders, which often violates international law and human rights, is an incarnation of the European Union's misanthropic exclusion policy.~~ EU-neighbourhood-policy and EU-development policy ~~must~~ should be geared towards lasting improvement of living conditions and focus on the promotion of human rights in all partner countries and regions. We denounce all tendencies to create a repressive apparatus of survey and control in Europe.⁶²⁵

More importantly, the user representing the Czech Pirate Party, Markéta Gregorová, provided an explanation: First, she explains, “we'd like to withdraw from that 'command' tone; expressions like must or unacceptable are too binding and it can't make it through our board in the approval process in such way.”⁶²⁶ Second, “‘capacity’ is a broad term; we need in this case some specification, otherwise it gives a space for own – and sometimes negative – interpretation.”⁶²⁷ “[L]ast,” she writes, “the Frontex. It's an unknown issue in the Czech republic therefore it seems really unnecessary in the common program; plus it's only a statement - it doesn't offer solution or way; and there was even an opinion that this statement without proof or explanation might seem falsely - and though *we* believe you what is Frontex like, we can't afford such baseless (in the program!) statements (emphasis in the original).”⁶²⁸

Subsequently, having refused “any burden-sharing references,” the UK Pirates proposed the formulation that appeared in the final version of the manifesto, which was subsequently agreed on.⁶²⁹ It appears that in agreeing the final version, the European Pirates opted for the lowest common denominator. Even though this means that the segments struck down by the Czech Pirates would have probably been removed anyways (likely by the UK

623 “Online Conference on the Common European Election Programme.”

624 Ibid.

625 Ibid.

626 Ibid.

627 Ibid.

628 Ibid.

629 Ibid.

Pirates⁶³⁰), the drafting process is insightful in that it reveals more about the opinion of the Czech Pirates on the issue of asylum policy and their explanation and reasoning.

In the Name of Security Threats

Finally, one section of the Pirates' program refers to measures taken in the name of terrorism and other threats, reading as follows: “The threat posed by unlawful and excessive surveillance measures, imposed on us by governments both foreign and domestic, whether in response to terrorism or other threats is grave. There is an immediate need for action to redress the balance and restore our privacy.”⁶³¹ Indicating the Pirates' discontent with the curtailment of privacy rights in the name of security threats, this attitude could be possibly relevant also in the case of the curtailment of other human rights under similar circumstances. This statement is particularly notable as it challenges measures introduced in the name of security.

The Devil's in the Portrayal

In the studied materials, the representatives of the Pirate Party did not explicitly mention issues that touch upon immigration and asylum policy. As a result, this section will focus on the portrayal of issues that could be relevant in influencing the public opinion on immigration and asylum (the construction of our identity, communication of relevant values, etc.).

Europe is Our Sea

As has already been indicated above, in terms of identities conveyed, the message of “being European,” or a quality of “Europeanness” is stressed probably the most. It is evident in the party's communication of its political cooperation with other Pirate Parties at the European level,⁶³² its vision for the creation of a European demos, the portrayal of the EU and, perhaps most clearly, its slogan.

The Czech Pirate Party navigated the campaign using the slogan “Europe is our sea.” This accent on Europe and cooperation at the European level was consistently supported on numerous occasions—in articles and news releases, interviews, as well as visual materials.

Bartoš, the leader of the party list for the Pirates, repeatedly said that the Pirates are “euro-critical [critical to the EU], but definitely pro-EU.”⁶³³ According to him, “the EU is

630 Ibid.

631 “Common European Election Programme of the European Pirates for the Elections of the European Parliament in 2014 (CEEP).”

632 “Evropská Pirátská Strana Vyplouvá!”

633 “Novinky.cz: Piráti, Zelení, Svobodní: Jsou to černí Koně Eurovoleb? | Svobodní.”

according to us [the Czech Pirate Party] a platform for cooperation, and not something that is economically interesting due to subsidies and national interests. Our goal is democratization of the EU and its opening to the citizens, so that Europe is our sea.”⁶³⁴ In advancing EU as a platform for cooperation, Bartoš advanced cooperation as a value and, on the other hand, denounced the narrow, economic perspective of national interest that was often heard from other parties in the course of the campaign. Bartoš in fact identified cooperation as one of the main points for the Pirates and identified the level at which it should be happening: “We cooperate with a number of pirate parties in Europe and run with a common European program,” he said in the “super-debate.”⁶³⁵ Moreover, he argued that “Europe is a common project” and that their “goal is not to win the best for the citizens of the Czech Republic, but for the citizens of the EU,”⁶³⁶ explaining that as a member of the EP, he would represent citizens of the whole Europe.⁶³⁷

The emphasis on “Europeanness” is apparent also from the party's visual materials. For example, its video commercial features the pirate ship logo with European stars around it, a number of personalities (not only from the Czech Republic) who say the slogan “Europe is our sea” either in Czech or English, with Bartoš saying “Europe is our sea. We are in the same boat.”⁶³⁸ The Pirates' Facebook cover photo also included the slogan, under which a reference to the Pirates' cooperation at the European level is again made: “24 Pirate Parties in Europe.”⁶³⁹ One of the pictures posted on the Timeline of the party's Facebook page includes logos of the European Pirate parties, with the EU flag in the background, conveying the same message.⁶⁴⁰ Similarly, according to one of the videoclips posted to the Timeline, the party representatives were in the course of the campaign distributing flyers informing voters about the activity of a Pirate representative elected to the EP in Sweden.⁶⁴¹

Pirates' Values

Besides appealing to our common European identity, the Pirates have also expressed their views on racism. On the occasion of the Victory in Europe Day, the party posted a flyer on its Facebook timeline that depicts a panda bear on a yellow background, with the panda saying: “Dude, racism is really dumb. I am black, white and from Asia and still everyone

634 Ibid.

635 “Evropské Volby 2014.”

636 “Evropské Volby 2014,” May 14, 2014.

637 “Evropské Volby 2014.”

638 *Volební Spot Pirátů 2014 - Evropa Je Naše Moře.*

639 “Evropa Je Naše Moře (cover Photo).”

640 “Evropa Nové Generace.”

641 *Pirátský Létající Cirkus Před Volbami Do Evropského Parlamentu 2014.*

loves me.”⁶⁴² The picture's description explains that “[o]n the occasion of the end of World War II, it is good to remind [everyone] that hatred is not a solution.”⁶⁴³

The party can also be concluded to support open-mindedness. Another flyer presented on the party's Facebook page shows Bartoš shaking hands with a man who is evidently not of European origin—which I'm pointing out because of its potential relevance to immigration to Europe—at Million Marihuana March.⁶⁴⁴ The background is composed of Rastafari colors and the writing says: “Is Europe going to be broadminded?”⁶⁴⁵ ⁶⁴⁶ On the photo, Bartoš is holding a magazine named “Legalizace [Legalization in English],” so in all likelihood, the broadmindedness refers to our attitude towards marihuana. At the same time, it could also be seen as an occasion the Pirates have used to raise the question of our open-mindedness conceived more generally—can we accept people who are different from us?

On a similar note, another flyer by the Pirates proclaims “Open Europe.”⁶⁴⁷ Though this openness most likely primarily refers to Europe being open to its citizens; this is an idea for which support can be found in one television debate, in which Bartoš replied to the host's question that “[in six years], [he] envisions Europe that is open, thanks to technologies that we support, Europe that communicates.”⁶⁴⁸ This openness can also refer to open government, open access, and open data defended in their program.⁶⁴⁹ Even in this instance, however, the openness mentioned could possibly implicitly refer to openness on a more general level—potential openness to new ideas, new—and other identities, etc.

Finally, another flyer says “More friends, less/fewer⁶⁵⁰ boundaries.”⁶⁵¹ Again worded somewhat broadly, the boundaries could refer to all kinds of boundaries between people and states, as well as more metaphorical boundaries. With a number of statements being worded comparably broadly, this does not appear to be a coincidence, but possibly a value statement whose aim is not to identify a position on a particular issue, but rather to declare a general principle. Whether the Pirates would support its application also to immigration policy, however, they did not explicitly communicate.

642 “Kámo, Rasismus Je Fakt Hloupej.”

643 Ibid.

644 “Piráti Na MMM.”

645 In Czech, the sentence is “Bude Evropa svobodomyšlná [literally meaning 'freethinking']?”

646 “Bude Evropa Svobodomyšlná?”

647 “Otevřená Evropa.”

648 “Evropské Volby 2014,” May 14, 2014.

649 “Common European Election Programme of the European Pirates for the Elections of the European Parliament in 2014 (CEEP).”

650 In Czech, the slogan is “Více přátel, méně hranic.”

651 “Více Přátel, Méně Hranic.”

Communication

Czech Pirate Party: Summary

Representation of the In-Group

- we are Europeans
- we are not racist and don't see hatred as a solution
- we are open-minded
- we support the respect for minority rights
- we are against discrimination and human rights violations

Representation of the Out-Group

- N/A

Categorization of Immigrants

- refugees, other categories unspecified

Immigration: A Matter of...

- human rights and the fulfillment of obligations of international law
- limiting the repressing apparatus of survey and control in Europe introduced in the name of security (not directly related to immigration and asylum)

Language that Draws the Picture Complete

- N/A

Justifications and Persuasion Strategies

- N/A

Argumentation: Appeal to Reason

- The European approach to asylum and refugees must fully respect the Geneva Convention on Refugees and the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child

Argumentation: Appeal to Normative Structures

- The European approach to asylum and refugees must be based on the acknowledgement of human rights

3.2 Map of the Czech Political Discourse on Immigration

The goal of this section is to sketch out the landscape of the Czech political parties' discourse on immigration. Whereas the detailed nature of the analysis of individual political parties' communication allowed the depth of the parties' communication to be exposed (which was useful particularly for understanding the parties' positions and the argumentation behind them), in this section, I aim to map the landscape of the whole discourse. It will emerge from bringing the individual parties' communication together and identifying patterns across the discourses of individual parties. Rather than focusing on the details of the parties' communication, this approach thus takes a “big picture” perspective and, following the “discourse as a landscape” metaphor, maps the discourse terrain, describing its characteristic features and tendencies. This chapter thus also captures the width of the immigration discourse (and therefore maps out its boundaries) and reveals its notable landmarks.

The subsections in this chapter have been created primarily for the purpose of presenting these patterns and as such are rather artificial. By way of example, the construction of immigration as a threat to our values *de facto* amounts to, following the constructivist approach, a matter of security (as immigration is constructed as a matter of societal security), but it is also a very consequential portrayal of the out-group. The following categorization should thus be understood as driven primarily by the concern for conveying the findings. Its various subchapters may be thought of as snapshots of the discourse landscape from various perspectives. Only together do they provide a comprehensive image of the discourse as a whole.

3.2.1 Discourse Topics

The first section is devoted to the contexts in which immigration appears in the discourse. These discourse themes or topics may be “characterized as the most 'important' or 'summarizing' idea[s] that [underlie] the meanings” of a segment of the discourse.⁶⁵² When approaching the data, I identified them by asking the following questions: In what terms/in what context/as a matter of what is immigration presented?

Importantly, to capture primarily discourse on immigration, I included only those themes that were directly related to immigration and asylum; that is, if solidarity, for example, was communicated as a value that should be the basis for intra-EU relations, as a principle not directly related to immigration, I did not include it in this overall analysis (on

⁶⁵² Ibid. 56.

the other hand, such broader values and related themes were considered in the previous in-depth analysis for the purpose of providing a greater insight into the context in which the communication emerged). Thus, when included, these topics should be considered as “represent[ing] what speakers or writers deem to be the most important information of a[n immigration] discourse.”⁶⁵³ Whenever possible, I try to identify the parties that ventured into the respective discourse topics to suggest how prevalent the tendency to see the respective topic as important is in the context of the overall political discourse on immigration.

Fulfillment of International Law Obligations

Interestingly, the only party that introduced immigration in the context of international law obligations was the Pirate Party. In the European-wide program, it stated that the European approach to refugees and the granting of asylum need to fully respect the Refugee Convention signed in Geneva and the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child.⁶⁵⁴ This is the only occasion that the Refugee Convention (or any international legal document for that matter) was mentioned in the studied material. Importantly, though the context of international law is evident, it is also that of respecting human rights, with the specific international law obligations serving more as a reminder of their source rather than their fulfillment being an end in itself.

Global Justice

As the only political party in the studied campaign, the Green Party presented the issue of immigration as a matter of global justice.⁶⁵⁵

Human Rights

Several political parties mentioned immigration in the context of human rights. First, for the Pirate Party, the respect for human rights in asylum policy was the focal point of their message regarding refugees.⁶⁵⁶ Second, the Communist Party also declared that international migration needs to be regulated with consideration to the respect for human rights.⁶⁵⁷ Third, the Green Party mentioned the need to respect human rights particularly with regard to entry to the EU (respect to human rights on EU's borders) and ensuring that people can ask for protection (the right to seek asylum).⁶⁵⁸

653 Hart, *Critical Discourse Studies in Context and Cognition*. 36.

654 “Společný Program Pirátských Stran pro Volby Do Evropského Parlamentu v Roce 2014.”

655 “Change Europe, Vote Green: The Green Common Manifesto.”

656 “Společný Program Pirátských Stran pro Volby Do Evropského Parlamentu v Roce 2014.”

657 “Volební Program KSČM pro Volby Do Evropského Parlamentu v Roce 2014.”

658 “Program pro Eurovolby.”

National Interest

Immigration is also framed as a matter of national interest. This is especially the case for ODS that perceives immigration through the national interest lens. Though this was mentioned explicitly only in the case of migration from the Ukraine, the party's stress on national interest in most policy areas is very pronounced.⁶⁵⁹ Moreover, the leading candidate introduced the current immigration situation as presenting a relative advantage for the Czech Republic, as one which should be maintained—also displaying a national interest perspective.⁶⁶⁰ ANO 2011 also tended to stress the perspective of the national interest in its program and, moreover, one ANO candidate explicitly defined migration as a process whose goal is to satisfy the needs of the state.⁶⁶¹

Level of Authority and Sovereignty

Immigration was also constructed as a matter of sovereignty. Particularly, the Party of Free Citizens, ODS, TOP 09 and the Dawn movement all dealt with the level at which decision-making on immigration and asylum should take place and the degree of authority which the Czech national government should retain over this policy area. The fact that I studied political discourse on the occasion of the election to the European Parliament likely contributed towards the salience of this discourse topic. While the rest of the parties generally argued for the preservation of the status quo (and therefore a degree of discretion over this policy), the Dawn movement stated that its representatives would suggest a stricter policy on immigration in the European Parliament,⁶⁶² potentially suggesting a greater role for the EP in this policy area.

Security

Much of the immigration discourse is permeated by the language of security concerns, the “rhetoric of the rejection of the Other in the name of the protection of the Self.”⁶⁶³ It appears to be one of the several manifestations of the very close connection between the issue of immigration and security concerns that is by no means unique to the Czech politics and points to the high politicization of the topic and in some spheres, the institutionalization of security. This connection manifests itself in a variety of ways, from the level of large semantic macrostructures, the (policy) topics in the context of which immigration is

659 “Volební Program ODS - Otáčíme EU Správným Směrem.”

660 Ibid.

661 “Radiožurnál - Stalo Se Dnes (06.05.2014 21.”

662 “Celoevropská Petice Hnutí Úsvit „Za Zpřísnění Imigrační Politiky EU“ S Podtitulem „Nechceme U Nás Nepřizpůsobivé Cizince Nebo Náboženské Fanatiky“.”

663 Bigo, “Immigration Controls and Free Movement in Europe.” 584-585.

presented, through direct identification of immigration as a threat (to a variety of referent objects), to the level of individual security-related words that imply the existence of a threat and are scattered throughout the political representatives' communication regarding immigration.

Following the conceptual framework for security proposed by Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde in their seminal work “Security: A New Framework for Analysis,”⁶⁶⁴ when applicable, I identified the referent objects of these security claims (to what immigration is proposed to present a threat) and the sector to which they belong (the authors differentiate between the military, economic, environmental, societal and political sectors⁶⁶⁵).

Security Context: A Reflection of Policy

First, one distinct category of the close interconnection between security and immigration appears to be the result of the close association of immigration and the control of the Schengen area's external border at the level of the EU institutional framework; the fact that immigration has been institutionalized as a matter of protecting the EU's external border, the border of “an area of freedom, security, and justice.”⁶⁶⁶ This is a clear example of how the securitization of migration policy in Europe, where the discursive construction of migration as an internal security issue played an important role in its beginnings, has been directly reflected in the immigration discourse in the course of a political campaign in one of EU member states and as such indirectly further contributes towards sustaining this particular discursive framing of migration, as well as the complementary portrayal of immigrants and refugees “as an illegitimate presence.”⁶⁶⁷

As ANO states, “securing [providing for]⁶⁶⁸ the external border” is the “[f]undamental precondition for security in the so-called Schengen area [characterized by] no controls at internal borders.”⁶⁶⁹ Much of the political program of ANO reflects and is organized according to policy reality at the EU level; immigration is thus introduced in the context of the protection of the external border in the name of preserving the domestic functions and authority of the governments inside it. Threats such as organized criminal activities (above all human trafficking, abuse of children, economic crime and corruption, illegal trade in narcotics, computer criminality), terrorism and other, newly growing kinds of threats, have

664 Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde, *Security*.

665 Ibid.

666 “TFEU - Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.” Art. 67.

667 Huysmans, “The European Union and the Securitization of Migration.” 770.

668 In Czech, the word used is “zajištění” that can be translated as “securing,” or, perhaps more precisely (because the word root does not refer to “security”), “providing for.” However, the meaning is closer to “securing,” though a word that does not refer to security was chosen instead.

669 “Program Do Eurovoleb.”

thus turned out to be the prelude to the party's stance on immigration and asylum in the program.⁶⁷⁰ Though the existing policy is less apparent from the TOP 09's program, or KDU-ČSL, which turns to immigration in a chapter related to the “defense of safety,” for example, the context is rather similar: immigration is presented as a matter of border control and the current rules on entry to the EU.⁶⁷¹

In the case of both TOP 09 and ANO 2011, this had the effect of their reassertion of the current rules on entry; particularly, both parties insist on opposing “illegal” immigration (stay and entry) and defend strict measures against it. The opposition to illegal immigration is however implied also in other parties' vocabulary, construction and use of categories of immigrants, the proximity of security language and immigration in the program implying their association, as well as their connection in the speeches of candidates, as discussed elsewhere.

Buzan et al. identify *military security matters* as “aris[ing] primarily out of the external and internal processes by which human communities establish and maintain [...] machineries of government.”⁶⁷² Military security agenda is about maintaining the state's ability to defend itself against both military and non-military threats to their existence and “the maintenance of civil order and peace, as well as administration and law.”⁶⁷³ When political parties invoke security in the context of the protection of the external border, it may be argued that the referent objects largely belong to the military security sector. This is more evident in the case of terrorism, but in my understanding applies only to the attempt to address all sorts of criminal activities (including the “illegal” entry of immigrants), as they present a threat to the authority of the government or involve the breaking of the existing law, including human rights, or administrative procedures set up by the sovereign. Much criminal activity involves also an economic dimension and some crimes (such as economic crime or corruption, but also the employment of “illegally” staying immigrants, among others), may present also a threat to the national economy, though probably not necessarily an existential one.

Immigration: A Threat Most Often Associated with Muslims

Many parties not only mention immigration in a security *context*, but also refer to immigration (or its subcategory) being a threat more directly. Related to the state's ability to defend the personal security of its population and the maintenance of civil order and peace,

⁶⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁶⁷¹ “Volební Program Do Evropského Parlamentu 2014.”

⁶⁷² Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde, *Security*. 51.

⁶⁷³ Ibid. 51.

the referent object of the threat presented by immigration may also be categorized as belonging to the military sector.

For example, TOP 09 in its program stated that refugees from Syria are a *threat* to Christian communities, for example.⁶⁷⁴ The referent object seems to belong to the military sector (as refugees are argued to present a security threat to the very existence of a collective of people). The Party of Free Citizens also identified “vast migration waves” to be a “*security risk*” that should be solved by “*military means*,” also likely associated with the military sector (primarily judged by the level of suggested response).⁶⁷⁵ KDU-ČSL representatives repeatedly talked about immigration in the context of the criminal activity of foreigners, violence on the outskirts of France, or mentioned European Muslims fighting in Afghanistan and Syria or planning “terrorist attacks” that also evoke the image of immigrants as being threatening.⁶⁷⁶

In fact, the association of threat with Muslims above all is apparent from the discourse. The party list leader of ČSSD for example started talking about the security threat that Muslims present without being asked about it, pointing to the association in his mind.⁶⁷⁷

The ČSSD representative also explicitly mentioned that Islam/Arab immigration is from the security perspective the most risky.⁶⁷⁸ Moreover, instead of “Muslims” he used the word “Islamists”⁶⁷⁹ which may further evoke the image of threat due to the word's connotations. An Úsvit candidate took the security threat and extended it to the point of arguing the entire Europe will be ruined (subverted) if we accept a certain amount of immigrants.⁶⁸⁰ This would not be only a matter of the military sector (as a threat to the state), but also potentially (as a threat to the collective identity) of the societal sector. What seems to be implied in this language and the context of the Dawn's overall communication⁶⁸¹ is a threat arising from a “[situation] that undermine[s] the rules, norms, and institutions that constitute [a regime],”⁶⁸² a threat belonging to the political sector. The Dawn movement representatives' association of Muslims with all sorts of issues, including security (we need a “strict immigration policy, so that in a few years we don't have to search mosques for *weapons*

674 “Volební Program Do Evropského Parlamentu 2014.”

675 “Politický Program.”

676 “Lidovecký Kandidát, Kterého Obviňovali Z Fašismu.”

677 “J. Keller pro MF Dnes: Evropa Není Hrozba, Ale šance.”

678 Ibid.

679 Ibid.

680 “Vyjádření Kláry Samkové K Imigrační Politice – Musíme Zabránit Přijímání Emigrantů Do EU!”

681 Kobza in particular warned against the rise of the political influence of Muslims that will lead to the introduction of the Sharia law.

“Islámské Tažení Evropou.”

682 Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde, *Security*. 22.

(emphasis added)⁶⁸³) is extensive (for more information please see the chapter devoted specifically to the Dawn movement's communication).

Opposition to the Negative Aspects of Security

Though the opposition to the securitization of migration is not as widespread as the tendency to engage in it, it was possible to detect some challenge to the rhetoric and related measures. One candidate representing ODS, for example, when asked about the protection of the external border and the “fear” of mass migration said that the topic of Muslim/Arab immigration is exaggerated and that Muslims do not form a very large group in the Czech Republic.⁶⁸⁴

What is also notable in this regard is the general absence of security-related language in the Green Party's communication of immigration and related matters. In one section of the Common European Manifesto, the authors did assert the need for a secure environment through fighting various kinds of crime. However, the party proposed that at the same time, the “EU and its member states should *prevent the stigmatization of migrants and minorities* (emphasis added).”⁶⁸⁵ This proposal is noteworthy in that it is the only instance when the stigmatizing effect of the crime- and security-laden language on certain groups is reflected upon.

Moreover, the Party of Free Citizens denounced the restriction of an individual's liberty through massive personal data collection through Schengen cooperation.⁶⁸⁶ The Czech Pirate Party expressed its support for restricting the repressing apparatus of survey and control in Europe (measure introduced in the name of terrorism and other security threats).⁶⁸⁷

Crime

Another feature of the Czech political discourse on immigration is the political actors' tendency to introduce immigration in relation to criminal activities. This tendency is closely associated with securitizing immigration (in the sense of framing the issue in security terms, introducing it in security context and using security-laden language), not least because criminal activities are often presented as a security threat, or a by-product of our measures to prevent it. The criminalization of immigration is evident in the context of the Schengen border protection and arises from the rules that govern it—which is very much related to the

683 “Reakce Radima Fialy K Prohlášení Ministra Obrany O Jednotkách NATO v ČR.”

684 “Oldřich Vlasák.”

685 “Change Europe, Vote Green: The Green Common Manifesto.”

686 Bartas, Mach, and Payne, “Odcizená Evropa.”

687 “Common European Election Programme of the European Pirates for the Elections of the European Parliament in 2014 (CEEP).”

differentiation between “legal” and “illegal” immigration (addressed below). In fact, the criminalization of breaking the current rules on entry to the EU appears to be the main engine of using the criminal lens with regard to immigration.

However, some political actors also used criminalizing language when introducing their policies or justifying them. In my view, more likely than not, not directly arising from any legal or policy framework, these claims are grounded in negative stereotypes the political actors feel are going to win them some political points. The tendency to criminalize immigration is highly problematic, because it perpetuates the stigmatization of immigrants as criminals.

As already mentioned, the tendency to present immigration and related issues in the context of external border control is the most evident in the political program of ANO 2011. Asserting the need to ensure security inside the Schengen area, it emphasizes the imperative to fight against criminal activities both within the Schengen and on its external border.⁶⁸⁸ In this context ANO first addresses immigration. Treating the current rules on entry to the EU and regular stay as given, the party declares its support for other tools in the fight against illegal migration—whether illegal entry or stay.⁶⁸⁹ Particularly, the need to act against criminal groups and networks that organize it is asserted.⁶⁹⁰ Moreover, the member states need to persecute the employment of illegally staying as it is a negative phenomenon.⁶⁹¹ Though the party lists a number of positive effects of immigration (creating the most extensive list of the benefits of immigration of all studied parties), it presents immigration above all in the context of law-breaking and measures that need to be taken to prevent these illegal activities of those who illegally enter, illegally stay, illegally work, and all those who illegally help them commit these crimes. Other parties (notably TOP 09 and KSČM) also mention the need to intervene against the illegal entry, stay and employment of immigrants, while additionally referring to “illegal” immigration, or the “criminal trade with immigrants” pointed out by the Dawn movement,⁶⁹² further engaging in the criminalization of immigrants involved in this practice.

Yet immigration is associated also with other crimes. The Communist Party, for example, supports “measures that make the movement of *foreigners committing criminal acts* stricter (emphasis added).”⁶⁹³ From the perspective of ANO, criminality would result if

688 “Program Do Eurovoleb.”

689 Ibid.

690 Ibid.

691 Ibid.

692 “Petice Za Zpřísnění Imigrační Politiky EU.”

693 “Volební Program KSČM pro Volby Do Evropského Parlamentu v Roce 2014.”

immigration trends were left “unmanaged.”⁶⁹⁴ Turning to ČSSD, one of its candidates created an entire category of immigrants of a “criminal type” who break the law and commit crimes.⁶⁹⁵ One KDU-ČSL candidate also warned against immigrants “who burn cars on the outskirts,” drawing on an example of immigration-related violence in Paris, and described in detail how drug-related crime is organized by certain groups of foreigners.⁶⁹⁶ Similarly, one Dawn movement candidate presented Africans as people who get into fights and occasionally hurt or kill someone.⁶⁹⁷ The tendency to associate immigrants with criminal and otherwise hurtful behavior is thus evident across most of the political spectrum. In fact, even the accusations that immigrants come to abuse our social system that is so commonplace portrays immigrants as cheaters.

Values (That We Display)

Perhaps unsurprisingly, immigration was also often argued for (and also against) in the context of values (whether these were invoked as an argument or consideration). These values were used in several ways with relation to immigration; as a result, I grouped them in several sub-categories.

Many parties engaged in defining our, often identified as European, values in contexts other than migration (generally as a principle, in the context of our foreign policy, the situation in the Ukraine, etc). To the extent they are considered constitutive of our identity and important for our self-representation(s), they are included in the “Representation of the In-Group” section. On the other hand, the theme of how immigration is constructed to relate to our values and identity is outlined in the section devoted to the portrayal of the out-group.

Solidarity

The value of solidarity can be said to have permeated the whole immigration discourse. Generally, it tends to be particularly invoked in discussions on a system of redistribution of asylum-seekers within the EU. It was for example implicitly invoked by a KDU-ČSL candidate who argued that the redistribution of immigrants from third countries among EU member states should be a possibility, because otherwise the Czech Republic is “parasitizing” on the system of external border protection.⁶⁹⁸ When asked about the possibility of redistribution of refugees from other countries, the leading ANO candidate

694 “Program Do Eurovoleb.”

695 “Radiožurnál - Stalo Se Dnes (06.05.2014 21.”

696 “Lidovecký Kandidát, Kterého Obviňovali Z Fašismu.”

697 “Rozhovor S Jiřím Kobzou pro Parlamentní Listy.”

698 “Jan Zahradil.”

stated that a certain degree of solidarity would be “fitting,” though it is unspecified whether the object of our solidarity are other EU member states or rather people coming from third countries.⁶⁹⁹ TOP 09 also mentioned solidarity as the basis for addressing the problem that some states are “overburdened” by asylum-seekers and illegal immigrants; it should take the form of material and logistical help through European funds and other instruments, rather than direct redistribution.⁷⁰⁰

The Green Party proposed that generally, in issues related to immigration and asylum, we demonstrate solidarity to one another within the EU.⁷⁰¹ With regard to the rest of the world, it introduced the matter of asylum in the global refugee context and informed about the relative role of the EU in participating in refugee resettlement as a justification for its greater role. It stated that when it comes to asylum and immigration policy, EU member states need to demonstrate *solidarity* to unsettled neighboring regions.⁷⁰² The Green Party and KDU-ČSL talked about the issue also in the context of the need to offer *help* to those who need it.⁷⁰³

A ČSSD candidate, Poche, implicitly invoked solidarity when justifying his assertion for the need to ensure safety for the Volyn Czechs in Ukraine, proposing that “we need to be able to look after our countrymen who now don't feel safe in the Ukraine.”⁷⁰⁴ Though implied in this statement, solidarity is not explicitly referred to as a value that should inform overall immigration and asylum policy in the Social Democrats' program.⁷⁰⁵ The Manifesto of the Party of European Socialists that served as an inspiration in drafting the Czech Socialists' program, in contrast, did explicitly state that “solidarity among all EU member states has to be shown in migration and asylum policy to avoid more human tragedies.”⁷⁰⁶ This omission points to the Czech Social Democrats' choice not to invoke solidarity in immigration and asylum in its program. The party on the other hand does mention solidarity as a principle that should guide our conduct generally, but without referring specifically to immigration or asylum, similarly to three other parties: KSČM, TOP 09 and KDU-ČSL.

(Not) Living Up to Our Values

The Green party argued in its program that it is unacceptable from the perspective of

699 “Telička: Máme Jedinou Ambici – Vyhrát.”

700 “Volební Program Do Evropského Parlamentu 2014.”

701 “Program pro Eurovolby.”

702 “Change Europe, Vote Green: The Green Common Manifesto.”

703 “Program pro Eurovolby.”

704 Poche, “Varuji Před Zbrklým Rozšiřováním EU a Eskalací Napětí S Ruskem.”

705 “Chceme Spravedlivou a Sociální Evropu! Programový Manifest ČSSD pro Volby Do Evropského Parlamentu 23.-24. 5. 2014.”

706 “PES Manifesto Adopted by the PES Election Congress in Rome on 1 March 2014: Towards a New Europe.”

human values that thousands of people die annually at EU's border.⁷⁰⁷ Interestingly, a Dawn movement representative made a case for “not living up to our values” in a sense; she said that the non-acceptance of immigrants “may seem inhumane and in a way is,” but it needs to be done, to subsequently make a case for the “theory of the greatest good.”⁷⁰⁸ Similarly, the Dawn movement stated that we cannot allow for our compassion and humanistic traditions to be misused by the criminal trade with immigrants.⁷⁰⁹

Advancing Our Values in EU's Neighborhood

The Green Party mentioned the granting of asylum as one of the tools that can be used in advancing our values in EU's neighboring regions.⁷¹⁰

Recalling Our Past: Sympathy and Reciprocity

Two parties referred to our past in defending asylum policy. It was, first, ANO that invoked our historical experience in the context of asylum policy; though not explicitly, the party seemed to rely on implied reciprocity (our exiles were accepted abroad) and sympathy (judged by the fact that it chose to justify the institution of asylum).⁷¹¹ Similarly, a ČSSD candidate argued for the need to look after refugees because we were in a similar situation recently.⁷¹² The basis for his argument seems to be the values of empathy (not so long ago, we found ourselves in the same situation) and sympathy (we cannot turn our backs on them).⁷¹³

Economy

Czech political parties referred to immigration as a matter of the (most often Czech) economy on numerous occasions, making the economic lens a relatively common perspective on immigration and asylum. The use of categories that differentiate between *economic* migrants and refugees is where this perspective is manifested, and institutionalized, the most. Though various parties tend to look at immigration from this point of view (as illustrated below), another important feature of the Czech discourse landscape is the framing of immigration in terms of limited resources, as a phenomenon that will negatively impact our economy.

For example, when an ODS candidate referred to the current immigration rules as presenting a “relative advantage” to the Czech state (a matter also of national interest;

707 “Program pro Eurovolby.”

708 “Vyjádření Kláry Samkové K Imigrační Politice – Musíme Zabránit Přijímání Emigrantů Do EU!”

709 “Petice Za Zpřísnění Imigrační Politiky EU.”

710 “Change Europe, Vote Green: The Green Common Manifesto.”

711 “Program Do Eurovoleb.”

712 “Radiožurnál - Stalo Se Dnes (06.05.2014 21.”

713 Ibid.

described above), the economic consideration was more likely than not implied—especially considering the fact that ODS assesses the desirability of most developments at the EU level through the lens of a cost-benefit analysis.⁷¹⁴ Conveying a relatively neutral portrayal, TOP 09 understands asylum and immigration policy to have a significant impact on the national treasury, which is why, in its view, the Czech Republic should keep the right of veto in the Council of the EU.⁷¹⁵ The TOP 09's tendency to call immigration (particularly some of its instances) a “burden” may also likely imply a burden to the economy.

Immigration is presented also in the context of positive effects on the economy. KDU-ČSL argues that immigration may offset Europe's aging problem, implying a positive effect on Europe's economy.⁷¹⁶ It is similar to ANO's arguments that immigration may help us overcome negative demographic trends, bring top-level specialists, fill vacancies that are ceasing to be attractive for domestic population or improve EU's competitiveness.⁷¹⁷

On the other hand, the link between immigration and its negative economic consequences is very much evident in the communication of a rather large number of parties. KDU-ČSL, ODS, KSCM, ČSSD and the Dawn of Direct Democracy candidates all portray immigrants as likely, possibly, or under some conditions taking advantage of or abusing our generous social system. In the case of the Dawn party, this was one of the principal topics around which the campaign was built. It presented immigration not merely as a threat to the social system, but also as a threat to Czechs' jobs, as well as a drain to governmental resources, such as funds for requalification, integration, etc.).⁷¹⁸

ANO also used the economic lens with regard to immigration and related topics, which can be illustrated on the fact that it held that “the employment of illegally staying [...] third country nationals” needs to be fought “as a very negative social and *economic* phenomenon (emphasis added).”⁷¹⁹ Finally, one ODS candidate stated that we need to protect the EU from any “economic vacuum cleaners.”⁷²⁰ ⁷²¹ A similar theme may be considered as potentially present in the “unadaptable immigrants” rhetoric, as “unadaptable citizens” are in the Czech discourse often considered as voluntarily not working and abusing the social system.

714 “Volební Program ODS - Otáčíme EU Správným Směrem.”

715 “Volební Program Do Evropského Parlamentu 2014.”

716 “Vyjádření Pavla Svobody K Diskusi O Pohledu KDU-ČSL Na Migraci.”

717 “Program Do Eurovoleb.”

718 “Glosa Kláry Samkové - Je Imigrace Přínosem?”

719 “Program Do Eurovoleb.”

720 In Czech language, the translation of the word “vacuum cleaner” is “vysavač,” the root of which is associated with the verb “to suck.” This particular word choice thus directly implies that we need to protect the EU from immigrants who would wring money out of our economy.

721 “Marcel Kollmann.”

Securitization of the Economic Sector?

Interestingly, though not all statements that imply the perception of immigration through economic lens point to immigration as having a negative impact on the Czech budget and economy, some of them do present immigration as as an economic threat. This threat is hardly *existential*; however, if the criteria of as Buzan, Waever and de Wilde were to be applied. They state that

“[besides firms] [n]ational economies have a greater claim to the right of survival, but rarely will a threat to that survival (national bankruptcy or an inability to provide for the basic needs of the population) actually arise apart from wider security contexts, such as war. Unless the survival of the population is in question, the huge range of the national economy doing better or doing worse cannot be seen as existentially threatening.”⁷²²

That said, political parties do construct the economy to be the referent object of a certain threat—which, following their argumentation, arises from immigration. Judged by the criteria of Buzan et al., however, this threat is not constructed as existential; it is not meant to justify extraordinary measures outside of politics. This security construction nevertheless raises the question of repercussions of the fact that another sphere of life has been permeated by security language and concerns.

3.2.2 Who Are We: Representation of the In-Group

Political representatives of most studied parties identified the in-group (their audience, the Czech voters) as “Europeans;” in the case of some parties (such as the Pirate Party, TOP 09 and the Green Party) the notion that “we are Europeans” was turned into one of the main themes of the campaign. Even political parties that put emphasis on the voters' “Czechness” mentioned this parallel identity. ODS, for example, though having stressed the Czech perspective and Czech national interest in the EU, still communicated that it perceives the Czechs to be Europeans. Similarly, the Dawn movement, which displays distinct nationalist tendencies, also identified “us” to be Europeans with European values. TOP 09 that expressed in its program the support to healthy national confidence built the entire campaign on the notion that “we are Europeans” and thus engaged in an otherwise unprecedented identity-formation campaign. The stress on the Czechs' European identity was rather missing in the communication of ANO 2011. Though in the campaign, they drew attention to the Czech perspective and interest, it is rather clear from the overall campaign that they consider the Czech Republic to very well be a part of Europe. On the other hand,

⁷²² Buzan, Waever, and Wilde, *Security*. 21.

this emphasis on European identity was absent from the communication of the Free Citizens' Party, which however mentioned that the Czech Republic is part of the “Western culture.”

In many cases, the identification of the in-group as “European” was developed through a reference to the values “being European” is connected to. These were often called “European values,” most often linked to the respect for human rights (though this link was not always necessarily explicit in the sense that “being European means respecting human rights”). Besides human rights, the studied political parties generally emphasized their respect for the various aspects of a democratic society. Some parties have chosen to stress their support to certain rights that may be particularly relevant to understanding their values as they relate to immigration. For example, KDU-ČSL declared its support to “weaker and endangered groups;”⁷²³ Pirates stressed “the respect for minority rights” and opposition to “human rights violations” and “discrimination of any kind;”⁷²⁴ KSČM highlighted their support to “sex equality” and disapproval of “all forms of discrimination;”⁷²⁵ while the Free Citizens' Party mentioned their respect for religious freedom.⁷²⁶ The Green Party stated its emphasis on solidarity, which, along with openness and tolerance, is the basis of Europe.⁷²⁷ Very relevant to their stance on immigration and asylum, the Greens also advanced the notion of global justice. The description of Europe as “not a black and white world, but a colorful mosaic”⁷²⁸ made by TOP 09 seems also particularly relevant to the topic of immigration.

Many political parties have also communicated their disapproval with certain populist and nationalist tendencies, racism, xenophobia and the like. A KDU-ČSL representative mentioned that expressing xenophobia towards foreigners is not compatible with European values;⁷²⁹ TOP 09 declared to oppose nationalists and populists,⁷³⁰ ODS mentioned its disapproval of populism;⁷³¹ ČSSD communicated its opposition of populists and those who want to break the EU in the name of national egoism and emphasized the need to stand up against racism, hatred, anti-semitism and xenophobia,⁷³² similarly to KSČM that stated its opposition to fascism, national egoism, racism and xenophobia⁷³³ and the Greens that

723 “Program KDU-ČSL pro Volby Do Evropského Parlamentu 23. a 24. Května 2014.”

724 “Common European Election Programme of the European Pirates for the Elections of the European Parliament in 2014 (CEEP).”

725 “Volební Program KSČM pro Volby Do Evropského Parlamentu v Roce 2014.”

726 “Otázky a Odpovědi.”

727 “Program pro Eurovolby.”

728 “Volební Program Do Evropského Parlamentu 2014.”

729 “Pavel Bělobrádek: Xenofobní Výroky Od Poslanců ANO Mě Velmi Překvapily.”

730 “Volební Program Do Evropského Parlamentu 2014.”

731 “Volební Program ODS - Otáčíme EU Správným Směrem.”

732 “Chceme Spravedlivou a Sociální Evropu! Programový Manifest ČSSD pro Volby Do Evropského Parlamentu 23.-24. 5. 2014.”

733 “Volební Program KSČM pro Volby Do Evropského Parlamentu v Roce 2014.”

declared to oppose xenophobia, Islamophobia and racism⁷³⁴ and finally, Pirates who said they were against racism and hatred.⁷³⁵

It is evident that most of the studied parties chose to actively denounce these tendencies, most often as part of a positive self-portrayal or negative other-portrayal strategy (the object of which were most often other political parties). However, the discrepancy between the parties' declared values and the fact that some of their actions are characterized by these very tendencies is evident and worrying. It may be concluded that for the most part, they made an active attempt to position themselves as not populist, nationalist, racist, xenophobic, etc., which applies also to the Dawn movement, for example, which tried to convince voters that they are being called xenophobic unjustifiably. It may be inferred that these labels are in the context of Czech politics generally perceived as negative and parties consciously try to avoid them.

Several political actors made an explicit reference to religion and religious identity when depicting the in-group. Particularly, the KDU-ČSL political program mentioned that “Christian roots”⁷³⁶ characterize Europeans and a Dawn movement representative mentioned “Christian values” as the basis of our cultural identity.⁷³⁷ Finally, the Free Citizens' candidate Mach identified Christianity, along with other influences (Judaism, Ancient times, as well as pre-Christian times) to be “the basis of our Western culture.”⁷³⁸ The identification of the in-group with a particular religion is relevant particularly if the out-group is (to be) identified with a different one—something many parties have done.

With regard to specifically asylum, the representatives of two political parties (ČSSD and ANO) referred to the Czechs' historical experience, particularly the fact that many of “us” sought asylum abroad in the past. Such reference to this experience of the in-group brings forward an aspect of our historical consciousness that we share with (a segment of) the out-group. A reference to commonality, it is essential in building a basis for solidarity-motivated action. Moreover, bringing attention to something the respective groups have in common plays a role in their portrayal as groups that are similar, making xenophobia less likely.

3.2.3 Who Are They: Representation of the Out-Group

Categorization of Immigrants: Setting the Scene

The categorization of immigrants is extremely relevant to policy-making. Assuming

734 “Šadí Shanaáh - Humorem Proti Nenávisti.”

735 “Kámo, Rasismus Je Fakt Hloupej.”

736 “Program KDU-ČSL pro Volby Do Evropského Parlamentu 23. a 24. Května 2014.”

737 “Petice Za Zpřísnění Imigrační Politiky EU.”

738 “Otázky a Odpovědi.”

coherence in a party's opinions and proposed policy-solutions, the axes of differentiation (or the criteria considered relevant in the categorization of immigrants) point to the quality the party considers relevant to policy-making. For example, if the party stresses that legal—illegal immigration distinction, it implies the (in this case most likely) *illegal* nature of the entry/stay/employment is the problem that needs to be addressed, indicating what kind of policy the party may propose or support. As a result, with the axis of differentiation being considered a salient characteristic of the out-group, the categorization of immigrants is described thoroughly.

Refugees vs Economic Immigrants

An absolute majority of the studied parties differentiates between refugees and economic immigrants. Reflecting the current legal status quo,⁷³⁹ the reason for leaving one's country—and its perceived legitimacy—appears to be the most significant axis of differentiation. The two parties that do not categorize immigrants in this way is the Free Citizens' Party and ODS, with their rather similar ideological outlook⁷⁴⁰ raising a question whether this lack of categorization could be its function. The Party of Free Citizens mentions merely the reasons for migration—catastrophes, uneven demographic development, uneven need for resources (strategic raw materials, water and energy), uneven economic development and other causes—without further commenting on them (such as asserting which are legitimate and which are not). ODS does not engage in this categorization either (though, unlike the Free Citizens' Party, it does engage in others).

A few parties talk about just one category, without specifying the other; the Pirates, for example, describe their policy on refugees, explicitly recognizing this category, without specifying—or labelling—the rest of immigrants. ANO 2011, for example, talks about the asylum policy, implicitly recognizing the category of refugees, but does not explicitly label the other category either (the party program merely mentions “asylum policy”). Similarly, the Green Party points out “people whose live is threatened” as a special category, avoiding using any commonly used label.

This can be contrasted with parties that explicitly differentiate between economic migrants and refugees. KDU-ČSL, for example, uses two categories of migrants: economic migrants and refugees, also referred to as “political migrants.” It can be implied that TOP 09 also differentiates between these two categories, though only “uncontrolled” economic

⁷³⁹ Honusková, “Právní Pohled Na Otázky Migrace a Uprchlíctví - Podklad pro Současnou Debatu.”

⁷⁴⁰ The Party of Free Citizens ideological outlook is based on libertarian values. The Civic Democratic Party (ODS) is an economically liberal party that of all studied parties is, in my view, the closest to the Party of Free Citizens in ideological terms.

migration is mentioned in the context of that kind of immigration that needs to be protected against. These two parties merely present these categories without further connotations.

The Social Democrats also distinguish between these two categories; its representatives mentioned “political refugees we should take care of” and “those who come to work.” The second category is further divided based on education and qualification on “qualified and educated *people*” vs “unqualified *immigrants* from developing countries (emphases added).” Interestingly, the latter group is “dependent upon our social system” and “causes social unrest.” This theme of immigrants' taking advantage of our social system is present in the case of KSČM and the Dawn of Direct democracy, with the difference that in the case of these parties, economic immigrants are portrayed as *all* draining the social system (whereas the Social Democrats point out that only those unqualified do).

The Dawn movement uses the category “economic migrants” and “social migrants” interchangeably; considering the campaign context, there is little doubt that this is to communicate the message that they have come to abuse our social system. The Communist Party took the use of labels one step further; it differentiates merely between refugees and “social tourists.” This differentiation, leaving no other third option, implies that as an immigrant, one either has a legitimate claim, or is automatically a “social tourist” that takes advantage of the Czech social system—to the detriment of Czechs who have a better claim to it than these foreigners.

This conflation of economic migrants with those who exploit our generosity points to the problem associated with this categorization of immigration. Dijk describes the circumstances under which the label of “economic refugees” appeared, pointing to the issue with this categorization:

The concept of “economic refugees” was coined around 1985 when large numbers of Tamils fled from civil war in Sri Lanka and came to various European countries. It was at that time that a new conceptual and discursive categorization of refugees became imperative, *not so much because refugees suddenly began coming to Europe only to find jobs or to flee from poverty but because there simply were “too many” of them*. The pitiful image of the traditional political refugees, and especially fleeing from communism (like the Vietnamese boat people), needed to be *strategically changed so that severe immigration restrictions could be enacted and legitimated among the public at large*. The notion of “economic” refugees thus became the new political buzzword to denote “fake” refugees, if simply not all those profiteers who were seen as “coming here only to live from our pocket.” The press reacted accordingly. The conservative newspapers and tabloids especially further exacerbated this negative image projected by leading politicians. Fast-growing resentment among the European population at large against such scroungers showed that these strategies were very successful. Indeed, this manipulated voice of the people was in turn used as a democratic legitimation to clamp down on the massive immigration of refugees

everywhere in Europe (emphasis added).⁷⁴¹

Dijk describes the birth and evolution of the label “economic refugees” that still bears traces of the category from which it was derived (refugees). Interestingly, today, the labels used in the Czech discourse are primarily “economic *immigrants*” and “refugees.” Although, as has been said, this differentiation has been so institutionalized that it is now reflected in immigration and asylum institutional framework,⁷⁴² it further serves to strengthen the image that people have in their minds about the categories of immigrants. Though some parties do differentiate between various types of “economic immigrants,” pointing to the fact that they include also highly qualified people that may be beneficial to our economy (most notably ANO with their stated support to the Blue Card initiative), it is evident that some parties typecast all economic migrants as a drain on our social system (above all KSČM and Úsvit). This move creates a dichotomy between the “traditional, pitiful political refugee who has been prosecuted” and the other category of economic refugees that are, largely due to the existence of the “real” refugee category, much more likely to be *all* presented as “bogus refugees,” the exploiters of our social services.⁷⁴³

Especially recently, there has been a tendency in the public discourse to downplay the fact that—if only because of international law if not our values—some immigrants have a legitimate claim for protection. Typecasting most immigrants as economic immigrants, and therefore bogus refugees, has in my view emerged as one of the main features of the Czech discourse on immigration. This section pointed out the role of political parties in actively enforcing categorization that contributes to not only the perpetuation of these categories (as the current immigration policy framework is probably more durable in this sense), but that, above all, serves as the starting point for a rhetoric advanced by certain political actors—whose simplified, negative portrayal may be so appealing that it crowds out even the “positive” and “legitimate” category in contrast to which the category of “economic immigrants” emerged in the first place.

In this regard, I believe it is worth mentioning the Green Party's categorization and their potential role in immigrants' representation. The other category the Greens mention (besides “people whose life is threatened”) are “poor people” (while both categories are presented as in need of help). Although avoiding an outright label such as that used by other parties is in my view desirable, presenting the group as in need of our help, the party does not refer to any group of immigrants that would not need to be *pitied*—and be accepted for

741 Riggins, *The Language and Politics of Exclusion*. 44-45.

742 Honusková, “Právní Pohled Na Otázky Migrace a Uprchlictví - Podklad pro Současnou Debatu.”

743 Riggins, *The Language and Politics of Exclusion*.

reasons other than pity. This portrayal, though referring to immigrants as “people, [above all],” also creates a negative image in people's minds. Moreover, it also tends to remove the political agency of immigrants in my view, which stands in great contrast with the difficult choices these people made and may also have political implications. Another danger of this portrayal is that it may be easily abused by other political actors to which it offers an opportunity to simply make the case that this group is nothing but a drain of resources. This only points to the precariousness of talking about such a sensitive issue with significant repercussions that immigration is.

The Legal-Illegal Dichotomy

Another important feature of the Czech immigration discourse is the labelling of a certain subset of immigration as “illegal.” The use of this label is commonplace in the media, the civil service, as well as among the public. The underlying social representation has also manifested in the parties' categorization of immigrants. Half of all studied parties categorized immigration (or immigrants) as legal vs illegal (ANO 2011, TOP 09, KSČM and Dawn of Direct democracy made this differentiation in the party program or official party communication, while in the case of ODS, it was the party list leader who referred to the “illegal immigration” category). It may be understood as referring to those who have illegally entered and/or are illegally staying in the country; in fact, when party representatives use this term, they do not define what they mean, which indicates the term is generally understood in the society.

Quite notably, from the larger parties, ČSSD and KDU-ČSL avoided making a distinction along this line in the studied communication. The Party of Free Citizens made only one distinction (discussed above). The Czech Pirate Party referred merely to “refugees” who cannot, due to the current rules, enter illegally (recognizing this, the Pirates moreover stressed the need for the respect of human rights in this regard). Finally, the Green Party also avoided using this label altogether.

Whether the choice to use or not to use the “illegal immigration” label is consciously made or not, it has certain connotations that may influence how people perceive immigration. A reflection of the trend to criminalize migration though the “use of criminal sanctions, or administrative sanctions which mimic criminal ones (such as detention)” in respect to “non-nationals whose presence on the territory of a state has not been authorized by the state authorities or is no longer so authorized,” the language used is not neutral.⁷⁴⁴ By identifying

744 “Criminalisation of Migration in Europe: Human Rights Implications.”

immigrants as “illegal,” one implies they have committed a crime. Through the use of this language, immigrants become associated with crime and “tainted by suspicion,” contributing to their stigmatization.⁷⁴⁵

It is especially problematic when this term is used to denote “even in situations where the individuals concerned have not even approached the EU territory where, for all the knowledge of EU officials, they may still be in their country of nationality.”⁷⁴⁶ This charges immigrants with crimes that have not been committed, presupposing they are about to take place.⁷⁴⁷ Moreover—and perhaps most importantly—such practice also necessarily implies the assumption these immigrants do not have, from the perspective of international law, legitimate reasons to seek protection (because according to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, refugees shall not be charged with offenses related to their illegal entry or stay⁷⁴⁸). This appears to be especially relevant to the tendency to typecast immigrants as those who “just” want a better life, which, *understandably*, is not a legitimate reason to stay.

ČSSD: Immigration—Abstention from Crime Matters

Though unrelated to the “legality axis” of differentiation, one Social Democratic candidate introduced another category that criminalized immigrants. He differentiated between “immigrants of a '*criminal type*' who stand against the law and *commit criminal offenses* (emphasis added)” as opposed to those who come [to the Czech Republic] to work, are educated, willing to work adapt to Czech laws and de facto contribute to the development of the Czech Republic.⁷⁴⁹ The quality salient in this categorization is that of citizen orderliness that is a function of *abstention from committing criminal offenses* and the *willingness to adapt* to Czech society, with both aspects appearing to be recurrent in the Czech political discourse on immigration.

ODS: Immigration—Compatibility Matters

Finally, an ODS candidate touched upon another axis of differentiation: “compatibility.” Zahradil stated that the number of foreigners in the Czech Republic is not very high and, furthermore, those who are here are “*compatible* with the rest of the society (emphasis added).”⁷⁵⁰ Though presented in the context of an argument whose aim was to

745 Ibid.

746 Ibid.

747 Ibid.

748 “Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees.”

749 “Radiožurnál - Stalo Se Dnes (06.05.2014 21.”

750 “Jan Zahradil.”

challenge the exaggerated nature of the debates on immigration, he implied that there are other groups that are not compatible with the Czech society, hardly contributing to the positive image of immigrants.

Additional Portrayals

Muslims and the Rest

Muslims are by far the most cited out-group of all. Other group referred to in the discourse are most often Ukrainians (which is likely the effect of the crisis in the Ukraine, which was during the campaign a very hotly-debated topic). In fact, the concern with Muslims and Islam (at times associated also with “Arab”) immigration appears to be the most distinct; it is the only category in the case of which the identity of its members matters. This, by itself, should in my view be seen as problematic, as it necessarily tends to lead to the association of immigration with Islam, above all.

A number of parties presented Islam and Muslims in a negative light. The Party of Free Citizens, for example, talked of the “Islamization” of Western Europe as caused by the “faulty” policy of multiculturalism.⁷⁵¹ TOP 09 highlighted the Christian identity in the campaign: refugees from Syria were presented as posing a “threat to Christian communities,” which may be thought of as an implication that those presenting the threat were non-Christians—likely Muslims.⁷⁵² Similarly, the leader of KDU-ČSL, when inviting citizens to come to vote, arguing that if they won't come, “they will strengthen those who refuse the Christian roots of European culture and civilization and seek to 'de-Christianize' Europe.”⁷⁵³ Moreover, the original, unrevised, version of the party program included the following reference: “We don't want Europe full of unadaptable immigrants *who [...] bring radical Islamism* here (emphasis added).”⁷⁵⁴

The ČSSD party list leader Keller, besides associating Muslims (without any specification) with security threats, he also agreed with the interviewer that Islam is a “non-tolerant religion.”⁷⁵⁵ When asked whether Muslim immigration is the most dangerous, he replied: “From security perspective, definitely yes. Now it could be said that to Europe can only go those who will culturally assimilate as Europeans. [But] we can't tell who will assimilate only for appearance's sake, but will *remain an Islamist* (emphasis added).”⁷⁵⁶

751 “Otázky a Odpovědi.”

752 “Volební Program Do Evropského Parlamentu 2014.”

753 “Potřebujeme Vás, Přijďte K Volbám!”

754 “Lidovci Se Vymezili Proti Imigrantům, Drogám a Islamismu. Ted' Couvli.”

755 “J. Keller pro MF Dnes: Evropa Není Hrozba, Ale Šance.”

756 Ibid.

Following the logic in this sentence, those Muslims who do not assimilate “*remain Islamists*,” meaning that they necessarily had to have been Islamists in the first place, providing an insight into the candidate's conception of Muslims. The use of the words “Muslim” and “Islamist” gives the impression that they are interchangeable, necessarily reducing Muslims to Islamists in the process. Finally, the Dawn movement's communication is largely permeated by the negative portrayal of Muslims, but also Africans. The description that stands out above all others is the use of the label of “religious fanatics,”⁷⁵⁷ a warning against which constituted one of the main features of the overall campaign. Given the prevalence of a negative portrayal of Muslims and Islam (which is an “intolerant, non-discussing, and dogmatic religion that justifies violence”⁷⁵⁸), there is truly little doubt that “religious fanatics” are in fact “Muslim religious fanatics.” The Dawn movement also tends to present the immigration of Muslims as a security threat.⁷⁵⁹

On the other hand, the opposite tendency is also apparent. The representatives of several parties stated that the matter of immigration of Muslims—and what are perceived as problems related to it—is exaggerated (because they are not so numerous and because they are not as great an “evil” as they are often presented). An ODS candidate, when asked about immigration from the countries of the Arab Spring, for example, responded that the “topic of 'Arab' immigration is from the perspective of the Czech Republic lying in the very heart of Europe, more than exaggerated. [...] *Muslims in the Czech Republic don't form a very numerous group*, [...] about ten thousand people, *mostly foreigners* (emphasis added).”⁷⁶⁰ The ČSSD candidate Keller, despite having uttered many unfortunate remarks in this regard (illustrated above) on one occasion tried to also make the case that the immigration of Muslims is not so problematic as it may be at times presented: “Miloš Zeman [the Czech president] has the tendency to turn Muslims into greater evil than they actually are.”⁷⁶¹

In this context, it seems worth noting that the representatives of four out of the ten parties included in this analysis did not connect the issue of immigration with Islam at all (in the context of the studied data). They include: ANO 2011, the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia, the Green and the Pirate Parties. This is, in my view, a notable achievement—especially considering the context of the prevalent public discourse.

757 “Program Hnutí.”

758 “Islámské Tažení Evropou.”

759 “Reakce Radima Fialy K Prohlášení Ministra Obrany O Jednotkách NATO v ČR.”

760 “Oldřich Vlasák.”

761 “J.Keller pro MF Dnes: Evropa Není Hrozba, Ale Šance.”

“Unadaptable” Immigrants

The word “immigrants” has been on numerous occasions modified by an adjective “unadaptable” (a modifier which is at times also used as a noun⁷⁶²). The Czech public is very familiar with this word, as it is often used to describe citizens who do not live “properly” and by the rules of the “decent citizens,” which is most often equated with the—ethnic Czech—majority. In the Czech public discourse, the phrase “unadaptable citizens” is generally used as a euphemism for the Roma population that is often depicted as a disorderly minority, which refuses to work and abuses the Czech social system—as a group that is “unwilling to adapt to the majority’s way of life.” The “unadaptable citizen” word pair is so established in the Czech public discourse that it does not warrant the use of quotation marks anymore.

As Škabraha pointed out, key to understanding this label is the “able” suffix; importantly, the word used is not “unadapted” but “unadaptable.”⁷⁶³ The trait ascribed through its use is “inherent” and “typical”—“it’s not just a current state but a fundamental [quality] of someone who is practically unable to act [...] differently.”⁷⁶⁴ If the word used were “unadapted,” Škabraha holds, then we would naturally have the tendency to ask—“to what?,” thematizing the conditions to which one is not adapted.⁷⁶⁵ By using the word “unadaptable,” the attention is brought to the actor and his inherent inability to adapt, away from the conditions in our society to which the actor is required to adapt.⁷⁶⁶ The opposite could cause that the question about the rightfulness not only of these conditions (to which one should adapt), but also of the majority’s demands in this regard, could be raised,⁷⁶⁷ which is not in the interest of the majority that is comfortable with (benefits from?) the status quo.

We can therefore observe that several political actors sketched out a parallel between the issue of immigration and the Roma issue. This practice is in my view not accidental; it likely serves as a cognitive shortcut with the consequence of transferring the schema, or the cognitive framework people have created for the Roma issue, to the immigration issue—possibly including the prevalent emotion and level of richness (or, more likely, its absence).

KDU-ČSL and the Dawn movement used this label explicitly to refer to immigrants.

762 In Czech language, the word “unadaptable,” originally an adjective, has been used also as a noun. Though the noun form does not exist in English, in the text, I tried to stress the noun form, since, in my view, there is a slight shift in meaning, with the noun form giving a more derogatory impression. Lukáš Bárta, a Bohemist, commented on this matter in the following way: “Unadaptable as a noun positions this trait as crucial, defining. It is [a case] of typification. As a Scrooge or a hypocrite. When this word is in the role of an adjective, then I consider it to be as one of infinite possible traits. As a result, it does not carry such a negative [connotation].”

Bárta, *Nepřizpůsobiví - použití adjektiva versus substantiva*.

763 “Filozof Martin Škabraha.”

764 Ibid.

765 Ibid.

766 Ibid.

767 Ibid.

An ODS candidate made also made the link; when asked about the high criminality of immigrants and their unwillingness to adapt, he responded that “we ourselves have problems with unadaptable citizens.”⁷⁶⁸

On the other hand, a ČSSD candidate seems to have consciously avoided making a connection directly with the prevalent label. He mentioned one category of immigrants which does not display criminal behavior and described them as “educated, willing to work, adapt... [they] adapt to Czech laws.”⁷⁶⁹ This was a very interesting moment: Poche was about to use the word pair “adaptable [citizen]” that is by now rooted in Czech public discourse predominantly as the counterpart to an “unadaptable citizen.” However, half-way through the word, he deliberately opted for using the word root “adapt” as a verb, rather than a modifier in the form of an adjective that is associated with a particular discourse.

Immigrants As a Threat to Our Values

This section is devoted to the portrayal of the immigrant out-group as those who present a challenge, often even a threat, to our cultural and social values, our identity. As an attempt to advance an inter-subjective meaning that depicts immigration as a threat to a “large scale collective identit[y],”⁷⁷⁰ it can be thought of as an attempt to advance the politicization, if not securitize, society, and its identity, including religion, in particular (and thus belonging to the societal sector, following the conceptual framework proposed by Buzan et al.). As involving a construction of immigration as a threat to a collective identity, this section could be also included in the subchapter on the discourse topic of security. However, it involves a very consequential portrayal of “the Other” and as a result, I include it in this section on the representation of the out-group.

The Dawn of Direct Democracy nowhere explicitly mentioned immigration as a “threat” to our values, which would be in need of defending. However, this message is, to some extent, implied in a petition for making the immigration conditions stricter: “Europe belongs to Europe and those who respect European values. [...] Europe must stay and will stay European. We need to keep our *cultural identity* based on *Christian values* (emphases added)”⁷⁷¹ One candidate, for example, mentions the “clash of cultures” that may develop into the “clash of civilizations.”⁷⁷² “If we want to keep democracy, our traditional historical *culture and society*,” he argues, “we need to advance a closed Europe that will let only those

768 “Oldřich Vlasák.”

769 “Radiožurnál - Stalo Se Dnes (06.05.2014 21.”

770 Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde, *Security*. 22-23.

771 “Petice Za Zprísňení Imigrační Politiky EU.”

772 “Islámské Tažení Evropou.”

immigrants in that will *unconditionally accept European values*.⁷⁷³ Otherwise, it is hinted, we will have no democracy and our culture and society will disappear.

KDU-ČSL mentioned that immigrants need to “respect” *our values* (above all human rights),⁷⁷⁴ which was coupled by an argument that we need to educate immigrants while respecting their values.⁷⁷⁵ The party made the case for “defending” our values more directly in including a subcategory titled “For the *Defense of Our Values* and Safety (emphasis added)” in its program.⁷⁷⁶ One of the party's candidates then explicitly stated that those “who are not even willing to *respect our cultural and social values* and abide by the laws of the host country (emphasis added)” cannot be allowed to the EU.⁷⁷⁷ Moreover, the party also turned the religious identity salient when its party leader stated that if people will not vote for them, “they will strengthen those who refuse the Christian roots of European culture and civilization and seek to 'de-Christianize' Europe.”⁷⁷⁸ From the context of the party's communication, it may be concluded that immigration puts pressure on the Christian roots and nature of Europe.

In the perspective of an ODS candidate, “it is our natural duty to defend the EU [...] against any intruders of our cultural traditions.”⁷⁷⁹ Moreover, the party's political program reads: “we insist that immigration cannot lead to [...] an increase of cultural-civilizational tensions, or even violence.”⁷⁸⁰

Similarly, the “refusal of the unadaptable immigrants” discourse, to which, interestingly, the same political parties (the Dawn movement, KDU-ČSL and ODS) contributed, may be understood as belonging to this context (the “unadaptable” label developed in greater detail above likely includes an element of adapting to the new country's values, cultural identity, way of life).

The parties do not tend to make the case that immigration presents an explicit *threat* to our values, but rather threaten voters by the image of what it may look like if immigrants come and don't integrate. With its implied threat to our values, our way of life, our culture, society and identity (including its Christian aspect), this discourse, in the words of Huysmans “identifies multiculturalism [or the absence of immigrants' integration] as a cause of societal disintegration,” of which, Huysmans argues, “the best known version is Huntington's Clash

773 Ibid.

774 “Lidovci Se Vymezili Proti Imigrantům, Drogám a Islamismu. Ted' Couvli.”

775 “Lidovecký Kandidát, Kterého Obviňovali Z Fašismu.”

776 “Volební Program Do Evropského Parlamentu 2014.”

777 “Rozhovor S Kandidátem Do EP Vítém Ulrychem.”

778 “Potřebujeme Vás, Přijďte K Volbám!”

779 “Marcel Kollmann.”

780 “Volební Program ODS - Otáčíme EU Správným Směrem.”

of Civilizations.”⁷⁸¹ The “clash of cultures,” which may allegedly develop into the “clash of civilizations” was explicitly invoked just once by a Dawn movement candidate. However, the similarity between the assumptions which likely lie behind this aspect of the Czech discourse and those that inform Huntington's thesis is to a large extent undeniable.

3.2.4 Us and Them Relations: The Imperative to Assimilate

What is also notable is the representation of “us-them” relations. Not only are immigrants presented as intruders that will necessarily challenge our identity, values, traditions (as described in detail in the section above). When political actors talk about immigration, their statements are replete with conditions; rather often, they formulate the need for foreigners to integrate. The imperative not to alter or even present an alternative to our identity is thus present in the discourse. The opposite, in Huysmans words, “the cultural mixing resulting from migration,” is problematic; it is “politicized on the ground that multicultural developments challenge the desire for coinciding cultural and political frontiers.”⁷⁸²

This concern is undoubtedly present in the “unadaptable immigrant” proposition and discourse—it may be thought of as the reflection of the overall feeling that “to adapt” to the society is desirable, whereas “to *unadapt* [as a basis for the word pair 'unadaptable citizen']” is not. Homogeneity is valued; only those who are like us and do not cause any disturbances by not adapting to our society are welcome.

On a similar note, an ODS representative, when talking about the “compatibility” of certain immigrants de facto touched upon the issue of the likelihood of their integration and highlighted this quality as important.⁷⁸³ Regarding the conditionality present in the parties' communication, ANO stated in its program that the materialization of the benefits of immigration is conditional upon the successful integration of immigrants into the receiving society.⁷⁸⁴ One ODS representative said that “[i]ntegration means an *absolutely maximum adaptation to the host country and maximum observance of law of the given country*, without someone trying to turn it here to chaos (emphases added).”⁷⁸⁵ After talking about foreigners involved in criminal activities, making a case that immigrants are not going to adapt, respect the law and human rights, a KDU-ČSL candidate said that “these people [should] integrate

781 Huysmans, “The European Union and the Securitization of Migration.”

782 Ibid. 762.

783 “Jan Zahradil.”

784 “Program Do Eurovoleb.”

785 “Marcel Kollmann.” 757.

into our society in a better way.”⁷⁸⁶ A Dawn representative also mentioned that immigrants remain “unintegrated” and that in Europe, they cannot live according to “their way of life.”⁷⁸⁷ Even the leader of the Green party list stated that “it is necessary to enhance the degree of [immigrants'] *integration to European* society (emphasis added).”⁷⁸⁸ The stress on the need to integrate is thus a strong characteristic of the discourse. It is most often introduced as a condition for immigrants' stay and their peaceful coexistence with the majority society.

However, as Huysmans warns, stressing the importance of immigrants' integration may also involve negative consequences:

emphasizing the need to integrate immigrants can also directly or indirectly confirm a nationalist desire for a culturally homogenous society, identifying immigrants as the obstacle to the successful realization of this desire [...]. Integration policies often, at least indirectly, uphold the assumption that a culturally uniform society existed before migration started [...]. As a result pro-integration projects position migrants outside the national or European social formation of which they are a constitutive part. Migrants emerge as late arrivers who disrupted a culturally homogenous space, irrespective of their contribution to the creation of society as it exists today. Therefore projects supporting the integration of immigrants risk confirming the notion that the different life-style and culture of the (non-integrated) migrants are potentially destabilizing to the social formation [...].⁷⁸⁹

The emphasis on the need to integrate may therefore be a *reflection* of “nationalist desire for a culturally homogenous society,” but also contribute towards positioning immigrants outside the society, which further confirms the nationalist position that informed the desire for a homogenous society in the first place—reinforcing the view that cultural “otherness” is not desirable, because it may destabilize our homogenous society. The parties' emphasis on the need for immigrants to integrate, follow our rules and become as much like “us” as possible should be considered in this light. The stress on cultural homogeneity and foreigners' adaptation (a phenomenon the Czech discourse appears to be largely preoccupied with) may likely contribute to the negative perception and politicization of immigrants.

3.2.5 Making A Case

This section sketches out the strategies political parties tend to use when they “make their case” for one proposition or another. This short section is not meant to be exhaustive or representative in terms of the number of occasions these strategies were used. Nevertheless, since the amount of primary data studied for the purpose of this analysis was rather large, it may be thought of as indicative of the kinds of strategies political actors tend to use

786 “Lidovecký Kandidát, Kterého Obviňovali Z Fašismu.”

787 “Glosa Kláry Samkové - Je Imigrace Přínosem?”

788 “Evropské Volby 2014,” May 22, 2014.

789 Huysmans, “The European Union and the Securitization of Migration.” 765.

predominantly. For a more comprehensive insight in this regard, please see the in-depth analysis of the communication of individual political parties.

The following list should thus be considered as including merely the most evident of strategies and as complementing the overall strategies of positive self-portrayal and negative other-portrayal that permeate the whole discourse. Moreover, I include only those that were used in making a case for a particular position specifically on immigration and asylum (rather than strategies that were used in reference to other parties).

Parties take advantage of illustrating their argument on the experience of other states (mostly from Western Europe—KDU-ČSL and the Free Citizens' Party) and own experience—either our own experience as a nation (in the case of justifying the institution of asylum—ANO and ČSSD) or the candidates' personal experience (ČSSD and Green Party candidates took advantage of this move to challenge the negative connotations associated with immigration and foreigners, while a Dawn candidate mentioned his experience in an attempt to boost the legitimacy of his own statements). Similarly, a KDU-ČSL candidate used expert opinion to back up his claim through legitimization. Though not always in a truthful manner, parties also often used evidentiality to support their claims (most often through figures). The use of disclaimers appears to be also rather prevalent, particularly “Apparent Concession” and “Apparent Denial.” Moreover, the strategy of “Apparent Sympathy” has been also used (by ANO, ČSSD and the Dawn movement most notably) and appears to me even more precarious, as it involves a claim that something is for immigrants' “own good”—the challenging of which requires greater self-confidence and knowledge compared to the challenging of more self-contradictory claims such as “We are not a racist, but... (Dawn),” “We are not opponents of immigration, but... (ODS),” “We do not criticize Islam as such, but... (KDU-ČSL), or “Not all Muslims are the same, but... (Dawn).” Finally, parties have also tended to use exceptional example to illustrate their position (despite the fact that it is not representative) and otherwise skew reality to the advantage of their position.

3.2.6 Language That Draws the Picture Complete

Finally, after covering some of the more extensive features of the immigration discourse (such as discourse topics), let's turn to the details that complete the picture—political actors' lexicalization, or choice of words (other than described so far). In my view, they are extremely important in complementing the main message, in coloring the connotation, conveying the atmosphere, etc.—not the least because a single word may at times convey more than an entire discussion.

Perhaps most noticeable and with a presence that successfully permeated the entire discourse is the use of lexicon related to flows of water. “Inflow,” “influx,” “flood,” “tide,” or “wave” all indicate that immigrants or refugees will “pour here in masses” or “flood” us. As Dijk calls these “stereotypical metaphors of ‘flow’ (words such as *waves*, *floods*, *streams*, and *tides*) [that] are routinely applied to asylum-seekers (emphasis in the original),”⁷⁹⁰ they seem to be very well established in other than Czech discourses as well. The *flood*, *tide* and *wave* metaphors—and more recently even tsunami⁷⁹¹—evoke “being overwhelmed” and thus have negative connotations. Moreover, as natural phenomena, they also convey a quality of inevitableness.⁷⁹²

The candidates also often communicated using language replete with indications of the need to defend ourselves. It implied we need to “defend” ourselves against “illegal” migration, “regulate” migration and “defend ourselves” against migrants, the “intruders of our cultural traditions” who “burden” societies. The risk that immigration will get out of control needs to be “neutralized *on time*.” Immigration was also referred to as a “great problem” and “punishment for colonies” and the potential cause of “social storms.”

Though ironically, the Green Party used the derogatory labels of “Arabush,” “dinks,” “negroes” and “half-Japanese,”⁷⁹³ which therefore also need to be considered as part of the discourse. The Dawn movement depicted immigrants as black sheep and those who “parasitize on our system.” By calling one group of people “decent” citizens, its representatives also implied that immigrants are not decent (resonating with the “unadaptable” label). Refugees were labelled as “miserable” and “desperate.” Finally, the tendency to frame immigration in a security discourse was completed by the ČSSD candidate's using the words “Muslims” and “Islamists” interchangeably (the Dawn movement referred to “religious fanatics”). They are those who “attack the non-Muslim world” and cause its “Islamization.” The modifiers for Islam also tended to be negative (such as “intolerant,” “dogmatic,” “unadaptable” religion that justifies violence and that will cause the “clash of cultures” that may result in the “clash of civilizations.”)

On the other hand, several parties' representatives used language that in my view was either neutral or had the effect of turning down the heated debate. ODS candidates, for example talked about “foreigners” rather than any other category, saying that they are “long-

790 Riggins, *The Language and Politics of Exclusion*. 47.

791 Though I did not come across this rather extreme metaphor in the course of the analysis, recently, it started to appear; in my view, it illustrates well how quickly a powerful metaphor may take root in a discourse.

“Čeká Nás Tsunami Uprchlíků?”

792 An insight offered to me by my mother, Ivana Ženatá, the natural scientist.

793 “Humorem Proti Nenávisti: Nesnáším Arabáče, Rákosníky a Negráče. Polojaponci Jsou v Pohodě.”

term *guests*” here. Similarly, ANO in its program did not talk about asylum-seekers but referred to “exiles.” Ukrainians were by the Dawn movement presented as “normal people who don't wish for anything unusual”⁷⁹⁴ and were (as well as migration from Ukraine) generally portrayed in neutral terms. The Green Party also talked about all members of the out-group as of “people” above all and thus avoided using labels with negative connotations in its program.⁷⁹⁵ Finally, one ČSSD representative intentionally avoided using the “(un)adaptable” label as an adjective and rather used it as a verb (“[those who] adapt to Czech laws”), despite the fact that his original tendency was to engage in the “(un)adaptable” rhetoric.

Though the negative labels are undoubtedly more visible—and arguably more powerful (resonating with people's fears and thus expediently forming a negative image of immigrants in people's minds), this does not mean the neutral or positive portrayals are not present in the discourse. They are, but importantly, their presence was not apparent upon my first engagement with the material and emerged from the texts only upon focused, systematic attention to the data in. In fact, I believe it is precisely this quality that makes them problematic—in discourse context where negatively-charged lexicon has become domesticated, more neutral representations get easily lost and emerge only upon second sight.

794 “Dnešní Projev Poslance Martina Lanka v Poslanecké Sněmovně K Situaci Na Ukrajině.”

795 “Program pro Eurovolby.”

4 Czech Immigration Discourse: Conclusions

4.1 Immigration Discourse Landscape: Points of Interest and Points of Intervention

4.1.1 Political Discourse on Immigration: Underlying Assumptions

Most political parties went to great lengths to declare their respect for “European values,” generally understood as the respect for human rights, the rule of law, democracy, tolerance; some actors even explicitly stated their opposition to nationalist tendencies, populism, racism, xenophobia, etc. In fact, only a few candidates expressed blatantly racist or xenophobic opinions—in this regard, the communication of Úsvit is the most notable, although even this party, which built its campaign entirely around xenophobic rhetoric, aimed to convince its audience that what they say is labelled as xenophobic only unfairly. This points to the likely existence of the norm that, as the leader of one party put it, “xenophob[ic] language should not appear in the [communication] [...] of a governmental party and, above all, a party that claims allegiance to European values.”⁷⁹⁶

However, the Czech political discourse is—nevertheless—permeated by language which may not necessarily appear overtly racist or xenophobic at first sight, but whose underlying assumptions tend to be ethnocentric at minimum. By “present[ing] immigration [...] as essentially problematic, if not threatening, while defining refugees, immigrants, or minorities as a main cause of many societal problems”—or, as it is the case in the Czech Republic, as a *potential* cause of many societal problems—politicians, according to van Dijk, “participate in more subtle forms of elite racism.”⁷⁹⁷ Their manifestations in discourse are neither necessarily always identical, nor starkingly frequent, yet they point to how political actors, when engaged in the representation of the “Others” do in fact tend to “[think] alike in startling ways.”⁷⁹⁸ The systematic and detailed exploration⁷⁹⁹ of a large portion of the political discourse in this thesis points to these individual manifestations (be they enshrined in an extensive argument or a single word) not being isolated, but rather forming a larger pattern revealing how political parties tend to conceive of the in-group in relation to the out-group. It may be concluded that in the context of the Czech discourse, the representations of the

796 “Pavel Bělobrádek: Xenofobní Výroky Od Poslanců ANO Mě Velmi Překvapily.”

797 Riggins, *The Language and Politics of Exclusion*. 31.

798 Wodak and Meyer, *Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis*. 8.

799 It was an approach that put the “stereotypical topics of difference, deviation, and threat, story structures, conversational features (such as [...] repairs in mentioning Others), semantic moves such as disclaimers (‘We have nothing against blacks, but...’, etc.), lexical description of Others, and [...] other discourse features” at the center of analysis. Schiffrin, Tannen, and Hamilton, *The Handbook of Discourse Analysis*. 361.

“Others” largely share ethnocentric, if not racist,⁸⁰⁰ assumptions. This is not to imply that all representatives or candidates of each political party share and reproduce this underlying outlook—many have notably displayed also opposing tendencies—but the tendency to some extent applies to most parties across the political spectrum.

Importantly, the tendency to reproduce the current social representations of “Others,” particularly their ethnocentric aspect, is not necessarily always intentional. Not only are opposing tendencies in portrayal detectable within a single party's communication, with xenophobia both challenged and advanced. It is also evident that certain actors aim to actively oppose the negative portrayal of “the Others” in an attempt to deescalate the issue of immigration—yet reproduce some aspect of the negative representation in the process or on another occasion. By way of example, one candidate, when asked about the fear of immigration and the “related issue” of the rise of radical movements' influence, responded by saying that “there is no need to scare [others] with migrants” because in the Czech Republic, there are only 4 % of foreigners, who are, “moreover, communities very '*compatible*' with the rest of the population (emphasis added).”⁸⁰¹ Despite the candidate's intention to decrease the urgency of the discussion, he implied that a certain group of immigrants is in fact, incompatible with our society, creating also an opposing effect. Similarly, the existence of certain xenophobic utterances, for example, does not necessarily cast doubt on the genuineness of the candidates' (or parties') commitment to their declared values of tolerance, etc. It may well be the effect of the underlying “ideology,” to use an expression used in the critical discourse analytical tradition—an unconscious manifestation of how we, generally, tend to think about the world. This is not by any means meant to indicate such unfortunate utterances do not have consequences; following the CDA conception of discourse, they do. They further reproduce the discourse as well as its underlying assumptions.

One of my aims in this thesis was to bring attention to these underlying assumptions as part of a larger effort to de-naturalize them; remove their “taken-for-granted” quality. Perhaps the communication to politicians of how these xenophobic, and at times even racist, attitudes are manifested in their everyday speech and how harmful their reproduction is, could contribute towards challenging this tendency. It is entirely possible that actors do not necessarily always intend to convey a meaning with such negative consequences to gain political points; it may well be the case that more often than we would appreciate it, “language speaks man” also for the worse, to put it in Heidegger's words—without them

800 “[I]ncluding antisemitism, xenophobia, and related forms of resentment against 'racially' or ethnically defined Others.”
Ibid. 362.

801 “Jan Zahradil.”

necessarily endorsing it. Demonstrating how some of these instances contribute to the reproduction of this outlook using concrete examples could lead towards politicians' greater awareness of them, which may be a first step towards transforming the discourse.

4.1.2 Discourse Manifested

The immigrant is in the studied political discourse presented in a variety of contexts. In most, however, he or she tends to be portrayed in negative light, as someone who presents a threat—to our social system, to our culture, values and, generally, way of living; to our security and peaceful social fabric. Though the majority of political actors refrained from explicitly politicizing immigration as a threat, this construction informs much of the discourse. Immigrants are depicted as presenting a threat to a variety of referent objects, yet only a few opted for blatantly racist remarks; most actors openly declared their disdain for xenophobia and racism. Yet the fact that these views, despite the actors' statements, in fact do inform much of the discourse is troubling—all the more that these “subtle, discursive means of representing and derogating Others” are more difficult to detect and as such more easily infiltrate the thinking of those who do not aim to do so.

Yet the discourse is not all about negative portrayals; neutral, as well as truly positive portrayals of the “Other” are present in the discourse. ANO made perhaps the most strong case for the benefits of immigration. However, though relatively numerous, they were all economic and thus not qualitatively different from other economic counterarguments (or portrayals to this effect), which dominated the discussion. This points to a larger issue: neutral, as well as positive portrayals are undoubtedly present in the parties' communication, yet they tend to be overshadowed by the emotionally more charged negative portrayals, which tend to be more visible. On the other hand, even the relatively neutral portrayal of immigrants as merely people who need our help advanced by the Green Party involves pitfalls: not only does this message tend to remove agency from immigrants, the portrayal of immigrants as people in need of our help leads to a thin line between the intended conclusion (“we are going to help”) as opposed to a rather counter-productive conclusion that such help will present a threat to our wallets. The notable use of some of these potentially problematic portrayals, labels, and other discourse features is summarized below.

4.1.3 Security and Crime

Immigration is not only constructed to present a threat to a variety of referent object, but is framed in security terms also in the traditional sense. It is generally linked to security

and the associated issue of crime. The fact that immigration tends to be understood—and also presented—as a matter of security is to large extent related to the “integrat[ion] [of] migration policy into an [EU] internal security framework, that is, a policy framework that defines and regulates security issues following the abolition of the internal border control”⁸⁰² in the Schengen Area. Huysmans identifies a variety of inter-connected developments at the EU level that indirectly contribute towards the “negative politicization of immigrants, asylum-seekers and refugees as an illegitimate presence and scapegoat,” such as the restrictive migration policy, the privileging of EU member states nationals in the internal market, or the idea of cultural homogeneity.⁸⁰³ The analysis pointed out an explicit link between the security context of immigration introduced in the course of the studied political campaign at the national level and the institutional integration of the migration policy into an internal security framework at the EU level. The security connotations of the immigration issue may therefore be, to a large extent, understood as a reflection of the pervasion of migration by security-related matters at the EU level and the more general conception of immigrants and refugees involved in this institutional framework. According to Huysmans, both these direct and indirect mechanisms make the inclusion of immigrants, asylum-seekers and refugees in European societies more difficult.⁸⁰⁴ Since this practice is so highly institutionalized at the EU level, it will arguably be rather difficult to challenge it. The relative role of securitizing practice and discourse at the EU level versus the national level with regard to the negative implications for the prevailing conception of immigration and asylum could be the object of further research.

Though other immigrant groups appear in the parties' communication, the group that is most discernible in the discourse are Muslims. It is also Muslims who are, as a group, most often linked to security-related matters, such as terrorism or the activities of radical religious fighters. Muslims are also object of the most apparent and undisguised negative stereotypes and racist prejudices, at times portrayed as “Islamists,” associated with the security threat allegedly presented by radical Islam. Although to challenge the security orientation of migration and related policies may be in the medium run impossible, as it permeates an entire cluster of mutually interconnected policies, the stereotypical representation of all Muslims as a security threat is not inevitable and appears more amenable to challenge—and change. Since Muslim refugees appear to inevitably become part of our society in the immediate future, it is essential that negative stereotypes related to the Muslim identity are dispersed if

802 Huysmans, “The European Union and the Securitization of Migration.” 770.

803 Ibid. 770.

804 Ibid. 753.

racial hatred, and its consequences, are to be avoided. Importantly, with the current negative portrayal of Muslims in the media, above all (to which the political representation undoubtedly contributed), media cannot be excluded from these efforts if they are to be successful.

Huysmans argues that “the negative rendering of migration at the European level further bolsters domestic political spectacles in which migration is often easily connected to security-related matters such as crime and riots in cities, domestic instability, transnational crime and welfare fraud.”⁸⁰⁵ Whether the connection of immigration with crime as a security-related matter is also related to institutional developments or not, it is undoubtedly present in the Czech political discourse. In fact, the Green Party also expressed its desire to counter the stigmatization involved; in one section of the Common European Manifesto, the authors asserted that “EU and its member states should *prevent the stigmatization of migrants and minorities* (emphasis added).”⁸⁰⁶ This proposal is noteworthy in that it is the only instance when the stigmatizing effect of the crime- and security- laden language on certain groups is reflected upon by the political actors themselves.

Criminal activities in particular tend to be heavily associated with immigration—with immigrants the perpetrators of crime (as when they “illegally” enter, stay, or work, or when the “criminal type of immigrants” engages in other criminal activities, such as drug-dealing, or even the abuse of the social system), as well as the “objects” (as when their illegal immigration is organized by “criminal groups and networks”). The designation of immigrants as “legal” vs “illegal” is also responsible for much criminalization of immigrants' conduct and their stigmatization as criminals.

The use of the term “illegal” to denote activity that has not taken place (such as in the case of migrants who have not approached the EU territory) is particularly problematic, as it charges immigrants with crimes that have not been committed, presupposing they are about to take place⁸⁰⁷ Moreover—and perhaps most importantly—such practice also necessarily implies the assumption these immigrants do not have, from the perspective of international law, legitimate reasons to seek protection (because according to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, refugees shall not be charged with offenses related to their illegal entry or stay⁸⁰⁸). This appears to be especially relevant to the tendency to present immigrants as not having legitimate reasons to come to the EU—present them as those who

805 Ibid. 770.

806 “Change Europe, Vote Green: The Green Common Manifesto.”

807 “Criminalisation of Migration in Europe: Human Rights Implications.”

808 “Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees.”

“just” want a better life.

The challenging of this label alone appears to be an immense task: not once during the entire campaign did any political actor use the word “irregular” instead of “illegal” to describe immigration. With “irregular” migration used merely by the NGO sector, it appears that the challenging of the use of “illegal” immigration presents a challenge—as well as significant potential.

4.1.4 Misuse of the Social System: Developments

In an analysis of the topic of international migration in the programs of Czech political parties before the election to the Chamber of Deputies in October 2013, Čaněk concluded that the “topic of the 'misuse' of the social or health system by immigrants [was] not very politically significant.”⁸⁰⁹ He maintained that it was rather the poor, the “unadaptables,” the Roma, the unemployed and the homeless who were portrayed as taking advantage of the Czech social system.⁸¹⁰ It may be concluded that half a year later, on the occasion of the EP election, there was a clear tendency of—even the major—political parties to present immigrants as those who may “misuse our social benefits.” Though not all parties labelled immigrants as outright “social tourists,” many have indicated the need to differentiate between those who are going to be “dependent on our social system” and those who won't—a more desirable category. The fact that political representatives from KDU-ČSL, ODS, KSČM, ČSSD and the Dawn of Direct Democracy—half of all political parties studied as “relevant”—portrayed immigrants as likely, possibly, or in under certain circumstances taking advantage of or abusing our generous social system points to the fact the issue has quickly become a significant feature of the Czech political discourse on immigration.

The repercussions are potentially vast. The shift in the portrayal of immigrants as presenting a de facto threat to the Czech social system points to a rather swift politicization of another dimension of the economy as endangered by immigrants. Even if citizens resisted other arguments against immigration, through this portrayal, political actors offer them another reason for opposing—or even *fearing*—immigration. Czech citizens' sensitivity towards economic matters may have been arguably increased by the prolonged economic downturn in the past years, as well as their experience with the 2010-2013 government of “budgetary responsibility” that introduced numerous austerity measures. The combination of

809 Čaněk, “Od Vstřícné Důslednosti K Nepřizpůsobivým Imigrantům? Analýza Tématu Mezinárodní Migrace v Programech Politických Stran Před Volbami Do Poslanecké Sněmovny.”

810 Ibid.

these circumstances may have arguably made this argumentation resonate more among the electorate.

This tendency may be understood as part of a larger political strategy of presenting immigrants as, above all, economic immigrants, a category originally created for the purpose of denoting a certain group of immigrants as “fake” refugees as opposed to refugees with legitimate reasons to leave their country and seek protection elsewhere.⁸¹¹ Though the categorization of “economic immigrants” vs “refugees” has been since 1985, when it was coined in Europe,⁸¹² institutionalized to the point that it is reflected even in the institutional and legal framework at the EU level (where further categorization of economic immigrants is under way and the consolidation of the “highly qualified workers” category necessarily creates a category of workers who are not highly qualified and therefore less desirable), its roots allow us to get valuable insights into the politics of the emergence of this label.

Whereas originally, the entire “economic refugees/immigrants” category was created to denote “bogus” refugees, in the Czech political discourse of today, it appears that it is the portrayal of immigrants as “exploiters” of the Czech social system that serves this purpose. This is likely the result of two factors: on one hand, the politicians' aspiration to typecast immigrants as presenting an obstacle to our economic well-being in order to strike political points and, on the other hand, the fact that such portrayal of *all* economic immigrants is in the current—particularly legal—environment unsustainable.

However, the line between economic immigrants who are welcome and those who “abuse our social system” is thin, as the politicians themselves demonstrate. In fact, the tendency to conflate both into the latter category has been present, as can be best illustrated on the program of KSČM which declared the need to differentiate between “refugees” and “social tourists,” leaving no option for a third category of economic immigrants who could be welcome. In fact, the parties' stress on what should be avoided (the abuse of our social system by immigrants) is very powerful a portrayal of the “Others.” The construction of a threat—the idea that immigrants could take something away from us—thus has the tendency to dominate the overall portrayal of economic immigrants. As such, it also likely has negative consequences for the portrayal of all immigrants, making the argument that the arrival of immigrants may be in fact economically beneficial, less viable. Through portraying immigrants as an economic drain, political actors contribute towards not only misinformation, but also towards the spreading of fear. It is currently at the discretion of the

811 Riggins, *The Language and Politics of Exclusion*. 44-45.

812 Ibid. 44-45.

Czech government whom it is going to accept as an economic immigrant and whom not; that it will let “social tourists” come is thus highly unlikely.⁸¹³ Yet the political actors present this as a very real option, something we should guard against, unnecessarily putting this issue on the agenda and spreading fears of the adverse repercussions the arrival of “economic vacuum cleaners,” as one ODS candidate put it, may bring. One of the consequences of inaccurately portraying the situation and provoking fear is a decreased likelihood that the issue of immigration—particularly its economic aspect—could be discussed rationally and on its own merits.

4.1.5 Asylum-Seekers and Refugees

The category of asylum-seekers or refugees is generally recognized by political parties, as may be inferred from the existence of refugees as a category of immigrants (although at times it is merely implied by a reference to “refugees” or “asylum-seekers.”) Its prominence in the discourse, however, is not very large, as the topic is largely overshadowed by the parties' stress on other aspects and shapes of migration, especially economic immigration, the drawbacks of immigration, etc. In the course of the campaign, some parties did not even bring up the existence of this group—not even implicitly—necessarily contributing towards the sidelining of the issue relative to the rest of migration. This was the case with ODS that differentiated only between legal and illegal immigration and the Party of Free Citizens that distinguished merely between the various causes of migration. Other parties did indicate their recognition of the difference, but were nevertheless relatively uninterested in justifying its existence or asserting, for example, that it is this lens which should be employed with regard to immigrants.

Only two parties engaged in justifying the existence of the institution of international protection by referring to our historical experience (ČSSD and ANO 2011). Though this justification appears to be very compelling and potent, it is generally not as widely invoked as it could be expected. The Green Party did appeal to our responsibility to the rest of the world in this regard, but no other party or candidate made the case for asylum explicitly and directly on the ground of values or certain portrayal of the in-group (such as the argument that we should live up to our values, or live up to our reputation, etc.). Though the value of solidarity was more noticeable in the context of the EU with regard to the redistribution of immigrants/asylum-seekers, it was not employed in the argumentation with regard to asylum-seekers directly. Although this tone is present in the Czech Green Party's political program (it

813 Honusková, “Právní Pohled Na Otázky Migrace a Uprchlíctví - Podklad pro Současnou Debatu.”

makes the case for the need to help people in need), it is perhaps the most distinguishable in the Greens' Common European Manifesto where an argument for resettlement of refugees was made on the basis of the global need for it. The Pirate Party presented the issue primarily as a matter of our international law obligations fulfillment, yet no party made the argument that it is the matter of our international reputation, for example.

Though three parties brought up the need to respect human rights in the context of asylum policy (the Green, the Pirate and the Communist Parties), no political actor made the case explicitly and forcefully that asylum policy is a matter of human rights above all, contributing to the blurriness of boundaries and conceptual ambiguity surrounding the various words used to describe immigrants, refugees and asylum-seekers and the differences among them. Though in the case of the Green party, the aim appears to have been to make the case that all immigrants are primarily *people* in need of our help, given the Czech discourse context, this approach appears to also facilitate the understanding of all immigrants as above all economic immigrants—possibly contributing towards undermining the legitimacy of asylum-seekers' claims. Moreover, such framing also raises the need to pay attention to how immigrants' and asylum-seeker's agency is portrayed.

4.1.6 “Unadaptable” Immigrants

Another notable feature of the immigration discourse appears to be the use of the label “unadaptable” to describe immigrants. This label is generally used in the Czech public discourse to describe citizens who do not live “properly” and by the rules of the “decent citizens” (which is most often equated with the—ethnic Czech—majority). It may be thought of as a euphemism to denote, most often, the Roma population, which is often portrayed as a disorderly minority. The tendency to use this label to describe immigrants serves as a cognitive shortcut; the negative characteristics which define the “unadaptable citizens” label are easily transferred to “unadaptable immigrants.”

The use of this label to describe immigrants is not a new phenomenon. In the previous campaign on the occasion of the election to the Chamber of Deputies, Čaněk argues, “the [Dawn of Direct Democracy] tr[ied] to do it the most loudly.”⁸¹⁴ Though he said the Dawn movement did it the most loudly, he did not mention any other actor who would also advance this description. On the occasion of the 2014 EP election, it was not only the Dawn representatives (who used it also for their flyers, etc.), but also KDU-ČSL that took over this

814 Čaněk, “Od Vstřícné Důslednosti K Nepřizpůsobivým Imigrantům? Analýza Tématu Mezinárodní Migrace v Programech Politických Stran Před Volbami Do Poslanecké Sněmovny.”

rhetoric. Moreover, an ODS candidate also made the link between immigration and “unadaptable citizens” in the course of the campaign. The increased use of this label shows that in a short period of time, it took root in the political discourse, with other political actors besides the Dawn representatives having found a use for it.

This development raises questions about the fluidity of discourse. Although discourses are to some extent sedimented and therefore resistant to abrupt changes (with the degree of their “stickiness” largely contested—and likely varied), this development points to the possibility that the discourse landscape may transform somewhat if a feature that has the potential to resonate appears. To understand these changes, it is important to approach the discourse as a whole; perceive each element *through* the discursive context in which it is situated.

This discursive development should thus be understood through the conditions that allowed it to resonate; the overall tendency to delegitimize the stay of immigrants (such as the tendency to stress the economic aspect of migration, the various links to the misuse of the social system), as well as the construction of immigrants as intruders of our cultural space combined with the perceived imperative to integrate may be considered as having facilitated this particular development. It is with this in mind that the main features of the Czech political discourse on immigration—and what it suggests about the larger social world—should be viewed.

4.2 Proposals for Further Research

Although the analysis of political discourse may be thought as providing a good estimate of the overall immigration discourse (it is assumed to reflect the wider discourse to some extent), it cannot be said to provide a complete picture of the overall immigration discourse, which likely differs somewhat. Numerous other actors influence the overall immigration discourse in the Czech Republic: the media, other prominent political and public figures, civil society, etc. In fact, even in the studied communication, it was clear that media representatives play a very important role in setting the topics, tone, introducing discursive links in asking certain questions, etc.

This analysis could therefore be considered as an input in the study of the overall immigration discourse in the Czech Republic. In this regard, a study of its other aspects and how they relate to one another may be beneficial for our understanding of the discourse dynamics. Greater insight into the other components of immigration discourse would not only allow us to understand how they differ; it could also further our understanding of how the

various actors influence the overall discourse. It could, for example, also shed more light on the dynamics of inflammatory speech with regard to immigration, and thus inform action that could address it more effectively.

An understanding of how these dynamics develop in time could also be beneficial. In his analysis of Czech political parties' stance on international migration before the election to the Chamber of Deputies in October 2013, Čaněk suggested that it is non-parliamentary political parties which attempt to *shift* the political discourse on immigration.⁸¹⁵ Though in campaign to the EP, the issue appeared overall more politicized across the entire political spectrum than Čaněk's analysis suggests was the case in the previous election to the Chamber of Deputies, my observations tend to confirm Čaněk's suggestion that it is primarily smaller, non-parliamentary parties that politicize the issue of immigration the most. The tendency of smaller parties to bring attention to immigration was much more pronounced than it is the case with parliamentary parties with higher chances of political success—this is particularly evident in the Czech TV pre-election “superdebate.”⁸¹⁶ It was the representatives of the Dawn movement and both of the parties that were not included in this analysis, the Common Sense Party and the Public Affairs party who referred to immigration on many occasions—as opposed to most of the other political parties that, generally, avoided the topic.⁸¹⁷ Although both of the parties not included in the analysis warned against “illegal” immigration, it was the representative of the former party in particular that repeatedly made statements on curbing immigration, especially in relation to unemployment and the “creeping Islamization” of Europe.^{818 819} This analysis provides an insight into how the most relevant parties in the Czech Republic have handled the issue of immigration and could thus serve to inform political science research on the use of the issue of immigration across the political spectrum.

To what extent such utterances of these relatively marginal parties influenced the overall immigration discourse to have a lasting effect would be interesting to know also from the perspective of an open, democratic exchange—will such statements become marginal in the context of the larger discourse and eventually forgotten? Or will they become “useful metaphors,”⁸²⁰ to use Rorty's expression, for other actors; take root in the discourse and shape it with a lasting effect? Comparative analyses may provide insights into how immigration discourse develops over time and also shed some light on the ever-present question regarding

815 Ibid.

816 “Evropské Volby 2014,” May 22, 2014.

817 “Evropské Volby 2014,” April 30, 2014.

818 “Evropské Volby 2014,” May 22, 2014.

819 “Radiožurnál - Stalo Se Dnes (06.05.2014 21.”

820 Rorty, *Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity*.

discourse fluidity and social change.

There are numerous tendencies in the Czech political discourse on immigration that make the overall discourse inconducive to the rational discussion of immigration. Not only are the parties themselves rarely equipped with a strong expertise in the topic, they also tend to engage in a variety of negative other-portrayals that make it less likely that the issue is going to be rationally discussed—surrounding the issue of immigration with security connotations, crime, economic uncertainty, the fear of the “Others” which tend to be depicted as intruders of our cultural space that pose a challenge to our cultural identity and values, etc. Both of these aspects point to the potential existence of a democratic deficit in this policy area. Not introducing their political stance on immigration policy or introducing too simplified a version prevents voters from taking this stance in account when choosing a political party, disrupting the representative democratic link. Moreover, the atmosphere of uncertainty and fear surrounding the issue makes it less likely that it is going to be discussed on its own merits, further presenting obstacles to the democratic foundations of decision-making based on the open clash of arguments.

This analysis thus points out how certain discourse may contribute towards the democratic deficit. If it is present in the democratic politics at the national level, it appears to be highly likely that it is going to be reproduced in decision- and policy-making at the EU level. This is particularly the case with issues such as immigration that are largely decided on an inter-governmental basis, without any significant input of the European Parliament that could potentially offset the democratic deficit. However, so long as citizens have to choose among political candidates to the EP largely without being informed their position on these issues, the democratic deficit cannot be addressed even through the input of the European Parliament.

The study of how discourses—and particularly the immigration discourse in the Czech Republic, but also in the EU polis, for example—contribute towards the existence of the democratic deficit at both the national and the EU levels thus appears to be another potentially fruitful direction for further research. Similarly, conceiving of discourse as a (likely limiting) factor in various kinds of endeavors, it might also be insightful to consider its role in the interest-formation as a basis for action of a variety of actors involved in immigration and asylum.

Similarly, the study of political discourse on immigration could be useful in the study of European integration, particularly in the policy area of immigration and asylum. Its understanding could serve as a litmus paper. For example, the revision of the Dublin system

stipulating the EU member state responsible for assessing asylum-seekers' application for international protection is inevitable, as the current system is, according to many, neither fair to countries which tend to receive the most first applications for asylum and are, according to the system in place, responsible for their examination, nor fair to asylum-seekers in terms of respecting their rights, as the non-governmental sector warns above all. One of the aspects that will inevitably need addressing is thus the matter of enhanced intra-EU solidarity⁸²¹ as a basis for the increased sharing of responsibility among EU member states, potentially involving the much discussed relocation system of mandatory quotas.⁸²² An understanding of the political discourse on immigration in EU member states could provide an insight into the political actors' (and therefore also governments') preparedness to adopt measures of this character and, more generally, provide indications regarding the direction of further European integration in immigration and asylum policy.

The study of immigration discourse also necessarily includes reflections of the social representations of “us” and “them.” Involving an aspect of identity, the study of discourse could also allow for a productive intersection with research on identity, frontiers, and, possibly, also European integration. In the context of immigration discourse, it is the boundaries of the EU that appear to be the most important ones, which is, more likely than not, the result of the abolition of internal border controls. The shifting of boundaries that have importance to us, from national to the frontiers of the EU/Schengen Area, appears to have a parallel in our understanding of what constitutes the in-group. This tendency can be clearly illustrated on the campaign of TOP 09 that argued that “We are Europeans [not them].” In fact, no studied party, even those that assert a “healthy national self-confidence” (proclaimed, interestingly, also by TOP 09) or argue for a confident Czech nation (the Dawn movement), would contest the idea that Czechs are also Europeans. In the broad spectrum of potential identity-related topics, the study of the Europeanization of identity (as related to migration and asylum policy) could be another fruitful direction for research.

821 “An EU Agenda for Better Responsibility-Sharing and More Mutual Trust.”

822 “Communication from the Commission: A European Agenda on Migration.” 4.

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